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Introduction  
 
”Basing societies around plural self-governing communities of choice would enable individuals to 
exercise  the option of doing things differently, but also offer the constraint of exit over exercise 
community regulation, since such obligations would be voluntary. Greater community self-control 
would tend to reduce inter-community friction, because individuals would not feel threatened that they 
would be the subject of legislation in matters of morals and lifestyles by artificial political majorities”1 
 
Background 
 
 
These “artificial political majorities”, as Paul Hirst has phrased it, leads to a  kind of oppression, in 
which ”democratic process” becomes its legitimatory ground. Because of merely passing through the 
carousel of “democratic process”, suddenly it would justify the oppressive nature of governance in, 
which law is being employed as at tool to oppress the minority who lost in the “Democratic Carousel”.      
 In the words of Carl Schmitt, “Whoever control 51 percent would be permitted to use legal means to 
close the door to legality, though which they themselves entered, and to treat partisan opponents like 
common criminals, who are then perhaps reduced to kicking their boots.”2 Because “The majority is 
now suddenly no longer a party; it is the state itself. In the state, as Otto Mayer once said, “that which 
is without limits breaks through” the norms, in which the legislative state and statutory application 
bind themselves, however narrow and limited these  
sets of norms may be.“3 
This control of political power enables the majority to employ law as an instrument to exert their 
power. “The claim to legality renders every rebellion and countermeasure an injustice and a legal 
violation or “illegality.” If legality and illegality can be arbitrarily at the disposal of the majority, then 
the majority can, above all, declare their domestic competitors illegal, that is, hors-la-loi, thereby 
excluding them from the democratic homogeneity of the people.“ So the question, which arises with 
our regular “nation-state law” is, to which extent will our system accommodate the diversive values 
which resides within  political entity?  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Paul Hirst, Statism, Pluralism and Control,Brit. J. Criminol. (2000) 40, 279-295  
2 Carl Schmitt, Legality and Legitimacy p.37 
3 Idem 
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In the past century we have witnessed  many legislative processes, in which majority in the parliament 
exploited the democratic process to get control on the legislative force. They pushed through many 
legislative acts through the parliament, many times, even criminalizing the minority or the actions of 
minority. 
  Female circumcision is a clear example to illustrate this phenomenon. Without attaching any moral 
value about the content of this practice, at a certain moment a public opinion is created, out of a  
sudden, based on one or two cases that is being scrutinized in mass media. And female circumcision is 
banned. Not only is it banned, it is also being criminalized.  
 In the same token, but slightly different, is the  desire to ban male circumcision. It was quite 
surprising to witness a commercial of the Physician’s association who draw the attention on the danger 
of male circumcision to health, which was the result of many discussion that were going on, in the 
mass media to ban male circumcision. Strangely enough, male circumcision belongs to the profession 
of Plastic surgery, and the whole branch as such is not being criminalized, but just one practice that 
belongs to, a minority within this society.  Triggering the public opinion, is one of the tools to attain 
the majority in the parliament and to attain the legislative power, to oppress the minority, in their 
actions, dealings, life and customs.  
 Carl Schmitt’s above quoted phrase, is a direct challenge against this phenomenon of the so-called, 
legal instrumentalism, the abuse of legal tools by majority, to press their will through the whole of 
(political) society, amongst others. There are also other ways  in which legal instrumentalism can be 
employed, namely ”social engineering projects”, like in Turkey and Afghanistan in 1923, where 
certain or a whole legal systems has been implemented, with the aim of modernizing the, 
predominantly, traditional Muslim population.  
 Carl Schmitt attack is clearly aimed at Hans Kelsen’s dictum of “Herschaft der Mehrheit” (majority 
rule), which advocates that in order to maintain a great amount of freedom, “Herschaft der Mehrheit” 
is the best option among the worst. The fact that the majority will rule and oppress the minority, is 
perceived as a minor collateral damage. Because according to Kelsen, the minority would have a 
chance in this system to gain the majority in the parliament and undue all the ‘harm’ that is being done 
to them. 
 However, as Tamanha depicted, “Common to these ideas is that they encourage participants to pursue 
only their individual or groups agendas. They involve a process of competitive combat, they invest 
faith in the capacity of the process to select or produce the correct outcome, they draw upon metaphors 
to discredit  interference with the “natural” working of the process as improper meddling that 
generates distortions, and they assert that winning is verification of right or entitlement. The visitors or 
survivors  or products of these processes, by having gone or common good. 
 The losers don’t see it that way. They complain that the process unfairly rewards those with greater 
resources, that the system has a built-in tilt against them, that the decisionmakers are biased or corrupt, 
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that competition or combat is not a proper way to decide what is right, and that the winner are the most 
rapacious or unscrupulous rather than the mot deserving. But these complaints have  little traction.”4 
The attention that I want to draw on is not so much, which political system would attain more freedom 
or more equality (Carl Schmitt argues; Equality and Freedom do not match), but to attack the process 
in which law is being endorsed as an instrument to attain a certain goal to a certain group or people. 
This requires a totally new approach to law and governance, whereby attention would be paid on 
“particularity” instead of “universality”.5  
  
 
Research Object 
In order not loose track in my thesis in exploring an alternative from of law and governance, I will try 
to follow strictly the research following research question: “How can legal pluralism liberate citizens 
from oppressive value systems imposed by the state?” 
 
 
Object of Study 
Legal Pluralism is a theory that is developed by social scientists based on their empirical experience 
on the ground about the existence of diversive legal system or legal normative frameworks. Gradually 
on this theory developed further into a kind stand off against the existent dominant concept of nation-
state law, as the sole generator of legal norms. Nevertheless, their attempt is ill-faded because of its 
analytical lacuna. 
 This is why I will embark first of all with analysing this concept of legal pluralism, and develop it in 
such a way that it can be employed for political ends as well. The aim is to achieve  a concept of Legal 
Pluralism, which is comprehensive enough so it can include both legal norms as well as the 
institutional-organizational framework which accommodates it. Moreover, while identifying diversive 
legal systems, I will argue than one has to take the social unit into account, since law is embedded in 
the whole overarching institutional-organizational framework of the social unit. .  
 But before I embark on this exploration I will first try to give a brief historical survey, in order to 
comprehend the nature of Legal. I will further continue emphasising on the conceptional dispute 
between John Griffithh, who has constructed the concept of Legal Pluralism, and Brian Tamanaha, 
who attacks this concept on analytical grounds. Departing from this dispute, I will develop my 
conception of Legal Pluralism that is comprehensive and broad enough to be applied in my thesis to 
solve my research question. Since Legal Pluralism as a concept is linked to the modern concept of law, 
I want to emphasise on the organizational -institutional framework, in which different legal 
                                                 
4 Brian Tamanaha, How the Instrumental View of Law Corrodes the Rule of Law, 56 DePaul L. Rev. 469 2006-
2007 
5 “There is therefore but one categorical imperative, namely this: Act only on that maxim whereby thou canst at 
the same time will that it should become a universal law.”  P.38—p.46 Kant  
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system/norm can originate from. This is essential to my research since I want to explore how legal 
pluralism, as an autonomous body, can accommodate value systems. For this purposes I will employ 
Eugen Ehrlcih’s  account of  Living Law, where he addresses the importance of autonomous 
organizational structures like community or association has legal and/or norm generating structures. 
 In the next chapter I will dwell more on this organizational structure of community and associations 
and I will apply the rather new scholarship of “community and law” approach to explain how 
community can generate and enforce legal norms. For this purposes I will emphasis on three elements 
within this field, namely, trust, values and Alternative Dispute Resolution. 
 For the sake of clarity I will apply Tönnies dichotomy of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, in order to 
explain the difference between the modern concept of law and that of “community and law” approach. 
This is not give an exhaustive theory of how “community and law”, but just to give a clue on what it 
entails. Only in this way we would get a glimpse in the difference and the function of community as a 
legal-norm generating organization. By using Tönnies typology I want to locate the locus of law 
within community. By juxtaposing these three elements, namely, Trust, Values and Alternative 
Dispute Resolution, to Logic, Rules and Judication, I will try to sort out the different perspectives of 
the locus of law, between community and nation-state.  
Consequently, I will try to illuminate this theory, by illustrating how the diamond industry has 
maintained its own legal system for so many years (centuries), parallel to the state legal system. I will 
argue that reputation-trust in the diamond industry, their peculiar Value system and the function of 
Diamond Dealers Club as the arbiter, which employs ADR,  has been essential in this process.  
 In my fourth chapter I will dedicate on the main criticism from the liberal point of view on 
“community and  Law” approach. Namely that individuality is being discarded in this approach, since 
communities will only emphasise on group achievements and not on individual’s accomplishment and 
ambitions. I will refute this claim by posing two arguments. The first one comes from within the 
liberal philosophy, namely I will argue that the Harm-principle of John Stuart mill would be enough 
safeguard to protect citizens. Although, this concept can give an absolute protection to individuals, 
since  no theory can, it will give the maximum amount of safeguard to protect individuals. 
 On the other hand, I will argue from an associationalists point of view, and claim that associationalist 
do emphasise on the importance of the “individual within the community and association. But since 
they consider an individual as a ‘social animal’”, who can only achieve his goal through collaboration 
with others, existence within a community is perceived as an prerequisite to pursue their individual 
goals.  
In the next following two chapters, I will use Afghanistan as an example and try to apply whatever I 
have analysed up till now. First I will try to argue that the so-called legal and political lacuna, which 
exists in Afghanistan is to great extent the result of the failure of adopting constitutions, which would 
pave the way for a modern concept of state. All seven constitution, which were adopted, have failed.  
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 In the last chapter, I will further argue that since idealistic perceptions underlies the adoption of seven 
failed constitutions,  we should pay emphasise on  the fragmented society of Afghanistan.  I will argue 
that  by adopting Althusius’ theory of social-federalism, we would  be able to draw Afghanistan’s  
reality of tribal and communal fragmented society into a political framework.  My main argument is 
that Althusius’ concept of “popular sovereignty”, which attaches sovereignty (political power) in the 
social units, allows social units, like tribes, clans and communities to have political significance. By 
integrating these social units within the political system, instead of centralizing political power in one 
government, stability can be attained in Afghanistan. 
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Chapter 1  The Concept of Legal Pluralism 
1.1 Introduction 
 
1.1.1  Law and Legal Pluralism 
What Law “is” or what law “ought to be”, has kept the legal minds of many scholars, philosophers and 
theorists, busy for centuries from any range of scientific field.6 Whether they derive from philosophy, 
religion, sociology or anthropology, everyone has contributed and troubled one’s head about what law 
should actually entail and how it can or will effect our society.7  This development of the concept of 
law went parallel with other scholarly achievements that marked our intellectual history, like the 
Renaissance and Scholastic era, Humanism and Enlightenment, Modernity and Post-Modernity, they 
have all put their stamps on the question about what Law ”is” or what law  “ought to be”. 
 However, the call for a more pragmatic approach to law, stripped from all fancy, formalistic 
scientific, formula and concepts, has been looming up in the past century and is absorbed by the 
society in their public debates. This culmination is the result of both scholarly achievements of the 
past decades, in exposing the pragmatic of law, as well as the vast demographical change that has 
swayed around the world. 
 Between all this, Legal Pluralism as a concept has appeared as a counterforce against the dominant 
notion of law, which is characterized by formalism and rationality. Legal Pluralism as a concept is 
being instigated as a “weapon”  to break through the fence, which modern concept of law convulsively  
tries to defend.  In contrary to the monistic approach of the current modern concept of law, Legal 
Pluralism asserts that not one but a variety of legal systems can be  applied and exist in a certain 
political territory. 
 
1.1.2 Problem statement 
Given that my research question is about  “How legal pluralism can liberate citizens from oppressive 
value systems imposed by the state”, I want to dedicate this chapter on analysing, exploring and 
constructing  a concept of Legal Pluralism that is in pace with current needs. Moreover, I want to get 
to a more comprehensive concept of Legal Pluralism, whereby the emphasise will be laid on the 
organizational/institutional framework, which will generate and enforce legal-normative rules. More in 
particular, I want to develop a concept of legal pluralism which conceives law in a broader 
perspectives, taking the social unit, like community or associations, as its guiding line.  
 
                                                 
6  See, Roger Cotterrell,  The Politics of Jurisprudence, 2nd edition, Lexus Nexus 1996, for a comprehensive 
analysis of Common Law Legal Philosophy  (Jurisprudence); H.L.A. Hart, The concept of Law; 
7  Hans Blumenberg, die Legimität der Neuzeit; Gerald F. Gaus and Chandran Kukathas (edited by),  Hanbook of 
Political Theory, Sage Publications 2004 
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This is why the first question I want to tackle is, as Chiba has asserted, ”…the scientific validity of the 
inquiry into legal pluralism, for it is a basic requisite of scientific inquiry to formulate the operational 
definition of its objective in order both to delineate its extension distinctly and to analyse its intension 
clearly.”8  
  
1.1.3 Outline 
 
This explains why I want to elaborate briefly, on the conceptional background of Legal Pluralism, in 
order to demarcate the scope and purpose scientific inquiry into Legal Pluralism. I want to stress on 
the “dual conceptional problem”, which not only denotes the fact that Legal Pluralism is a concept in 
its infancy, but at the same time, as being an anomaly against another concept namely, the concept of 
“Law”.  
 Subsequently, I will indulge on the conceptual and analytical twist between John Griffths and Brian 
Tamanaha. The main argument in this debate, concentrates on the so-called “the Malinowski 
problem”, which brings us back to the main legal philosophical question as explained above. What is 
Law?  “Malinowski Problem” deals with the dilemma that if we would conceive every human social 
action as law, than were do we set the boundary between that what constitutes  law and that what is 
just normal social behaviour? 
My main argument against the so called “Malinowski Problem”, is the scientification of law. What we 
tend to call law, nowadays is just, bluntly put, a mere logically framed tool for central governance. I 
will outline my arguments further by bringing up the so called ”Logical, Formal, Reasonable” theory 
of  Max Weber, amongst others, and claim that this “logicalization” of law has put a kind of aureole of 
exclusivity around the modern concept of law. This explains why, whenever a scholar points at the 
social nature of law, his argument or theory is easily being discarded as “not law”, by legal scientists 
or theorists. One of the most prominent Legal Theorist, in this respect  is Hans Kelsen, who has tried 
to settle for once and for all  the exclusivity of “Logical”, “normative “, characteristics of law, by 
asserting that ”ought” (prescriptive) and “is” (descriptive)  are and should be separated. 
 Instead, I want to claim that “is” and “ought” are not separable, but in the contrary, intertwined and 
interdependent. Social rules nurture Legal rules (Law), because they belong to the social environment 
with its inner dynamics. Moreover, I will eventually claim that it is the comprehensive nature of 
association/community, in which we can trace law as part of this social unit.  
 For this reasons, I will propose to utilise Eugen Ehlich’s notion of “Living Law” instead of Sally Falk 
Moore’s ) “Semi-Autonomous Social Field”,  which I will explain in the next paragraph. My assertion 
                                                 
8 Masaji Chiba, ’Other Phases of Legal Pluralism’, in ‘the Contemporary World’, Ratio Juris. Vol. 11 No. 3 
September 1998 (228–45), p.2   
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is that Eugen Ehrlich’s account of law is more suitable to underlie the comprehensive concept of Legal 
Pluralism, since it does not only concentrate on norms but embraces also all tenets of law which 
partakes in the law generating activity. More in particular, Ehrlich addresses clearly the importance of 
associations and communities in law-creating and law-abiding activities, in his theory.  
 
1.1.4 Background 
 
The Archbishop of Canterbury unleashed a fierce public debate about whether or not Sharia, should be 
accepted alongside with the English law. While advocating for Legal Pluralism, paying attention on 
Sharia Law in particular, caused for a wide upheaval/disturbance in society which was reflected in 
public debates. The striking point was not so much the fact that the archbishop was advocating for 
Legal Pluralism, since the English were already acquainted with the excessive use of Arbitration Act 
by alternative legal systems, notably by Jewish Law. Instead the turmoil was focused on the clash 
between certain values, namely that of enlightened values and Islamic values, which are both being 
represented by Common Law System and the Sharia Law.   
 In his speech, the Archbishop touched upon a core issue in the development of law, which cannot be 
avoided, and that is the indisputable link between values and the legal consciousness of that particular 
community. As he stressed “…there is a risk of assuming that 'mainstream' jurisprudence should 
routinely and unquestioningly bypass the variety of ways in which actions are as a matter of fact 
understood by agents in the light of the diverse sorts of communal belonging they are involved in.  If 
that is the assumption, 'the appropriate temporal unit for analysis tends to be the basic action. Instead 
of concentrating on the history of the individual or the origins of the social practice which provides the 
context within which the act is performed, conduct tends to be studied as an isolated and one-off act' 
(139-40).”9 
 Moreover, the focal point of identifying  legal-normative systems has been transformed from 
normative systems, to tracing a more private-communal regulatory system, which is more 
comprehensive and contain other elements that can influence the legal-norm making effect.  
 In order to depict this change of identifying the locus of norm generating factor, Prakah Shah has 
dedicated a whole book on how Legal Pluralism is being employed in United Kingdom outside the 
official channels. He asserts that, “In the British scene, therefore, (…)we have an uneasy coexistence 
of at least two models of legal regulation. One of the positivist modernist, top-down model of state 
regulation, with a territorial emphasis, either throughout the country or in its subdivisions. On the 
                                                 
9  Archbishop of Canterbury, http://www.archbishopofcanterbury.org/1575. It is noteworthy to mention the 
longstanding tradition, which Archbishops of Cantburry had with associationlsim and self-regulatory goverannce 
of autonomous communities. See Figgis, Curches in the Modern State, 1973; and Laski Harold Laski, Studies in 
the Problem of Sovereignty, 1917. 
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other hand, we have a series of cultural communities which overlap territorially and residentially, with 
their varying values effectively forming zones of self-regulation”10 
 He further asserts that this condition/circumstances will eventually lead to  “…a conflict of values and 
principles between the state and the self regulatory orders of ethnic minorities, leading to different 
sorts of ‘deviant’ behaviours, both within the state and among the minority communities.”11  
  In a way, we have to depart from a normative centred approach to law, and Legal Pluralism, and 
embrace a more comprehensive approach, which can explain us the flow of these trends that takes 
place around the world and in Europe. We need a different approach to law that has its basis in social 
complexities and which can explain us how law is being framed within this complexities.  
 
1.2 Legal Pluralism and the “The Malinowski Problem” 
 
1.2.1 The Concept of Legal Pluralism 
 
In the past few decades many definitions and concepts of  Legal Pluralism has passed the revue and 
non of them had really encapsulated the totality of what Legal Pluralism actually entails. Moreover, 
they all have enlightened just one aspect of legal pluralism and were more a descriptive definition than 
a concept. What I will try to analyse and develop in this chapter is a concept of Legal Pluralism, which 
can easily be applied to a broader framework. There is namely a need for a more theoretical well-
defined concept of Legal Pluralism in which certain empirical data can be collected, processed and 
theorized. Otherwise, all the empirical data will only remain loosely, distorted collected data without 
any scientific or scholarly value. Data’s which are collected from empirical work, should be in turn be 
able to be employed for a legal -or political-theoretical research.  
  Like many other concepts, Legal Pluralism is first of all a tool to capture a specific part of a reality, 
in order to get charge over it. A concept therefore works like a vernacular, which will bring a certain 
part of view closer, by zooming up, but leaves the surrounding ( the contextual environment) out of 
sight. This will ultimately, lead to many controversies off course, disputes and arguments, but  after all 
this is the function of a vernacular, or in this case, the function a concept.  
  Hence, a concept, like a vernacular, cannot be considered as bearing any universal essentials in itself, 
since it is just a tool to portray a certain aspect of reality. If one turns the vernacular to another 
direction, the projected or presupposed reality would suddenly disappear or contain a different 
reflection of reality. Hence, what I want to claim here is that a concept in itself is just a tool, like a 
vernacular and nothing more, and one should not aim to try to find a kind of “universal truth” in the 
concept (tool) itself. As von Benda-Beckman rightly observed, Legal Pluralism as a concept  “… must 
be measured against their ambitions and evaluated for their usefulness for the enterprise actors are 
                                                 
10 P. Shah, Legal Pluralism in Conflict, Coping With Cultural Diversity in Law, 2005, p.64 
11 Ibid., p.6 
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engaged in.” 12 Considerably, one can try to improve the tool, in order to suite the conditions of the 
studied object (like for example, one can employ a telescope, which is much more sophisticated in  
studying the stars, than a vernacular is), but one cannot aim for “universality” in concepts. 
 Applied to Legal Pluralism, this concept is first initiated to study the anthropological nature of norm-
creating and norm-abiding habits of savage people in colonized countries. Along the way, the concept 
of legal pluralism got crystallized and developed into a “true” concept, which can be easily applicable 
to a wide range of legal research. However, it is this far fetched ambition of the concept of Legal 
Pluralism that has attracted wide criticism. 
 There are two hitches we have to bear in mind while dealing with the concept of Legal Pluralism. The 
first one is the fact that Legal Pluralism is rather a concept in its infancy and needs to be developed. 
Which means that it will have some inconsistencies and incoherency in the outlook of the concepts 
naturally, but they all can be surmounted. 
 The second one however, is a rather more complicated one. Namely, the fact that Legal Pluralism is 
an anomaly, a concept that is developed against an existent concept of law. This explains why Legal 
Pluralist struggle about this aspect of Law. Without getting it plain what actually is meant  with the 
concept of law, it is hard to proceed in developing on the concept of Legal Pluralism. Consequently, it 
triggers a “paradigm change”, which puts simultaneously more pressure on the soundness of the 
alternative paradigm as such. “A Paradigm is”, as Kuhn has elucidated that “what the members of a 
scientific community share, and conversely, a scientific community consists of men who share a 
paradigm”.13 A concept is based on a paradigm, which can be regarded as a kind of garden where 
“concepts” ‘rise’. This criticism or “anomaly” as Kuhn has mentioned, should in turn, not be 
conceived as something destructive, but rather as something constructive in achieving a more solid, 
comprehensive concept of legal pluralism, which can be applied in a wide range of facets concerning 
legal or normative systems. If the paradigm changes, so does the concept.  
Yet another problem, outskirts which we encounter is that Legal Pluralism is not a concept that stands 
on its own, but it challenges an already existent concept about law, namely that of “nation state Law” 
(modern concept of law.)” This conceptional progress of Legal Pluralism and it simultaneously 
challenge of an existent concept of law, attaches, as Teubner argues a “double faced character. On the 
one hand it starts to unravel new ground if it comes down to legal science, at the same time it wants to 
attack the existing concept of Law. This would eventually lead to as Teubner calls it a “double faced 
character”.  He argues that, “It is the ambivalent, double-faced character of legal pluralism that is so 
attractive to post-modern jurists. Like the old Roman god Janus, guardian of gates and doors, 
beginnings and ends, with two faces, one on the front and the other at the back of his head, legal 
pluralism is at the same time both: social norms and legal rules, law and society, formal and informal, 
                                                 
12Franz von Benda-Beckmann, ‘Who’s Afraid of Legal Pluralism?’, Legal Pluralism & Unofficial Law, Vol.37 
(2002), p.39  
13 Thomas S Kuhn, The structure of scientiifc revolutions,  p. 176 
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rule oriented and spontaneous. And the relations between the legal and the social in legal pluralism are 
highly ambiguous, almost paradoxical: separate but intertwined, autonomous but interdependent, 
closed but open.“14 It is this ambiguity within Legal Pluralism that has on the hand/side attracted much 
ataenion from (legal) scholars, but at the same time scepticism  
However, I argue that this so called double faced character is just part and parcel of  the 
underdevelopment of the concept of legal pluralism and the fact that is exemplification of and 
“anomaly” of another concept namely that modern state law.  
 
1.2.2 Legal pluralism: A Brief History  
 
 Legal pluralism is known for its diffuse and a complex amount of definitions, which makes the 
concept ambiguous and vague and therefore, inappropriate to be employed for (legal-)normative 
purposes. The reason for this hazy conceptual development, is that the scientific inquiry into unofficial 
legal systems, went simultaneously with the changes on the floor. The  scientific studies reflected the 
political and institutional changes that crossed the mainly colonized countries. This also explains why 
social scientists like anthropologist and sociologist, were the first ones who showed interest in 
unravelling unofficial legal systems. But unfortunately, this has amounted conceptually to a vast array 
of definitions and concepts of legal pluralism, mainly linked to an empirical research, which are highly 
inconsistent. 
 Nevertheless in order to portray a certain consistent historical development in the definitions of Legal 
Pluralism, which is being utilized in the past century, I will discern five phases of developments that 
has shaped the concept of Legal Pluralism. This five phases more or less embraces the phases which 
Merry15 and Berman16 had used in their Article about Legal Pluralism.  
 The first anthropological inquiry into unofficial legal systems, erupted with Bronislaw Malinowski’s 
17inquiry/study in the customs of certain tribes in Malaysia (Micronesia). In this study he reflected to a 
systematisation, which existed in the customs that has been practised, and he was the first one to 
                                                 
14  Günther Teubner, Two Faces of Janus,  Cardozo Law Review, Vol.13, 1991 – 1992, p.1443 
15 Sally Engle Merry, ‘Global Human Rights and Local Social Movements in a Legally Plural World’ (1997) 12 Canadian Journal of Law 
and Society 247 
16 Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism University of Connecticut School of Law, University of 
Connecticut School of Law, Year 2007 Paper 71; Günther Teubner, Legal Pluralism in the World Society, in 
Global Law Without a State 3 (Gunther Teubner ed.,1997); Sally Engle Merry, International Law and Socio-
legal Scholarship: Toward a Spatial Global Legal Pluralism, Studies in Law, Policy & Society (forthcoming 
2007); Marc Galanter, Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages and Legal Pluralism, The American University 
Summer, 1993  42 Am. U.L. Rev. 1393; 58Marc Galanter, ‘Justice in Many Rooms: Courts, Private Ordering, 
and Indigenous Law’ (1981) 19 Journal of Legal Pluralism 1 at 17–18.: Brian Tamanaha, Understanding Legal 
Pluralism: Past to Present, Local to Global, Sydney Law Review, Vol 30:375; Gordon R. Woodman, 
Constitution in a World of Powerful Semi-Autonomous Social Fields; Gordon R. Woodman, Ideological combat 
and Social Observation, Recent Debate  about Legal Pluralism, Part II. Urban  Nromative fields: Concepts, 
Theories and Crtiques 
17 Bronislaw Malinowski, Crime and Custom in Savage Society (1926) 
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expose a self-regulatory governance structure, in this particular village. Despite this interesting 
discovery, it was nothing more than an anthropological observance, which was difficult to put it in any 
abstract theory, reaching an analytical or scientific conclusion.  
  This pioneering work of Malinowski was promptly taken up/followed by other scholars who did 
research in tribal law, mainly in colonized areas. This soon  lead to the revelations of certain so-hybrid 
legal-systems within colonized countries/areas. This second phased was characterized by exposing 
how colonial legal systems intermingled with tribal customary law or religious law. Anthropologists 
like Posipil18, Hoebel19, Hooker20, Jude Star21 (in a non-colonized country, namely Turkey) did their 
research in how customary-religious law/legal interacted with colonized legal system (in case of Jude 
Law it was more the relationship between Turkish national Law and the rural customary law Turkey). 
These studies lead to theoretical conclusions in which legal systems were seen as ‘Legal Levels’ (in 
Pospisil case). ‘Legal Levels’ denoted the gradation in which one legal systems stands as opposed to 
the other. The importance of Posipil’s anthropological-theoretical depiction is that he emphasised on 
the hierarchical structure that existed both in the tribes themselves as well as their relationship with the 
state-law.  
 Hooker on the other hand tried to exemplify how colonial Dutch law, tried to integrate Indonesian 
Tribal law, called ‘Adat’, and Islamic law in their legal system. The important conclusion which one 
could derive from this elucidation is the way how ‘weak Legal Pluralism’22, tried to obliterate tribal or 
religious legal systems on the long run. At least, Hooker’s exposition clarified the aspiration of a state 
law in acknowledging and integrating other legal systems in their system, which is controlling and 
guiding these particular legal systems. 23 
 The more principle development came in around 1970’s and 1980’s, in regard to the conception of 
legal pluralism.24 Until this period, particular legal systems were seen as an exception in contrast to 
colonial legal system. By reverting the attention to national state law, this has become the focal point 
of attack. Culminating in Griffths’ call for the “destruction of nation-state law”.  
                                                 
18 Leopold Pospisil, The Anthropology of Law: A Comparative Theory (1971) 
19 Adamson Hoebel, The Law of Primitive Man (1954) 
20 M.B. Hooker, Legal Pluralism: An Introduction to Colonial and Neo-Colonial Laws (1979). 
21 June Star and Jonathan Pool, The Impact of a Legal Revolution in Rural Turkey,  8Law en Society Rev. 533 1973-1974 
22 ‘Weak Legal ‘ pluralism is a term introduced by John Griffths, which exemplifies national legal systems 
which has integrated ‘unofficial’ law in their system, as opposed to strong legal pluralism. Strong legal pluralism 
connotes the existence of parallel legal system juxtaposed to state law.  
23 In chapter 5 I will show how previous constitutions of Afghanistan has tried to apply “weak Legal Pluralism” 
in their legal systems and still failed.  In Israel for example, the Sharia Law is allowed to exist as long as it does 
not bridge the constitution of Israel. See, Yüksel Sezgin, A new Theory of Legal Pluralism: the case of Israeli 
Religious Clourts,  
24 Gordon R. Woodman, Constitutions in a world of Powerful semi-Autonomous Social-Fields, 1989 Third World Legal Studies 1 
1989, Gordon R. Woodman, Ideological Combat and Social Observation Recent Debate about Legal Pluralism, 
in ParII: Urban Normative Fields: Concepts, Theories 
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 This change of the state of mind by anthropologist made it possible to create theories on how 
unofficial legal systems’ worked. Most notably, we can mention the theory of Sally Falk Moore’s, 
“Semi-autonomous social field.”25 
According to Moore, “Semi-Autonomous Social Field is a social unit that can “ generate rules and 
customs and symbols internally, but that it is  also vulnerable to rules and decisions and other forces 
emanating from the larger world by which it is surrounded. The semi-autonomous social field has rule-
making capacities, and the means to induce or coerce compliance; but it is simultaneously set in a 
larger social matrix which can, and does, affect and invade it, sometimes at the invitation of persons 
inside it, sometimes at its own instance. The analytic problem of fields of autonomy exists in tribal 
society, but it is an even more central analytical issue in the social anthropology of complex societies. 
All the nation-states of the world, new and old, are complex societies in that sense.”26 
With the increasing influence of international organizations on direct enforceable legal rules and as a 
result of globalisation and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the existence of unofficial legal systems 
penetrated also in legal theory and legal science. Suddenly, legal theorist became aware of the effects 
of different legal system, whether tribal or not, in their own legal system. This has erupted in the so-
called post-modernist27 approach to law or sociological inquiry in the existence of different legal 
systems.28 International Lawyers, European Lawyers, but also Legal Philosophers started got 
interested in Legal Pluralism.  
European Law29 has broaden its scope with directives and regulations, which penetrated into the 
national legal systems. Within the 90’s national state border were pressured by globalisation and its 
impact on national law that occurred. The influence of GATT and later WTO regulations, International 
treaties, UNIDROIT Principles (which allowed contracting parties to apply these rules for their 
contracts) and so on. 
In legal philosophy the effect of global changes on nation- state legal systems, reflected in for example 
the book Francois Ost and van Kerckhove, ‘La Pyrmaid ou LeRessau’30, They depicted a change in 
law from hierarchical structure of legal systems to a web of legal systems that effect the citizens of a 
nation state. The nation state lost its monopoly in generating their own legal systems. To give an 
                                                 
25 Sally Falk Moore, Law as Process: an Anthropological Approach (1978)  
26 Idem 220 
27 Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Law: A Map of Misreading. Toward a Postmodern Conception of Law, , Journal 
of Law and Society, Vol. 14, No. 3 (Autumn, 1987), pp. 279-302;  
Bouaventura de Sousa Santos, Towards a Multicultural conception of Human rights 
Published in Hernandez-Truyol, Berta (Ed), Moral Imperialism. A Critical Anthology. New York University 
Press, 2002 
28 Niklas Luhman and Günther Teubner, The existence of autopoisesis.  
29 Francis Snyder, Global Economic Networks and Global Legal Pluralism, EUI Working Paper Law No. 99/6 
30 François Ost and Michel van de Kerchove ; De laPpyramide au Résau,Pour uneTtheorie Dialectique du Droit;  
François Ost and Michel van de Kerchove, De la Pyramide au Résau? Vers un nouveau mode de production du 
Droit? R.I.E.J., 2000.44  
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example, the Dutch Civil code  which was revised in 1992, needed another revision by 2003 due to 
huge amount of directives and regulation that made the quite newly revised Civil code abundant.  
Currently, we have reached a subsequent stage, which is part of this global this development. The 
Archbishop of Canterbury’s call was in this sense important because ,what he was referring to was not 
so much the acceptance of  diversive legal rules, but legal rules as part of self-governing social units 
like communities and associations  
Moreover, the question which we are dealing right now is how communities or certain groups, 
business corporation, can manage their own issues or business, without doing recourse on national 
state legal system. For this purposes we need to construct a concept of legal pluralism that is 
comprehensive enough to include institutional-organizational framework, which generates and 
enforces legal systems. This is the goals of this chapter.  
This brings me to the conceptual dispute between Griffths and tamanha, from which I can continue in 
my exploration into a more comprehensive approach to Legal Pluralism 
  
1.2.3 John Griffiths and Brian Tamanaha:’ The Malinowski Problem’ and  the Analytical dispute on  
Legal Pluralism 
 
Currently, the core issue in the dispute between John Griffths and Tamanaha evolves around Griffths 
concept of Legal Pluralism, which he defines as follows: “ In the legal centralist conception, law is an 
exclusive, systematic and unified hierarchical ordering of normative proposition, which can be looked 
at either from the top downwards as depending from a sovereign command or from the bottom 
upwards  as deriving their validity  from ever more general layers of norms until one reaches some 
ultimate norm(s) (Kelsen, 1949;Hart, 1961) ” 31The reason why Griffiths established his conception of 
legal pluralism against legal centralism, is mainly to counterbalance the monopoly of legal thought by 
legal centralism in the western world. 
According to Tamanaha, the main criticism against Griffiths’ account of legal pluralism and his notion 
of law, is the fact that it is based on a romanticized and retrieved theory of law, which defines law as 
framework of rules in formal and hierarchical settings. He argues further that this theory of law is 
based on Austinian conception of law, whereby the command of the sovereign is perceived as law, 
which also explains the hierarchical and formal nature of law. 
 Griffths further continues with his radical concept of Legal Pluralism by saying that “A Central 
objective of a descriptive conception of legal pluralism is therefore destructive: break the stranglehold 
of the idea that what law is, is a single, unified and exclusive hierarchal normative ordering depending 
from the power of the state, and of the illusion that the legal world actually looks the way such a 
conception requires it too look.”   
                                                 
31 John Griffths, What is Legal Pluralism, 24 Journal of Legal Pluralism & Unofficial Law 1 1986 
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 Tamanaha further challenges the ambiguity in Griffths’ concept of Legal Pluralism by addressing the 
unfeasibility of claiming both “concrete patterns of social ordering” and at the same time referring to 
institutional identification and enforcement of norms. If they bring up ‘concrete patterns of social 
ordering’ they will be entangled with the so called “ Malinoskwi problem”. 
The “Malinowski Problem” constitutes the core issue within this dispute. It stresses on the blurred 
boundaries between law and social norms when one labels every social norm as law. 32 He argues that 
within Griffths’ notion of law, which eh employs in his concept of legal pluralism, even a hand shake 
would amount to law. This is why Tamanha wonders whether it is not more appropriate to employ 
‘normative pluralism’ in this case, instead of ‘legal pluralism’.33 The reason is that Tamanha, 
implicitly departs from the existence of  a concept which can be framed as ”law” in contrary to other 
normative systems. However, as we will see in the next part, even Tamanaha is not certain how to 
define this concept of ‘law’.  
Although this proposal of Tamanah looks quite plausible in the first instance, it does not solve the core 
issue of the problem namely, what do you call law? Is that all legal rules which are enacted by the state 
and structured into a system? And what about rules that emanted from international organizations? We 
have reached to the central point of legal philosophy, namely what do we call law?  
 
1.2.4 Non-Essentialist Version of Law- definition of Law 
 
As a solution for the above mentioned legal-analytical problem, Tamanaha presupposed a kind of –
non-essentialist definition of law, which is stripped from any goal of purpose-orientated approach to 
law. As he states “The approach I suggest draws from the existing social views of law, so such 
conflicts will not routinely arise. Under my account, the normative relations within the family will be 
considered ‘law’ only if  the people within the social arena conventionally characterize them in terms 
of ‘law’. This approach is based upon the recent interpretative turn in social theory and the social 
sciences, which insists that greater attention and respect be paid to the meaningful orientations and 
categories of ordinary social actors.”34 
 This account of law draws further on Günther Teubners dichotomy of defining law as something  
which is depended on whether we call it “law“ or “non- law”, without going to deep into theoretical 
analytical inquiry. Its aim is to establish an account of law which prevents to be “…over-inclusive and 
under-inclusive, respectively, including phenomena most people would not consider to be law, and 
excluding phenomena many would consider to be law” 35 
                                                 
32 Brian Tamanaha, ‘The Folly of the ‘Social Scientific’ Concept of Legal Pluralism’ (1993) 20 Journal of Law and Society, p200 
33  Idem 
34 Tamanaha, Brian, A non essentialist verison of law, Journal of society and Law , Vol.27, Num.2, June 2000,  
p.20  
35  Idem 
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Because of the abovementioned problem of analytical inaccuracy of the underlying notion of law in 
Legal Pluralism as a concept, Tamanaha argued for a non-essentialist version of  law because  a 
concept of law will always portray/capture one aspect and not a “comprehensive” version of law. 
Moreover, his quest for a non-essentialist version of law is actually a call for a comprehensive concept 
of law, that embraces all aspects that contributes to the undertaking, acceptance and norm-generating 
function of law. 
However, as Tamanaha conceded this non-essentialist version of law entails actually a non-conception 
of law which is not possible. This is why he tried to construe a kind of non-essentialist concept of law 
which can be applied as the foundation for Legal pluralism as a concept. 
 The question is whether this so called “non-essentialist” concept of law will solve all the shattered 
underpinnings of Legal Pluralism. Does this concept really bring is further in applying this concept to 
the (newly discovered) legal developments (that threatens our nation state Legal system)? This 
question can only be answered the moment we dig into the roots of our current modern conception of 
law, and understand what makes this concept so practical and why it has created a strong group of 
adherents, while at the same time being repulsive to others.  
 
1.3 Law in Manacle of  Logic  
 
The main assertion  made by John Griffths is that his concept of legal pluralism is aimed to destroy the 
dominance of “nation-state –law”, as the controlling force in rule making and rule enforcement. And it 
is precisely  this misplaced, emotional and blunt statement that underlies at the analytical ambiguity 
argued by Tamanaha. This is why I want to assert that instead of taking the opposition against the 
nation-state as the main rule making factor in law, it would be more fair to oppose the logical, 
scientific and rational character of our dominant notion of law, whether or not emanating from the 
state. 
 The problem of logical structure has already appeared while doing comparative research in legal 
systems and legal cultures. It has already doomed at comparative research that legal rules are not 
easily replaceable by one or the other legal rules or systems, as if it is just a case of mathematical 
calculation. The comparative legal studies, and especially in the field of private law, are carried out 
with the aim and intention to look at possible harmonisations of legal systems, or to create a new 
common civil code. This is especially the endeavour of comparative lawyers of the last decade 36  
 As a response and critique  to this somewhat mathematical, calculative restrained approach to law, 
that became prevalent in comparative law, Pierre Legrand argued that “legal systems cannot be 
                                                 
36 Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz, Introduction to Comparative Law; Jam Smits, Een Europees Privaatrecht 
ald Gemengd Stelsel, Nederlands Juristenblad 73 (1998)p.61-66; In this article Smit argues that we should adopt 
a “free market of rules” so that legal participant could choose and apply the legal rules availbe to suit their own 
needs. In this way one could develop a more harmonized and unified private law system in Europe. 
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converged” just by comparing merely legal rules.37 In the realm of the construction of a European 
Ciivl code (Ius Commune) Legrand contended that legal systems themselves are nourished within a 
cultural background. In another words, legal systems according to Legrand, are not just merely  
logical, mathematical formula’s that can be easily counted up or deducted, instead, they are 
intertwined with cultural background of that particular country. 
But were does comparative legal studies went wrong according to Legrand, in its analytical analyses 
and study of different legal systems? One of the reason, he elucidates is:  
“Most reasonably, comparative legal studies is about law. But, who undertakes comparative work 
equipped with a theory of law? Who has a sense of where the law begins and where it ends? Who has 
reflected upon what counts as law and what counts as non-law? Where is the boundary to be drawn 
between the normal and the deviant, the normal and the pathological? For most ‘comparatists’, some 
of my colleagues, as they have intimated to me, are plainly irritated by the mere suggestion of the need 
for theory. In short, the law is to be found in legislative text and judicial decisions. And, it is that 
which ‘comparatists’ empathetically study. However, their conviction is not the outcome of deep 
reflection on the ontology of law. Rather, it is mere extension of what these ‘comparatists’ were taught 
about the meaning of law, often by teachers who themselves were not comparatists or theoreticians, 
but were simple technicians of the national law. Let me advocate that things are not so evident and that 
the meaning of law for comparative legal studies is rather more complex than is usually assumed.” 38 
Pierre Legrand has touched upon a soar wound in legal science, especially that within comparative 
law. In comparative law, legal rules are just being juxtaposed against each other, and in their goal to 
unify legal rules, they either harmonize legal systems or rules or they swap them, just like Ole Lando 
has done together with several colleagues in drawing an alternative European Private Law, which 
constitutes merely mozaïque of European legal rules.  
As he again stressed, “French law is much more than a compendium of rules and propositions. 
Accordingly, to say that the study of French law consists in the study of legislative texts and judicial 
decisions is plainly inadequate. French law is, first and foremost, a cultural phenomenon, not unlike 
singing or weaving.” 
Legal rules cannot be perceived in its “universals”, which is characterized by the logical underpinning 
of law. Just because legal rules are logically systematized or reasoned in logical way, does not mean 
that one can just swap a legal rule or implement a whole legal system. As he further argued, “I hold 
that civilians have long been proponents of the idea of ‘universalisation’ in law. My contention is that 
the values of rationalisation, systematisation and generalisation- the building blocks of mental 
processes whose aim is to banish particularised perceptions by ordering them into an exhaustive and 
categorical regulative framework- have seemingly always distinguished the civilian approach to the 
                                                 
37 Pierre Legrand, Are Civilians Educable?  Legal Stuides,  216 (1998); Pierre Legrand, How to Compare Now?, 
Vol.16 Legal Studies 232 (1996) 
38 Pierre Legrand, Are Civilians Educable?  Legal Stuides,  216 (1998), p.217 
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fashioning of the legal. Although ‘roman jurisprudence on the whole shows a disinclination to the 
process [of abstraction]’,this priority already mattered for jurisconsults like Q Mucius Scaevola, 
Gaius, especially, and Tribonian. In fact, ‘from the end of the third century a tendency towards 
simplification of the law set in [Rome], which is no less characteristic of the period up to Justinian 
than the tendencies towards classicism and stabilisation’.”39 
 During the renaissance, when  the interest in old roman language, culture, art and architectures 
revived, Justinian codex’s were studied as learning materials for Logic. This is how law faculty came 
to be and became the foundational source in the coming centuries to shape our legal mind. The interest 
in Roman Law were mainly due to its suitability for (central)governing purposes.40 
 Logical systematisation of legal rules and logical reasoning has been an indispensable element in 
scientification of legal norms, making law an objective and formalistic science. The rationale behind 
scientification most of all is its unitary, objective applicability of same rules to same events. This 
enhances predictability, certainty, and serves particularly the governability of human behaviour. 
Everything outside the realm of logical, formalistic, objective reasoning has been contemplated as 
being vague.  
Our modern notion of law dates back to roman law when roman law was not already codified. Even in 
this period there was a struggle in whether or not law has to be systemized in a logical way, in order to 
have a priori predictability, or whether it should be applied on factual case, like common law. 41 
Eventually roman law, in the version of Lex Justinianus became one of the modern, logical systemized 
codex’s of our time and an example to all jurists when it comes to down legal reasoning and 
systematisation.  
The importance of logic in this strand is again been reiterated by the study of Lex Justinianus as an 
example for logicians at the university of Bologna in the eleventh  century, which at the same timed 
marked the first study of modern legal science. Both Logic and Lex Justinianus has directed legal 
thinking in the middle ages and shown the practibility of legal science for governing purposes. 
Moreover, as a modern framework for future legal scientific world, logic was the basis on which 
future legal thinking was based on. It became its further shape in 15th century when law was being 
employed for the so called “civil science” purposes in order not only to govern human beings, but also 
to frame them into a certain shape, or civilization. This also explains and shows where the 
instrumentalist character of our modern concept of law comes from.42   
Thus, the modern concept of law was discovered and perceived as an appropriate instrument to govern 
human beings behaviour. Law became a tool along with politics, literature, philosophy and logic, 
                                                 
39 Idem 
40 Van Caenegem,  Legal history: A European Perspective, 1991 
41 Richard E. Speidel, Logic and Experience in Roman and Common Law,  59 Boston. University  Law  Review 
433 1979 
42 Brian Z. Tamanaha, How an Instrumental view of Law corrodes the rules of law, 56 DePaul L. Rev. 469 2006-
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which is called “civil science” philosophy. Its prominent advocate , Claude de Seysell argued that 
“civil science” constituted  ” as “ true philosophy…and is to be preferred to all other fields because of 
its purpose’43. 
The purpose of “civil science” is to create, mould and direct people into civilization, which actually 
means, systemizing them according to logical predetermined systems.  
As Donald R. Kelley mentioned,“ The Bartolists were masters of political thought as well as of legal 
science and set about literally to 'civilize' the world by bringing the activism of the civis, the urbanity 
of the civitas, and the regularity of the jus civile to the social groupings and political forces that 
agitated the cities and countryside of Renaissance Europe.” 44 
To keep it brief, the scientification of law, has already set it foot in the middle ages and created  a kind 
of artificial legal reality, which has become a common ground in normative sciences. The point I want 
to claim here is that logic has paved the way for the creation of legal profession and as Max Weber 
stated, the “aristocracy of legal literati”, the legal elite.  
Weber argued that “Practical needs, like those of the bourgeoisie, for a “calculable law”, which were 
decisive in the tendency towards a formal law as such, did not play any considerable role in this 
process. As experience shows, this need may be gratified quite as well, and often better, by a formal, 
empirical case law. ...This logical systematisation of the law has been the consequence of the intrinsic  
intellectual needs of the legal theorists and their disciples, the doctors, i.e., of a typical aristocracy of 
legal literati.” 45 
The importance of Weber’s account of law is that it clearly phrases how legal/normative science has 
elevated it self from a social phenomenon, which just constitutes one of the elements of social life, 
into a science on its own, with a high instrumental character. Law has become a tool to govern instead 
of directing element within social life. It creates its own vicious circle of legal prophecies who only 
can think within this frame of logic, leading to a self-affirming reality, which does not keep pace with 
the real world. 
As Otto von Gierke has correctly stressed “The fiction is used in the most comprehensive manner: 
indeed, in the fiction law celebrates its greatest triumphs. And where all this fails, it is made possible 
with the keenest abstraction simply  to deny what really exists, to set up what is nowhere at hand as 
the only  “theoretical” reality. “46 
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Moreover ”…the jurist turns with justifiable annoyance away from vagueness, darkness, confusion; he 
finds profundity and mysticism uncomfortable; what does not lend itself to definition does not exist 
for him” 47 Furthermore “ It is very easy to shake off those material  factors, which find no place in the 
theoretical formula with the assertion that they are  “juristically irrelevant.”48 
So, the issue which I have tried to exemplify above with Griffth’s  dispute with Tamanha, as regard to 
the underlying definition of law of the concept of legal pluralism, is the consequence of departing 
from a scientific notion of law. The whole “Malinowski Problem” is due to the fact that we depart, 
unknowingly from a logical, mathematical and sicentiifc notion of law. The moment a norm does not 
fit this logic, it is considered as non-law.   
 
 
1.4 Legal Pluralism and Institutional -Organizational Framework  
 
What is failing in Griffiths’ concept of Legal Pluralism is the depiction of institutional or 
organizational framework that accommodates the norm-creating and norm-enforcing dynamism in a 
particular “social field”. The importance to identify correctly the institutional/organizational 
framework, became clear in a recent research carried out by the University of Nijmegen to the 
existence of Sharia Courts in the Netherlands.   
The lacuna of Legal Pluralism is primarily that it focuses merely on the norms itself, and tries to 
ascertain to which extent one can frame a certain norm as law and whether a social definition of law 
can be established. This conception however goes astray of the institutional/ organizational aspect that 
is attached to the study of other legal systems. To begin with, it is important to note that in the 
construction of a comprehensive concept of legal pluralism (or a comprehensive understanding of 
Law), the components, which is discussed, do not reflect anything alike what we have in our mind.  
 In this paragraph I will concentrate on two writers that do emphasise on the importance of the 
organizational/institutional aspect of Legal Pluralism, namely Ido Sahar and Ricardo Vudoyra. The 
aim is only to reflect and give an insight in how organizational outlook of legal pluralism can add to 
the perspective of legal pluralism as a concept.  
The main criticism of Ido Shahar in this above mentioned debate between John  Griffths and Brian 
Tamanaha, is on their emphasis on norms, taking norms as the focal point of research. He argues that, 
the whole debate evolves around the concept of state-law, the same concept which Griffths tend to 
challenge.  
This is why Ido Shahar tries to get to another definition of legal pluralism by re-conceptualizing the 
notion of state, as the decisive concept within the concept of legal pluralism. He asserts that in 
addition to the dispute around Griffiths’ account of legal pluralism and law, that both scholars tend to 
                                                 
47 Idem, p.160 
48 Idem 
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take law, and in this case state-law, as the focal point of departure in their formulation of legal 
pluralism and the definition of ‘law’. He criticizes both authors of taking the conception of state, as 
being “well-defined and self-evident, which does not merit much discussion”. And he is in particular 
critical of Griffiths’ theory because of “…his implicit assumptions with regard to the state are in fact 
"statist" and centralist in nature.”49 
Ido Shahar’s main point is based on Timothy Mitchell’s perception of state and its relation to the 
society. According to Shahar, referring to Mitchell, the relationship between state and society is not 
clearly separated but are in a  kind of “dialectical relationship” as he calls it. Subsequently, the state is 
interfering in the “semi-autonomous social fields”, and vice versa. So, according to Shahar, (referring 
to Mithcell),  the distinction between state law and legal or non- legal normative systems are blurred, 
because of their mutual influence. 50  
 A way to look at this issue is from an institutional perspective. The reasoning which I will try to adopt 
here is try to distinguish normative systems in that what constitutes to be an institution and that which 
is not institutionalized. In finding the definition of “an institution”, Ricardo Vudoyra, referring to 
Helmke and Levinsky, maintains that “..informal institutions [should be understood as] socially shared 
rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated, and enforced outside officially sanctioned 
channels. By contrast, formal institutions are rules and procedures that are created, communicated, and 
enforced through channels that are widely accepted as official.“51 Furthermore, “Formal institutions 
refer thus to official channels, while informal institutions refer to unofficial channels.” 
 However, after having analysed different facets that should deal with the concept of Legal Pluralism, 
it still lacks the comprehensiveness which I am striving for. How does all these elements, like 
institutions, social definition of law, amongst others interrelate?  How does this comprehensive 
mechanism work? To answer this question I will refer to Ehrlich’s conception of Living Law for two 
reasons.  First of law his approach to law from an individual’s perspective, and secondly his 
communal approach to law. 
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1.5 Eugen Ehrlich’s “Living Law” 
 
In the previous paragraphs I have tried to analyse certain elements, which had a direct or indirect 
influence on the concept of legal pluralism. Exposing those elements helped me to identify the lacuna 
and the problems, which lie at the roots of legal pluralism. This brought me to the conclusion that a 
correct definition of law in combination with an institutional/organization framework, which enable 
the generation of legal norms, was missing. Either, Legal Pluralism was investigated from purely 
social scientific purposes, in which the notion of law got blurred with social norms, or from a legal 
perspective, where one was facing an analytical dilemma.  
 Moreover, the reason for this analytical dilemma was the result of separating the source of legal 
norms with legal norms itself. Eventually, what was lacking in all these definitions about law, for the 
purpose to develop a concept of Legal Pluralism, was that an overarching organizational approach was 
absent. While ‘state law’ had a clear source namely the state, Moore’s “Semi-Autonomous Social 
Field” only described a  certain social movement that could from the basis for the generation of legal 
norms. And basing a concept of Legal Pluralism like Girffiths did on Moore’s definition, would 
trigger much criticism from legal scientists.  
 This is why, I want to link a notion of law with an organizational framework that could explain us 
how certain legal norms or systems, are being generated and enforced. Moreover, I will try to argue 
the importance to conceive law within an organization framework like, community or association. I 
will claim that Eugen Ehrlich’s concept of “Living Law” is a kind of concept that could from the basis 
of this comprehensive concept of Legal Pluralism.52  
 As it already appears in the title of his theory, “Living Law” is centred on the phenomenon of law and 
has law as its point of departure in scientific research, whereas ”semi-autonomous social field”  
departs from the ‘social field’ as the point of research. Factually, there is not much difference among 
both theories, but their locus of research is different. While Ehrilch’s theory fits best for legal and 
political research, Moore’s account will be suitable for mainly anthropologists and other social 
scientists. This also explains for the great part, the “Malinowski Problem”, which I have set forth 
above. If one takes the social phenomena as the focal point, at the certain moment every action will be 
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defined in its social context. Whereas, if we take “law” as the main course, the emphasis will be laid 
more on legal-normative phenomenon, instead of social behaviour as such.  
 As stressed earlier in the second paragraph, framing human behaviours according to a more 
calculable, mathematical normative ordering is not only easy to administer, but also easy to adjust, 
mould and direct human behaviour to a certain course. Changing the concept of law in a kind of non-
essentialist way, does not help us further in understanding  the essence of law, and the way legal rules 
are being perceived and accepted by individuals. Besides, even if one could unmistakably proof that 
‘law’ is a logical construction’ which has an inherent exclusivity indebted in its vain, still the question 
is whether it matters if this ‘law’ would not have any recourse on the individual.     
This is why we need a total revised and different approach to law, which conceives beyond normality 
and embraces all facets that contributes to the creation and enforcing of legal-normative rules. If we 
try to understand Ehrlcih’s account of law only form the perspective of legal-normativity, than it is 
true that it is nothing else than a bundle of vague accumulation of facts, which does not give any 
clarity in the distinction between legal rules (law) and social rules. 
 But, if we ry to, otherwise, conceive “Living Law” as Ehrlich himself did, from the perspective of the 
individual, as Vanden Linden also encountered in his second revised article about Legal Pluralism,  
than suddenly all these “vague facts” will start to come down. 53 
 As Vanden Linden mentioned in his revised Article, the main error he made in his previous article on 
Legal Pluralism, was that he took the state’s perspective to law, as the leading ground for his legal 
survey. Instead, he argued, we have to perceive law from the individual’s point of view. The 
individual is more inclined to see law as a social phenomenon than the state does, for whom law is 
nothing else than a tool to keep citizens under control.   
He explains further that a “… man, as a member of many social networks, is constantly subjected to a 
dialectical process in which competing regulatory orders assert their power over him and strive to 
achieve autonomy from the others. Law is one of these regulatory orders and competes with them in 
order to assert its supremacy at the same time over the individual and other regulatory orders.” 54  
 This means that  ‘law’, according to Ehrlich is perceived as “Living Law” connoting: “The living law 
is the law which dominates life itself even though it has not been posited in legal propositions. The 
source of our knowledge of this law is, first, the modern legal document; secondly, direct observation 
of life, of commerce, of customs and usages and of all associations, not only those that the law has 
recognised but also of those that it has overlooked and passed by, indeed even of those that it has 
disapproved. “55  
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So instead of observing  law from a social or legal scientist point of view, one has to determine law as 
emanating from a social environment. And this is what Eugen Ehrlich tries to define with his “Living 
Law”. Law is the result of a social process, but it is not only social in its essence. It is normative, but at 
the same time also institutional/organizational. What makes law precisely law can only be understood 
if one grasp the totality of this social process that takes place within a certain organizational or 
institutional framework, namely an association or a community.  
Understanding “law” as a totality of social dynamism, will explain a lot about many legal issues that 
cannot be grasped with a mere logical and rational legal mentality. To illustrate this, I want to mention 
the way for example Sharia has been settled in United Kingdom.  
  The controversy about the Sharia Law stems mostly from a wrong perception and is limited to the 
endorsement of Shaira in totalitarian states like Iran or Saudi Arabia. However, this does not explain 
anything about the true nature of Sharia, which leans highly on social rules being practiced within a 
particular political environment. Before Sharia law can function as Law, it must enter first into a kind 
of a period of adjustment of two years in order to be adapted to social rules, existent in a particular 
area. Upon this adopted adapted social rules, legal rules (law) will consequently erupt.56 
 In other words this example shows us clearly  the inseparable relation between legal rules and social 
rules, as one whole social phenomena. This is why, the Sharia in United Kingdom would be a totally 
different kind of Sharia than the one in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Iran. This further explains, as 
explained above, why it is hard to ascertain ”Sharia Courts” since the distinction between religious 
values and legal enforcement are not separated. It is totally intertwined within the social nature of that 
particular community, within a particular country. 
 This brings me to my main contention about the suitability of “Living Law” , which is that this 
concept departs rather from a comprehensive totality of social dynamism than merely plain norms . 
More in particular, Ehrlich employs an approach that is very much in accord with my research 
question, since it detects not only legal-norms but everything that is related and which accommodates 
the creation and existence of legal norms, like institutional framework, enforcement and social rules 
that support the legal rulesIn order to get a clear view about his “comprehensive”  (”associational”) 
concept of law, I want to dwell a little bit more on Ehrlich’s account of law. 57 
According to Eugen Ehrlich, “A norm … must be recognized in the sense that men actually regulate 
their conduct according to it. A system of law or of ethics that no one gives heed to is like a fashion 
                                                 
56 Yilmaz, I. (2000) `Muslim law in Britain: reflections in the socio-legal sphere and differential legal 
treatment’, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 20(2) : 343± 50; Poulter, S.M. (1986) English Law and Ethnic 
Minority Customs. London: Butterworths; South Asian Muslim Law Today: An Overview Werner F. Menski; 
Shaykh Faisal, Family Law, Minorities and Legal Pluralism: Should English Law give more recognition to 
Islamic Law?; Maria Reiss, The Materialization of Legal Pluralism in Britain: Why Shari’a Council Decisions 
Should be Non-Binding, Arizona Journal of International & Comparative Law Vol. 26, No. 3 
57 Eugen Ehrlich, together with Gierke is also mentioned by Paul Schiff Berman as  a possible alternative in 
trying to address Legal Pluralism from a political context. They merge, namely,  political or institutional 
framework with legal framework. This means that departing from this perspective every legal system has to go 
together with a political or institutional system akin.  
 30
that no one follows. Only we must bear in mind that what has been said about the rule of conduct must 
not be applied to the norm of decision; for courts may at any time draw forth a legal proposition which 
has been slumbering for centuries and make it the basis of their decisions. And we must not conceive 
of this doctrine…as implying that the norm must be recognized by each individual. The norms operate 
through the social force which recognition by a social association imparts to them, not through 
recognition by the individual members of the association”58 
In other words, legal rules are contained by social rules within a society, and vice versa. Legal rules 
stems from the foundation of social values, custom, habits and religion and are nourished by those 
value systems. That is to say, legal rules, in order to have a normative effect on society/individual, has 
to be recognizable by a particular individual or the society as a whole. Otherwise, a legal-norm would 
not have any effect in practice and if enforced, would be acknowledged as an intrusion into their 
value-system.   
Hence,  legal rules (or law), are actually a kind of extracts of social reality or as Bouaventoura de 
Sousa Santos noted, “…the relations law entertains with social reality are much similar to those 
between maps and spatial reality. Indeed, laws are maps; written laws are cartographic maps; 
customary, informal laws are mental maps.” 59 The relationship between law and social rules can 
therefore not be discarded. Social rules form an eminent part of legal rules within a society, and 
therefore established the social nature of legal rules/law. 
But if we have to accept this account of law, what would it entail for the  purpose of governance? Can 
one really work with this concept of “living law”? Does it not actually confirms Kelsen’s argument 
that one cannot mix up “is” and “ought”, since descriptive theory cannot induce normative value, and 
so have no advantage for governance purposes? 60 
 I argue that we absolutely can work with this concept of “Living Law”, moreover what Ehrlich tries 
to depict is actually setting the limits for government interventions in social issues. More in particular, 
with “living Law” Ehrlich tried to outline the anatomy of how legal rules, which can be generated and 
enforced by and from society. As to governance is concerned, Ehrlich clearly contends that this whole 
anatomy of “Living Law” is part of a framework called community or association. As such, and 
hinging  on Otto von Gierke’s political concept of associationalism,61 which I will elaborate in the next 
chapters, Ehrlich clearly argues for a borderline between  the state and underlying communities and 
associations. 
 As Ehrlich further expresses on associations, “ It is not an essential element of the concept of law that 
it be created by the state, nor that it constitute the basis for the decisions of the courts or other 
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tribunals, nor that it be the basis of a legal compulsion  consequent upon such a decision. A fourth 
element remains, and that will have to be the point of departure, i.e. the law is an ordering. It is the 
deathless merit  of Gierke that he discovered this characteristic of law in the bodies which he called 
associations (Genossensahcaften)…And herein lies the germ of a true and great conception of the 
nature of law. Just as we find the ordered  community wherever we follow its traces, far beyond the 
limits set by Gierke, so we also find law everywhere, ordering and upholding every human 
association.”62 
 According to Ehlrich these organic organizational frameworks ( and natural governance systems) 
have their own dynamic in generating legal norms. Consequently, as to governance is concerned, 
Ehrlich departs from a more fragmented vision on governance, whereby different units within a 
political arena exerts their own authority. This does not have to be contrary to the central governments 
authority, in the contrary. It is conceived as true penetration of good-governance and democratic will. 
People are being governed on a micro level, which is more in concord with the local reality than 
centralized government.  
 The main emphasis in Ehrlich’s definition of law, or in his theory of living law, is that he argues that 
the social institutions where existent prior to the enacted statutes by nation-state. So he emphasises not 
so much on legal norms that create something but on institutions, which connotes the centralisation of 
society in Ehrlich’s notion of law. Its not the norms that create social institutions like marriage of 
contract or trade, but the other way round. It is these social institutions that are already existent, which 
constitutes already the normative foundation of these institutes. As he further argues: 
”Is a legal system possible without Legal Provisions? In other words, is a legal system imaginable 
which consists of nothing other than the Social Order?”63 This question must be answered in the 
affirmative if only for the reason that society is older than Legal Provisions and must have had some 
kind of ordering before Legal Provisions came into existence. This is why he correctly states that 
“Rules of conduct are social facts , the resultants of the forces that are operative in society, and can no 
more be considered separate and apart from society, in which they are operative, than the motion of 
the waves can be computed without considering the element in which they move”64 
This definition of law can be a suitable bases for the creation of a  more comprehensive approach to 
law. With comprehensive approach to law, I try to denote, a totality of a legal phenomenon with all its 
social, legal, institutional dynamics that generates and upholds the legal phenomena. Moreover, I 
believe that law, as a social phenomenon, controlling and guiding human interrelationship, cannot be 
separated from its social context, in order to create a pure science of norms, as explained in the second 
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paragraph. Law, in Ehrlich’s view, is being conceived as a totality of an organizational framework, 
namely that of an association or community. 
According to Ehrlich a “ social association” is: “a plurality of human being who, in their relations with 
one another, recognize certain rules of conduct as binding, and, generally at least, actually regulate 
their conduct according to them. These rules are of various kinds, and have various names: rules of 
law, of morals, of religion, of ethical customs, of honor, of decorum, of tact, of etiquette, of fashion.”65 
The importance to depart from a comprehensive approach to law, like from associations and 
communities, is because it depicts the dynamic within this social units, which creates, maintains and 
enforces legal rules. These communities or associations are not rigid or separate constructions, but are 
flexible and can overlap with other organizations structures, like other communities, associations or 
state’s structure.  
As Ehrlich maintains: “All of us… are living within numberless, more or less compactly, occasionally 
quite loosely, organized associations, and our fate in life will, in the main, be conditioned by the kind 
of position we are able to achieve within them. It is clear that in this matter there must be reciprocity 
of services rendered. It is impossible for the associations to offer something to each one of its 
members unless each individual is at the same time a giver. And in fact all these associations-whether 
they are organized or unorganised, and whether they are called country, home, residence, religious 
communion, family, circle of friends, social life, political party, industrial association, or good will of 
a business- make certain demands in exchange for that which they give; and the social norms which 
prevail in these communities are nothing more than the universally valid precipitate of the claims 
which the latter make upon the individual…The social association, is the source of the coercive power, 
the sanction, of all social norms, of law no more than morality, ethical custom, religion, honor, 
decorum, etiquette, fashion, at least as far as the outward observance of the precepts is concerned…”  
 A man conducts himself according to law, chiefly because this is made imperative by his social 
relations. In this respect the legal norm does not differ from the other norms. The state is not the only 
association that exercises coercion; there is an untold number of associations in society that exercise it 
much more forcibly than the state.“66 
 
 
1.6  Conclusion  
 
 
My point in this chapter was to develop a comprehensive concept of legal pluralism, which I could 
employ for political theoretical (organizational/institutional) context. Particularly, I wanted to embrace 
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law as a totality of a whole social dynamism, as a ‘social unit’. Instead of just scrutinizing on the 
legal-normative rules as such, I tried to develop a concept legal pluralism, which departed from an 
account of law that takes social units, like community and associations as the point of departure.   
 I argued that the current concept of legal pluralism was mainly based on social scientist endeavour to 
perceive law from a “social process”. The result was that they perceived in every social action a legal 
action, blurring the whole concept of law as such.  
 The so called “Malinowski problem”, as argued by Tamanaha, stressed this lacuna of the concept of 
“legal pluralism”, because social definition of law, which they utilized was blurring the line between 
social action and law. The whole emphasis of social scientist was to, in the words Griffths,  “breaking 
the “stranglehold of the idea that what law”, which is nation-state centred. But while doing this they 
went astray on demarcating on  what really constituted law and what not. 
 It is true that law should  not be perceived as emanating from nation state only, but what than makes 
“law” truly “law”, and in which sense is this different than social behaviour? I tried to argue that we 
have to let loose the obsession we have with Legal-normativity and start to look broader in 
organization/institutional framework. The problems was that both social scientists who challenged 
nation-state law, as well legal scientists who were upholding nation-state law, were all concentrated on 
legal normatively. They only differed in approach and methods. While legal scientist took, abstract, 
objective and logical structure as their basis, social scientist on the other hand embarked on empirical 
and social data as their point of departure to grasp the concept of law. 
 With referring to Eugen Ehrlich’s concept of “living law” I tried to argue that we should apply a 
broader concept of law, that only stresses the social embeddedness of law instead of trying to ascertain 
whether a certain behaviour should be determined as law or not. Moreover, trying to perceive law as a 
part of a social unit like association or community, enables us to locate the locus of law, within a 
social unit. Because each social unit contains a whole dynamism on its own that contributes to the 
creation of law.  
 In the next chapter, I will try to argue, which elements within social units like community or 
association will contribute to the eruption of law. I will emphasise on Trust, Values and Alternative 
Dispute Resolution, as the three elements with which one can locate law within a social unit.  
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Chapter 2 Community and Law: From Logic to Trust  
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
“A legal concept of community is devised to highlight the need for regulatory expression of communal 
relationships of trust; it recognizes the variety of these relationships and the diversity of forms of their 
expression. Consequently, it facilitates a pluralistic view of law. It recognizes the importance of order 
and coordination and the present, though not necessarily permanent, dominance of state law in 
defining and shaping the regulatory conditions of community. “67 
What made the concept of legal pluralism ambiguous and incomprehensible, was the lack of 
organizational and/or institutional framework. “Law” in Legal Pluralism was stripped off from its 
organizational/institutional background. Although many definitions and perspectives where 
represented, without any clear organizational framework, it was difficult and ambiguous to identify 
“law” within a social unit. Because of this, eventually, the definition of “law” in Legal Pluralism 
remained paradoxically enough “state centred”68, since the state was the only organization present, 
who claimed to be the only (organizational)  source of law. All other definitions, where just point of 
departure for a kind of anthropological or sociological inquiry without the emphasise on the 
organizational or institutional framework, which would generate those rules. This linkage between 
organization and legal rules, is unfortunately absent by many advocates of Legal Pluralism.   
In this chapter, I want to emphasise on this organizational/institutional framework, and in particular, to 
make the link between “Community and  Law”. I want to analyse how community or association 
generate legal norms (rules) and how they manage to maintain the legal order by their peculiar way of 
enforcement.  
The purpose of this chapter is not to make any claim, instead, I merely want to elucidate how 
Community and Associations could generate law, hence, the purpose is to identify and locate “law” 
within these social units. Moreover, my aim is to emphasis on certain elements that takes place within 
the community framework, which would trigger the legal conscience and enforcement procedure from 
within. As Cotterrell puts it: “To link law and community is thus to explore continually shifting 
patterns of social variation expressed or reflected in legal diversity. It is to hold out the possibility of 
theorizing law as a social phenomenon that is something other, or something more, than the law of the 
nation state as a political society.”69 Before I embark on outlining this process, I will first try to 
explore on the kind of definition of community I want to employ in this chapter.  
 The concept of community has been scrutinized from many fields, like sociology, anthropology, 
political science and economics. Since recently, even legal scholars started to show some interest in 
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the concept of community as an organizational form, which can accommodate legal norms. This is the 
result of the effects arisen from globalisation and the mobility factor, which makes it easy for certain 
communities to travel around the world and settling down. They are abiding by their own legal norms, 
culture, religion or other normative systems, which they took along with them.  
 In my attempt to identify the locus of law within the concept of community, I will first draw a 
conception of community, which I can apply. I will try to demarcate the concept in such a way that it 
resembles a ‘social unit’, which is autonomous and unified, bearing their own legal framework. A 
clear cut answer is something I cannot give, I will just try to clarify the concept and explain why I 
would adopt a certain kind of conception more than others. 
 Accordingly, I will pay emphasis on the distinction which Tönnies has made between Gemeinschaft 
and Gesellschaft (society), since it is within this dichotomy in which the concept Gemeinschaft 
(Community) can unfold itself. By discerning between Gemeinschaft  and Gesellschaft, I can explain 
clearly the internal differences between law as we adopt in the modern society and law with a 
community. 
Departing from the Tönnies distinction, one of my arguments to explain the locus of law in 
community, is to explain the difference of legal framework that underlies a Gemeinschaft and 
Gesellschaft. Namely, I will claim that the difference between these two frameworks are based on 
Trust on the one hand and Logical relationship, on the other.  
Trust relationship is one the essential characteristic of a community, since it forms the basis for many 
actions, simply because men trust each other, either because of the kind of relationship they expose or 
the fact that their share the same value. I will explain this further in many aspects. I will try to explain 
for example why trust in economics is conceived as an important ‘social capital’.  
Furthermore, I will emphasise on the importance of value in maintaining and enforcing the trust 
relationship. Moreover, I will explain the difference between Values as opposed to merely (system) of 
rules. People from the same community, either religious or ideological, or from any other grounds, 
base they actions mainly on the same values. Those values are so important since it constitutes one the 
elements to be part from the community. Values are guiding lines that induces an individual to act in a 
certain way. 
Eventually, I will try to explain in this chapter how the enforcement of this so-called, trust relationship 
and values are being endorsed and entrusted to a certain institution. Alternative Dispute Resolution 
explains, which methods can be adopted to enforce rules within a community. Since trust-based 
relationship constitutes the cornerstone of this relationship, the subsequent aim of ADR is the 
restoration of this trust-based relationship. In contrary to the kind of court-based justice-system we are 
familiar with, ADR is not based on mathematical construction of legal rules or legal reasoning, which 
will enforce justice. Instead they will employ all methods that will enable the restoration of trust 
between members, which underlies their relationship.  
 36
 Since it is impossible to point to the source or resources of law within a community, by juxtaposing 
all the above mentioned three component to societies equivalent, namely logic, rules and judicatory 
system, I want to exemplify the locus of law within community. 
 
2.2 Concept of Community 
  
A community is, as I would delineate it, a social unit, which keeps its outer boundaries closed for 
outsiders to enter and insiders to leave. It is a social unit, which is a closed, unified system, and 
because of this it will provide advantages for their members. Community is by far not a romantic 
concept (as Teubner, David Nelken, Steven Brint argue)70, but a concept which is as ancient as 
humanity and is founded the virtue to survive.  
 A community is established for people with sharing some common features which might be language, 
culture, religion, and profession and so on. In this sense, the community is therefore a closed system. It 
is made only for people identical on certain aspects, and does not have an open door policy or and exit 
strategy. In this sense it resembles, as Cotterrell made the comparison, with Carl Schmitt’s71 Feind and 
Foe dichotomy. The difference between other communities is a matter that reinforces the identity of 
the community. 
A more elaborate, but a quite simple definition of what community should denote, is provided by 
Tönnies, on whose conception of community I will base my exploration on the locus of law within 
community. Tönnies argues namely that “The group which is formed through this positive type of 
relationship is called an association (Verbindung) when conceived of as a thing of being which acts as 
a unit inwardly and outwardly. The relationship itself, and also the resulting association, is conceived 
of either as real and organic life- this is the essential characteristic of the Gemeinschaft (community)- 
or as imaginary and mechanical structure- this is the concept of Gesellschaft (society).72 
In the next chapter I will elaborate more on this dichotomy, which will be a kind of read threat of this 
chapter, in trying to depict Law in community. It suffice here to mention that according to Tönnies 
community distinguishes itself from society from being organic, and thus spontaneously created, while 
society is artificially established with an artificial structure. 
 Althusius on the other hand gives us a more political, and strangely enough a more sophisticated 
outline of what community signifies. According to him, “The community is an association formed by 
fixed laws and composed of many families and collegia living in the same place. It is elsewhere called 
a city in the broadest sense, or a body of many and diverse associations.--- Furthermore, this 
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community is either rural or urban. A rural community is composed of those who cultivate the fields 
and exercise rural functions.”73 
Steven Brint tries to give us a more elaborated, sociological account of what community actually 
entails and gives an detailed outline on which parts community is composed of. He defines community 
as “…aggregates of people who share common activities and/or beliefs and who are bound together 
principally by relations of affect, loyalty, common values, and/or personal concern  (i.e. interest in the 
personalities and life events of one another. Motives of interaction are thus centrally important in this 
definition, as they were for Tönnies. However, at least one outcome of these motives is also important. 
Because of the relative informality and consummatory character of communal relations, communities 
are based on a  sense of familiarity with others whose full personality is relatively  well known and not 
predominantly shaped by formal role relations. Thus, while a sense of community can be sustained in 
aggregates of as many as tens of thousands, true communities of place are invariably relatively small. 
It is perhaps unnecessary to add that not all communal social relations are amicable; a sense of 
security in the face of disliked others is deeply characteristic of communal relations.”74 
Robert Sampson on the other hand tried to distinguish the concept of community further and gave a 
further clarification in how communities are erupted. He argues that “The systemic model of 
community social organization conceptualises the local community as a complex system of friendship 
and kinship networks and formal and informal associational ties rooted in family life and ongoing 
socialization process (Kasarda &Janowitz 1974). The term systemic highlights  the theoretical focus 
on the system of social ties embedded within ecological, institutional, and normative community 
structures. The basic hypothesis derived firm this conceptualisation is that length of residence is the 
key exogenous factor that influences attitude and behaviour toward the community. “75 
Above, I have tried to give some definitions of the concept of community in order to have a kind of 
view in which way we have to look when we start to explore to the locus of law in community. A clear 
concept of “community and Law” approach is not given. It leans very much on sociological account of 
community and is therefore very much dependant on sociological description of community. 
Still Cotterrell has made an attempt to provide at least a kind of guidelines of where to look at if we 
trie to apply the concept of community in legal perspective.  
Cotterrell has tried to make a distinction in different forms of communities following Max Weber’s  
concept of community. He argues that: ”Following this  schema, community can be associated, first, 
with habitual or traditional forms of interaction: with the often accidental circumstance that people 
find themselves coexisting in a shared environment. This is traditional community. It includes what 
sociologists often refer to as  “local community”- the coexistence  of people in a defined geographical 
space; a neighbourhood, for example. But an empirical correlate of traditional community is also 
                                                 
73  Johannes Althusius, Politica (1614), p. 40 
74  Steven Brint, Gemeinschaft Revisited: A Critique and Reconstruction of the Community Concept,  p.9 
75 Robert J. Sampson, Linking the Micro- and Macrolevel Dimensions of Community Social Organziation 70 Soc. F. 43 1991-1992 p.45 
 38
found in the sharing of language. A linguistic community, in ordinary terminology, is a group of 
people who have  a particular language or dialect in common. Often, of course, local and linguistic 
groups reinforce each other’s  identity. Secondly, community may be associated with a convergence of 
interest among a group. This is instrumental  community, or community of interest. Is closest empirical 
correlate is a typical business community, or perhaps the original European Economic community. 
Thirdly, community may refer to the sharing of beliefs or values that stress solidarity and 
interdependence.  This can be termed community of beliefs. Religious congregations, churches or sects 
of various kinds most obviously approximate this type. Finally, the uniting of individuals by their 
mutual affection may be thought of in terms of community. This type can be called affective 
community. The legal philosopher John Finnis has noted that this is the kind of community in which 
“groupness” in itself is most important; indeed, “the most intense form of community [is] the 
friendship of true friends.” These four ideal types correlate indirectly  with Max Weber’s four ideal 
types of social action. Their formulation is an effort to extent Weber’s typification of action into a 
typification of basic forms of collective involvement and interaction. Thus, traditional community 
correlates with Weber’s type of traditional action, instrumental community with purpose-rational 
action, community of belief with value-rational action, and affective community with affective 
action.”76 
Thus, the concept of community, as I am utilizing it in this chapter has nothing in common with the 
communitarian political ideology. This approach is not a political concept but a more 
sociological/anthropological one, which tries to determine the inner social organization that exists 
within the society. Society, as such is a concept which is emanated from a political theoretical 
approach that departs from the ruler-ruled dichotomy. However, society is not just a blank 
accumulation of individuals which are kept together by the state, in the contrary. Society is further 
demarcated by different groups, organizations communities and association which has a greater 
influence on shaping and influencing the individual than the state alone.  
Society or ‘Gesellschaft’ as Tönnies phrased it, is a creation of state, which is comprised of a 
collection of different individuals altogether. Society is shaped in such way that it suits the governing 
structure of the state. This also explains why any other intermediary governing structures like 
communities are not allowed within the state, at least officially.   
However, due to global changes around the world, which increased the mobility of different 
communities from third world countries to the west, this firm institution of a society got challenged 
somehow.  Because of this demographic changes around the world, community as a concept gained 
importance in sociological research, into the nature of its institutional framework. Community, as a 
vital factor in society, has been ignored not only from a sociological point of view, (or at least not 
enough attention has been attached to this concept) but especially from legal point of view. Blood and 
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honour revenge is for example one of the customs, which is the result of communal bondage, which an 
immigrant has with its kin, or community, which can be traced all the way back to their village.  
 The importance of “Community and Law” approach is twofold. First of all it tries to exemplify the 
social and legal framework of that particular society. By having a clear picture of how this framework 
works, it enables the state, at least, to develop a policy that is adequate and effective enough to deal 
with problems that arises because of it. Especially in United Kingdom, Germany, France, The 
Netherlands and Scandinavian countries,,  there is a need to understand how these community 
structures work, in order to deal with the consequences that arises because of the clash between the 
community structure and society. In this kind of situation, criminal or immigration law does not 
provide adequate solution to solve the conflict. They will only deal with the symptoms of the 
problems.  
 Secondly, “Community and Law” approach will enable us to understand ‘law’ as a socially embedded 
phenomenon, however without discarding the phenomenon of law as such. Law cannot be merely 
perceived as a social process, like social scientists has done. Being socially embedded means that it 
derives its legitimacy from the social environment, but it does in no way mean that it is a sociological 
phenomenon. This is why my aim in this chapter is to identify and locate “law” within the community 
structure instead of explaining the whole social process.   
   
.  
2.3 Tönnies Typology Between Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft77 
 
 2.3.1 The Theory of Tönnies and the distinction between Gesellschaft and Gemeinschaft  
 
Tönnies typification of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft enables me to contrast the structural settings 
between community and society, in order to clarify the distinction between modern law and law within 
community. However, there are some minor remarks, which  
I want to expose first, before embarking on the issue. 
One of criticism against Tönnies’ analyses, which I want to refute, is the fact that his typification is 
simple, romantic and not appropriate for sociological, scientific research. As Brint asserted  
“Tönnies’s highly connotative approach invited confusion about the defining coordinates of 
community, and it encouraged the tendency of subsequent writers either to romanticize or debunk 
community, rather than to approach the issue of community and community types in a rigorous 
analytical spirit.”78 Because these typifications are not scientifically elaborated and outlined it just 
reflects certain sentiments of some who yearn for “the good old days”.  
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 The problem with sociology and with certain institutions which has to be unravelled within sociology, 
is that one has to start with simple typification in order to embark scientifically on a particular issue. 
Making first steps in sociological inquiry requires simple typifications in order to demarcate the 
research object carefully. From there on one can continue exploring or clarifying it further, or 
outlining research area within a certain topic. Moreover, only after certain simple typifications one can 
continue doing some empirical scientific work, based on these typification.   
 Because “Community and Law” approach is still in its infancy, Tönnies’ typification will therefore 
also be used in my chapter in order to clarify certain elements, which exists within community 
structure as opposed to “society” structure”. This typification is not used as scientifically proven facts, 
but tools to embark on a certain research area. Since I want to exemplify how community as a structure 
generates legal-normative rules, it is therefore essential to me to put it against society’s structure. Only 
in this dichotomy we will understand how community can generate legal norms, because there is no 
other way. And from here on one can continue further to make his point by attaching an example to 
illustrate the theory that is developed.  
 Concerning the claim, which is generally aimed at the  advocates of community approach (like Eugen 
Ehrlich) that Tönnies adheres to a kind of romantic nostalgic theory of community, is based on a 
presumption and cannot be derived from facts. As Assotionalists like Althusius, Gierke, Paul Hirst and  
Eugen Ehrlcih has stressed , community as a concept is not ideal theory but based on reality and facts, 
which is all but romantic. Community is an organization of individuals who come together to 
cooperate. In its traditional, rural, peasant-like version, community aims at survival. Every sociologists 
is aware of the oppressive nature of communities, which might be oppressive against individuals. This 
is mainly the reason why community is unravelled, in order to understand how it functions. I also have 
to add that in a political environment in which community as sub-unit is precluded, it is off course the 
task of sociologists to put it back on the agenda again stressing on certain attention and stressing on its 
importance.  
 The alternative to Tönnies’s  concept of community is that of Durkheim as proposed by Brint. 
According to Brint: ”Durkheim’s  work represents the most important alternative to Tönnies’s 
typological approach. Like Tönnies, Durkheim79 was impressed by the importance of community 
relations for equipping  human beings with social support and moral sentiments. Durkheim’s 
Conceptional breakthrough was to see community not as social structure or physical  entity but as a set 
of variable properties of human interaction that could be found not only among tradition-bound 
peasants of small villages but also among the most sophisticated citizens of modern cities.”80 
For scientific sociological inquiry, I would agree with Brint and adopt Durkheim’s  concept of 
community as an appropriate concept. However, Durkheim’s concept does not contribute to my 
                                                 
79 Emile Durkheim, The Elementary  form of Religious Life, transl. By Joseph  Ward Swain; Mustafa Emirbayer, 
Emile Durkheim: Sociologist of Modernity, Blackwell Publishing  
80 See, Steven Brint, p.3 
 41
inquiry in identifying the locus of law within community. It would be an apt theoretical foundation for 
empirical research, but would not help me in explaining how community generates legal norms.  
 
2.3.2 Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft 
 
According to Tönnies  All intimate, private, and exclusive living together, so we discover, is 
understood as life in Gemeinschaft (community). Gesellschaft (Society) is public life-it is the world 
itself.”. Gemeinschaft, according to Tönnies should therefore be perceived “…as a living organism, 
Gesellschaft (society) as a mechanical aggregate and artefact. Everything real is organic in so far as it 
can be conceived only as something related to the totality of reality and defined in its nature and 
movements by this totality.”81p.192 
The importance and the necessity to address the sociological anatomy of communities is that (just like 
we have to address pluralistic legal systems in legal science), is the fact that the natural organizational 
structures, which already exits prior to societies structure, is being overshadowed by the society as an 
organizational structure. This also explain that when legal scholars or sociologists who are trying to 
explore in the nature of community as a natural organization, they are being blamed of being 
“romantic”. 
  Community as an organization is established based to serve “necessity” of people, while society is 
perceived as an artificial construction of the state to enable individuals to pursue their lifehood the way 
they please. This artificial construction is characterized by Logical construction between individuals. 
Logical relationships constitutes the cornerstone of Gesellschaft as depicted by Tönnies, and  is 
artificial to the extent that the state has to maintain it by enforcing its power.  
According to Tönnies, community or Gemeinschaft is created by “…blood, denoting unity of being, is 
developed and differentiated into Gemeinschaft of locality, which is based on a common habitat. A 
further differentation leads to the Gemeinschaft of mind which implies only co-operation and co-
ordinated action for a common goal.”82 
Departing from this definition he distinguishes community in “…1) kinship, (2) neighborhood, and (3) 
friendship as definite and meaningful derivations of these original categories.”83 Although not 
exhaustive, this distinction provides us the “spheres” of influences, in which communities (or 
associations) might arise.  
Living in a community emphasises on the “locality” or proximity of the environment. Everything is 
kept simple and compact in contrary to life in a society, Gesellschaft. In a Gesellschaft everything is 
endless, and big. Moreover, cosmopolitanism for example,  can be perceived as a big society rather 
than a big community. Since cosmopolitans do not know each other and they also would not bother to 
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know. Paradoxically this is why they are cosmopolitans. They reside everywhere, without getting 
affected by the environment. They can settle down and feel at home wherever they are.   
Communities, in contrary to societies, are created on the ”sameness” principle of their community 
members. They live in the same territory, they speak the same language, they have the same habits the 
same customs. As Sampson argues  : “The ordinary human being, therefore- in the long run and for the 
average of cases-feels best and most cheerful if he is surrounded by his family and relatives. He is 
among his own (chez soi)”84 
Because community structure is total  “Neighbourhood describes the general character of living 
together in the rural village. The proximity of dwellings, the communal fields, and even the mere 
contiguity of holdings necessitate many contacts of human beings and cause inurnment to and intimate 
knowledge of one another.” 85 
In general, compared to Gesellschaft, living outside a Gemeinschaft (or Gemeinschafts) is hardly to 
imagine. Community’s  can be seen as a kind of safe havens, where process of movements are 
relatively free but outside the safe circles of community, suddenly the envirmont becomes more 
dangerous and incomprehensible. While society orderings enable individuals to move in large amount 
of space, but with the side effect of being distracted from its surroundings, community on the other 
hand gives a certain freedom of action but within a confined spatial and social territory. Outside this 
territory, it is hard of communal member to interact. This also explains why communities are largely 
closed to outside world, but also  
“All authority is characterized by particular and enhanced freedom and honor, and thus represents a 
specific sphere of will.”86 
“These inequalities can be increased only to a certain limit, however, because as the unity of unequal 
beings would be dissolved: In case the superiors’ legal power would become too great, their relation to 
the common sphere of right would become indifferent and without value and the inferiors’ legal power 
would become too small and their relationship thereto unreal and insignificant.” 
 “Reciprocal, binding sentiment as a peculiar will of a Gemeinschaft we shall call understanding 
(consensus).” 
“In the same way it can be said that everything that conforms to the conception of a  Gemeinschaft 
relationship and what in and for this situation has meaning.” 
“The real organ of understanding, through which it develops and improves, is language. Language 
given by means of gestures and sounds enables expression of pain and pleasure, fear and desire, and 
all other feelings and emotions to be imparted and understood.” 
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2.4 Trust, Values and Alternative Dispute Regulation 
 
2.4.1 Trust  versus Logic 
 
Trust 
 
Trust versus Logic resembles Tönnies’s typifictaion of Gemeinschaft versus Gesellschaft and Organic 
(natural) versus Artificial typifictaion of social structures. Natural, is that what occurs out of nature, 
because of necessity or the requirements of the nature as such. Since human beings are “social 
beings”, in nature they are forced to cooperate with each other and one reaches automatically to trust 
relationship, which exists between family members, between father and son, Husband and wife, 
neighbours and so on. These relationships are not voluntarily entered but entered  because the nature 
urges people to collaborate and cooperate together. This leads consequentially to a situation in which 
people has to trust each other and create s system where they will trust.  
 Trust, in a community, is the natural glue that keeps the members naturally bonded and connected. 
This natural connection of trust is rediscovered by economical science as an advantageous element, 
which can lower the cost that goes along with business contracts. As Avner Greif argued “Reputation-
based exchange is characterized by a low cost but a high marginal cost of exchanging with unfamiliar 
individuals. Law-based exchange, however, is characterized by the high fixed cost required to set up 
an effective legal system but the low marginal cost of establishing new exchange relationship.”87  This 
is why, as Kahan argued, “In this self-sustaining atmosphere of trust, reliance on costly incentive 
schemes becomes less necessary.”88 
This advantage by way of trust in economical science, is called, social-capital. The trust relationship, 
which exists between parties, lowers the cost that usually goes along with the regular contract. If men 
trust each other, they will not make an appeal to the costly legal apparatus that is set in force in order 
to accommodate impersonal exchange. But what does social capital (in economical context) entail? 
Social capital according to Portes is described in the following way “Whereas economic capital is in 
people’s bank accounts and human capital is inside their heads, social capital inheres in the structure 
of their relationships”.89 Contacts and networks are advantages that derives from social components, 
which benefits business contacts. As such trust is perceived as a social surplus that can be measured in 
economical terms.  
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In this respect, it is argued that what contributes to trust-relationship is the fact of reciprocity between 
the parties. As Kahan has clearly mentioned, “…logic of collective action counsels the creation of 
appropriate external incentives, the logic of reciprocity suggests the importance of promoting trust”90 
Collective action, as mentioned by Kahan is triggered by collective goals and aims, these collective 
goals are in turn, supported and accommodated by values, which are shared commonly and which I 
will try to explain beneath. People trust each other because they know they belong to a certain 
“totality”. As Olson argued:” “In collective-action settings, individuals adopt not a materially 
calculating posture but rather a richer, more emotionally nuanced reciprocal one. When they perceive 
that others are behaving cooperatively, individuals are moved by honor, altruism, and like dispositions 
to contribute to public goods even without the inducement of material incentives.”91  
These elements are not ‘created’ out of nothing, but is a natural result of having a kind of common 
goal. It is within this common aim in groups settings, that certain elements like honour, reciprocity and 
cooperation appears. What we try to do with sociological inquiry is to exemplify and identify these 
elements.  
As Kahan maintained, “And often, though certainly not always trust is specially characteristic of 
affective relationships. Certainly, its existence tends to promote the affective (emotional) element in 
social relationships. Trust implies power and dependence; the person trusted has the power over the 
one who trusts, as long as trust lasts. But Community is not a matter of ‘one way’ trusting 
relationships….Trusting relationships in a community are necessarily reciprocal.”92 
The relationship between reciprocity and trust is not one of enumeration but a kind of accumulation of 
elements. Both elements reinforces each other, that is to say, that trust enables reciprocity and the 
reciprocity, in itself, necessitates trust. Since there are many other social elements involved in a “social 
unity” that keeps the unit in a certain direction, these elements are not exhaustive. These are just some 
elements, which I brought in order to explain in where we could locate law in a social unit like 
“community”.  
 As Olson further stressed in “The reciprocity theory, in contrast, sees individuals as moral and 
emotional reciprocators. Most persons think of themselves and want to be understood by others as 
cooperative and trustworthy and are thus willing to contribute their fair share to securing collective 
goods.”93 
It is important to stress that members in a social units care more about long term expectations than 
short term. And for the sake of convenience, I like to claim that logical relationships, which I will 
explain hereunder, are based on short term expectations and outcome. That is why a clear decisions are 
desired rather than something ambiguous like restoring a relationship. The benefit of restoring a  
relationship is not something one would experience immediately and also the result is not as clear as in 
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regular legal system, based on logic. Since logic based, regular legal system aims at regulating and 
systematizing every action of an individual, it makes every action of an individual immediately judge 
able.  
 
Logic 
 
Logical relationship, on the other hand, fills in the lacuna, which exist in, when one removes the trust 
element. Since trust cerates certainty and predictability, one needs a substitute for this trust element, 
which is being found in the logical construction of legal rules (and logical and deductive reasoning). 
Logic is an apt way to create a system in which the individual on an impersonal basis (so without 
knowing each other) can enter into relationship. As Cotterrel put it : “Active interpersonal trust is 
largely replaced in many situations by a more passive confidence in impersonal systems (for example, 
financial, economic or political systems; or systems of activity represented by large business 
corporations or other organizations). Many of these social systems are defined, stabilized, and 
guaranteed by the law of the centralized state.”94 
To go a step further, one can even argue that the community responsibility system as Avner Greif 
defined it, could be even used for impersonal exchanges. In this case, it was the community as whole 
that stood guarantee for the dealings of the individual. As he argues  
“Mechanism enabling individuals to credibly communicate their social and personal identities are 
substituted for mechanisms for contract enforcement based on public information regarding past 
actions. Collective responsibility can thus foster impersonal exchange when past actions are not public 
information and personal identities cannot be credibly communicated across communal boundaries in 
the absence of collective responsibility:”95 
Logical construction, therefore,  emancipates individuals from their environment and at least to a 
certain  extent, gives them the presumption that a society can be build based on impersonal 
relationships between individuals. The logical axiomatic construction of logic, lies at the roots of our 
modern society with economics, or economical relationship as the groundwork for social relationship. 
Human beings are considered as Homos Economicus by Adam Smith,96 which means that we, human 
beings, are entrusted with a rational mind to make the right decision for our self. As rational human 
beings, our decisions are logical and therefore mathematical. Economical science, which is dedicated 
in the study of the rational homo economicus’ social relationship with one another constructed a whole 
social relationship on merely mathematical formula. What they argue is that the way human beings 
act, is very logical and easy to be predicted. Human actions can be calculated beforehand and 
regulated. 
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 It is mainly on this presumption that the modern concept of law is founded on. The modern concept of 
law as Max Weber argued is the product of capitalism in which legal rules try to assure  the flow of 
capital to a certain class in the society.97 
 The so-called certainty, which the modern legal system is praised to have, is based on this logical 
system of rules, in which actions are framed in this so called ”logical framework”. Outside this logical 
order, anything else seems obscure and ambiguous.  
Therefore, it is important to stress that logical methodology substitutes the loss of trust in impersonal 
relationships between partners, because “The language of judicial decision is mainly the language of 
logic. And the logical method and form flatter that longing for certainty and for repose which is in 
every human mind.”98 
Resembling law with mathematics allows men to predict and regulate human behaviour according to a 
beforehand, determined calculated rules. Moreover, law was considered as just a mathematical 
science. As Boonin  has stressed ”If Law was even compared with mathematics and the judge was 
considered a kind of geometrician, which implied that judges’ decisions were as bound by rules and as 
logically necessary as mathematical proof.”99 
As Von Jehring clearly expressed this (and his) annoyance of the employment of logic in law, he 
argues that “This desire for logic that turns jurisprudence into legal mathematics is an error and arises 
from misunderstanding law. Life does not exist for the sake of concepts but concepts for the sake of 
life. It is not logic that is entitled to exist but what is claimed by life, by social relations, by the sense 
of justice-and logical necessity, or logical impossibility, is immaterial. One could have considered the 
Romans mad, if they had ever thought otherwise, if they had sacrificed the interests of life to the 
dialectics of the school.”100 
The kind of picture that I want to draw in this paragraph about our modern concept of law, is very well 
illustrated by Duncan Kennedy. He argues that “Judgments of validity in modern "legal science" are 
(i) not judgments about a matter of fact, but correct or incorrect interpretations of the logical 
requirements of the meanings of the system of norms. They 
are (ii) not ethical judgments, because the logical coherence and gaplessness of the system of norms 
provides no warrant whatever of the moral desirability or moral (as opposed to legal) validity of the 
norm system as a whole or of any particular norm. They are (iii) "scientific" judgments, because 
validity is established according to interpretive procedures 
strictly bound by logic.101 As he further stressed ”In this system, as I explained above, gaps are filled 
by the analysis of the system, presupposed to be internally coherent, to build a chain downward from 
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some unquestionably valid abstract provision, or upward to and then downward from some logically 
required though unenacted abstract provision.”102  
The way Logic keeps the systems sustained, by creating its own independent validity system (which 
enables legal positivist Philosophers like Kelsen, to claim that Legal Systems work on their own) by 
way axiomatic deduction, has made legal science earn the title of science. But in effect it has no direct 
relationship with the main goal of the purpose of law, namely to have a normative effect on 
individuals. Because of Logical validity system, less attention has been paid on the normative effect of 
law and its subsequent effect on the society. Which would in turn remind us, that law is not a science, 
but a social phenomenon, indebted in the society.  
 
 
 
2.4.2 Values versus Rules 
 
Values  
 
The topic on values and rules will encompasses a whole encyclopaedia of books in order to outline 
and analyse it, reflecting on different scholarly perspectives, whether, (legal) philosophical, 
sociological or anthropological. This is utterly not my aim in this chapter. What I want to expose is 
how the underlying distinction of legal consciousness or the generation of legal norms between 
Community an society generates legal norms. It should help us to understand how for example, the 
Diamond Dealers Club, which I will explain in chapter three or the Jirga of Pashtunwali Afghans, do 
not use rules,- whether to not put in written legislative acts,- but base their drawings on values. While 
our modern concept of law is based on a logical system, which  logical systemized (or logically 
reasoned) rules, whether written or not (court decision and/or legislative acts), in order to induce 
individuals to certain actions. Values contain intrinsic inducements by norms, while rules (might) 
contain extrinsic inducement by norms.   
Values contain reason for human action, just like rules does. It forces people to act in a certain desired 
way. The totality of these reason are contained in values. Not all values are normative in nature, 
meaning that it will not induce individuals to act.  But the totality of the values create an intrinsic 
normativness, which will make human beings act in a certain way. The reason might be cultural, 
religious or based on certain business ethics, which the members are acquainted with.  
Values can therefore  be perceived as guidelines for actions to behave in a certain way. It does 
consist of norms, but these norms are contained in the totality of  (the shell of) values, which 
are persuasive. This is why values (from a sociological point of view) can be perceived as a 
normative set of conducts, which are desired or required to be taken. In order to take up an 
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inquiry into sociological nature of values, I have confined myself to Max Weber’s theory of 
values for two reason. First he makes a connection between incentives and actions. The 
importance of this method is that it provides us with a kind inclination into where the law 
could reside in community. Since community members live according to certain values and 
not so much by legal-rules, it is important to understand how this unfolds in practice. Another 
reason for me to adopt Max Weber’s  theory is that his theory on values and actions, is a part 
of a comprehensive sociological inquiry into how the modern society is changing. This 
juxtaposition of different systems, is of importance for my research. In the previous 
paragraphs and in previous chapter I have already depicted a certain account of Max Weber 
upon law and logic.  
Max Weber introduced the modern approach to sociology by scrutinizing the action of 
individuals. Instead of bluntly describing certain sociological features or concepts, Weber 
made an attempt to analyse human behaviour and how it would effect other fellow 
individuals. Based on this method, Weber made  an attempt to portray certain incentives that 
lie behind human action. He made an initial distinction between purpose-rational and value 
rational action  
He explains purpose- rationality and value-rationality in the following way:“[Social conduct 
may] be determined rationally and oriented toward an end. In that case it is determined by the 
expectation that objects in the world outside or other human beings will behave in a certain 
way, and by the use of such expectations as conditions of, or as means toward, the 
achievement of the actor's own, rationally desired and considered, aims. This case will be 
called purpose-rational conduct. Or, social conduct may be determined, second, by the 
conscious faith in the absolute worth of the conduct as such, independent of any aim, and 
measured by some such standard as ethics, aesthetics, or religion. This case will be called 
value-rational conduct."”103 
This highly elaborated outline of Max Weber, in which he tries to portray and link a 
comprehensive array of reasons to certain actions. This include both analysis of human 
behaviour based on irrational reasons as well as on rational reasons. Value-rational reasons 
for actions is conceived as irrational motives for certain actions. Value-rationality, in contrary 
to what the words project, are motives that make an appeal on emotions and believes. As he 
further clarifies, ”From the standpoint of instrumental rationality, however, value rationality is 
always irrational, and increasingly so as the value to which the action is oriented is elevated 
                                                 
103 Max Weber on Law in Economy and Society, (Max Rheinstein ed., Max 
Rheinstein and Edward Shils trans., Free Press 1954) (1925). 
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to the status of the absolute value. For as the intrinsic value of the action (pure conviction, 
beauty, absolute goodness, absolute devotion to duty) comes to the fore more unconditionally 
and exclusively, reflection on the consequences of the action diminishes.”104 So compared to 
purpose rationality (instrumental rationality) he argues that value-rational reasons are “always 
irrational”. In a way human beings are driven both by rational purpose aimed reason as well 
as intuitive, emotional reasons.  
Instead of just describing what value should entail, he connected those values with certain 
human action. In the end it is the action that counts. This is why Weber has classified six, so-
called ”value spheres” that would influence our conscience. As Oakes clearly enumerated: 
“Weber seems certain that there are precisely six such spheres, and no less confident as to 
what they are: religion, the economy, politics, aesthetics, the erotic (die Erotik) and 
intellectualism.”105 
 
Rules 
 
Rules on the other hand are just systematically collected directives of human action, it constitutes 
guidelines in how one should behave. The validity of ‘rules’ as ‘rules’ lies both in the logical framing 
of the rule, logical systematisation with other rules and logical application. In all these rules’ validity 
stems from logical construction. Rules are just like values, a facilitation of norms, but they inducement 
are extrinsic in contrary to values, which are intrinsic. Rules are always being enforced from outside 
and needs to a effective enforcement institution.106 
 According to Fuller, “Rules are systematic, public, products of perspective legislation, intelligible, 
consistent, feasible, and administered written.”107 Rules are therefore norms, which are induced from 
outside by way of enforcement procedures. Without enforcement procedure, no one would feel 
inclined to obey the rules, or at least the majority of rules. 
Kelsen on the other hand, brought up a more elaborated account of legal rules within a normative 
logical system, in his celebrated book called, Die Reihne Rechtslehre. He argues that a whole range of 
legal rules, hinges on a kind of “Grundnorm” (Basic norm), which function as a kind of an automatic 
validity system. Each rule is being scrutinise through other rules within the chain, up to the 
“Grundnorm”.   
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According to Kelsen, “Eine Vielheit von Normen bildet eine Einheit, ein System, eine Ordnung, wenn 
ihre Geltung auf eine einzige Norm als Letzten Grund dieser Geltung zurückgefürht werden kann. 
Diese Grundnorm konstituiert als die gemeinsame Quelle die einheit in der Vielheit aller eine Ordnung 
bildenden Normen. Und dass eine Norm zu einer bestimmten Ordnung gehört, geht nur daraus hervor, 
dass ihre Geltung auf die- diese Ordnung konstituierende- Grundnorm zurïckgeführt werden kann. 
Nach der art der Grundnorm, das heisst aber nach der Natur des obertsen Geltungsprinzips lassen sich 
zwei verschiedene Arten von Ordnungen (Norm-systemen) unterscheiden. Die Normen der einen Art 
“gelten”, das heisst das von ihnen angegebene Verhalten der Menschen ist als gesollt anzusehen, kraft 
ihres Gehaltes: weil ihr Inhalt eine unmittelbar evidente Qualität hat, die ihm Geltung verleiht.”108 
 Kelsen was one of the first legal positivists who tried to emphasise on the legal system that exist only 
out of legal rules, and finds its validity in the logical systematisation of those rules. According to 
Kelsen, legal rules (for Kelsen legal norms, and legal rules are interchangeable. Norm means “sollen”, 
“ought”). It suffice here to mention that legal rules is aimed conditioning a certain action and in this 
respect as Kelsen has put it constitutes to be an “ought”.109 
In contrary to legal-rules as we know, norms within values can be drawn from values, but they cannot 
exist outside the scope of values. Values constitute the foundation in which norms gets its meaning. As 
in legal semiotics’ conception of narativization explains, a legal rule can never be comprehended 
without the narrative context in which it resides.110  
 To illustrate this, one can mentioned the distinction between the Quran and Sharia rules. The Quran is 
the primary source for Muslim, which contain values for personal or group purposes. It gives direction 
on how one should live their lives, but can never be a source for governing purposes, since it does not 
contain any clear cut rules. In the contrary, the holy book is rather vague and ambiguous to be 
employed as a legal source, containing rules. The Sharia however is derived from the Quran, and 
contains only rules, which can be used for governing purposes. They are clear and ordered against a 
certain logical framework. Islamic jurisprudence is an independence science based on the Quran, but is 
not as original as the Quran itself. While Quran contain only values, rules that are derived from the 
Quran is gathered together in the Sharia. 
 
2.4.3 Judicatory System versus Alternative Dispute Resolution 
 
Alternative Dispute Resolution 
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In the past decades the interest in Alternative Dispute Resolution has increased immensely, because of 
its cost and outcome effectivity. While ADR is considered to be a collection of extra-judicial methods 
for legal disputes, it can also be used for non legal or extra-legal disputes. Moreover, the roots of ADR 
lies in anthropological and sociological inquiries in alternative ways to reach for a solution, than by 
legal and judiciary methods. Since judiciary is expensive and takes quite longer than ADR, one started 
to adopt ADR in regular judicial conflicts likes business agreements, divorce procedure, so anything in 
which maintaining a good relationship becomes important.111 This si why ADR emphasises more on 
methods that restores broken relationships than trying to adjudicate, which does not mean that 
adjudication is disregarded. Resorting relationships does not mean that it cures the relationship but it 
just makes it possible that a certain dialogue remains in order to achieve certain aims. This explains for 
example why mediation, as a from of ADR, is being employed in divorce cases. 
Which does not mean that it cures the relationship but it at least tries to find a solution in which a 
certain kind of relationship can be maintained, in order to pursue certain duties. Like in divorce access 
with children, ADR is mainly adopted because it reduces a lot stress and harm to children and 
maintaining the contact between parents for the sake of children is essential. This is why ADR is 
widely endorsed in divorce cases, but also in business contracts.  
ADR is a collection of possible methods for dispute resolution among which we can name mediation, 
conciliation, negotiation and arbitration.112 
Starting with arbitration,  arbitration is a direct alternative for state-structured judiciary system in 
which the judge is appointed to resolve the disputes which reach the court. The difference between the 
court procedure and arbitration lies mainly in the fact that the arbiter is chosen by both parties and the 
judge in the regular justice system, is appointed. What also matters in arbitration is that many cases 
that reach arbitration, are cases, which are founded on privately- drawn contracts or private legal 
systems, being agreed upon. So in essence, arbitration already bears a kind of particularity in this case.  
However, one cannot just assume arbitration only as “privately” installed judge. In the contrary. One 
can discern arbitration between official arbitration and unofficial arbitration. Official arbitration is 
always covered by official acts like the British Arbitration act.113 The subsequent courts or tribunals, 
which are founded upon those acts, like the Jewish Beth Din courts or the Muslim Arbitration 
Tribunal, are all based on this acts.114 Their decisions are therefore legally and officially binding. It is 
recognized by official institutions of the government.  
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Mediation on the other hand is a method in which a conflict, a dispute or an agreement, whose terms 
has still to be settled, are solved. A third party, with an objective view on the matters and  relationship, 
tries to find ways in which both parties would meet  in the middle way and agree. The aim is not to 
inquire about the nature or the roots of the problem and make judgements (Like the judiciary or 
arbitration does), but instead to find an agreement between the parties who can find themselves in the 
agreement itself. Maintaining a solid endurable relationship is the main prerequisites in mediation. 
Because even if agreements are reached, the parties has to apply the terms of the agreements in 
practice. This is the reason why they both have to agree, and as long as they do not agree with one of 
the terms the mediation process will just continue. In the judiciary system however, people do not 
have to agree with the adjudication terms. The terms will just be enforced by the judge, by 
enforcement mechanisms like fine, or even imprisonment. . 
 Negotiation on the other hand shares the same characteristic and principles as  mediation but is 
applied in commercial practices. In negotiation the parties do not want to solve  a conflict or getting 
out of a ditch, instead they want to reach the most suitable contract or agreement for both parties as 
possible. They will try to get an agreement which is the most profitable for both parties. They mostly 
enter into negotiation with a prior set goals, which they want set through by way of negotiation. They 
can negotiate alone or if desired with a third person to guide the negotiations.115 
Conciliation is a kind of mediation but its emphasise lies predominantly on  post-conflict restoration 
of relationships. The kind of situations in which conciliation is being employed are mostly harsher 
than in mediation. While in mediation takes place in the middle of a conflict or just after the conflict, 
conciliation only happens long after the conflict has already made a lot damage for both parties. One 
can say that  the parties who opt for conciliation are tired of the conflict and want to settle down the 
conflict.  
After having given a kind of brief introduction into certain methods of ADR, I will now try to 
illustrate how ADR functions in practice. I will especially focus on non-official methods, in order to 
stress my arguments of self-governing, autonomous social units’  like associations and communities.  
To illustrate how ADR functions in practice, especially in non-official, non-state way, I will use 
Afghanistan as an example. Afghanistan is characterized by the heavy presence of tribes, 
communities, clans and Kinships. The conflicts they resolve is very peculiar and with a logical mind, 
absolutely not comprehensible. Conflicts, need a thorough engagement in the subject manner. One 
cannot solve a  conflict by merely logical deductions. So this is why they attach a lot of value on 
conflict prevention by way of adhering to certain values, very strictly116, which have to be preserved, 
and if than still a conflict erupts than recourse is been done to unconventional methods. 
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 The importance of prevention of conflict, and conflict centeredness of ADR appears in the phrase of 
Ali Wardak where he stresses that “The primary concern in this case is to strike a balance between 
preventing the conflict from becoming a tribal enmity of revenge killing and the restoration of 
collective tribal honour.”117 The methods applied are simple but effective and adjusted to the problems 
at the floor. To illustrate a short example as stressed by Wardak in which Afghans try to solve their 
conflicts by arranged marriages between conflictions families. As he said, “Interestingly, in the last 
option of responding to murder, the offender and the victim's relatives (or their respective tribes) are 
not only reconciled by jirga, but become (new) relatives by marriage. But, the individual - a woman in 
this case - often pays the price for the tribe’s social survival in this patriarchal group-oriented society. 
This practice is not only in direct conflict with Afghan legal norms, but also a violation of the 
principles of Human Rights. This and the exclusion of women from jirga process are a reflection of 
the patriarchal social structure of Afghan society.“118 
Here we find a very lucid combination of a practise, which is necessary in order to restore the 
relationship between certain families and the same time a value-judgement based on universalistic 
perception by… himself. Whether women’s right is being harmed is something that is not at stake. 
Who would care about women’s rights (or anybody’s right) if the whole community (-ies) is being 
threatened to be exterminated.  
Group survival prevails above individual’s autonomy which is being protected by certain rights 
deriving from the constitution. As I will explain further in the next coming chapters about 
Afghanistan’s  constitution, one of the main lacuna in all the past enacted constitution was the 
emphasis on rights, which did find any recourse within the society. .  
 
Judicatory System 
The judicatory system system is very  much linked to the logical reasoning and systematisation of 
legal rules as I have depicted above. That is why in this paragraph there is not much to say except to  
stress a again the fact the judicatory system aims to try to ascertain issues in order to continue. Instead 
of “restoring the relationship” the judicatory system is stately imposed adjudication system, in which 
the emphasis is laid on reaching certain ‘goals’ or  ‘results’ rather than restoring relationships.  
As mentioned above, this is why the judges act as geometricians, simply because rules have to be 
applied according to certain logic. Everything that fall out of certain logic does not exist.  
 Whether we have the continental legal systems with its enacted codes and judiciary that applies it or 
the common law system, which has the fact finding judiciary ( an active judiciary) and encoding of 
their judgements, in all these cases judgements are made according to certain logical reasoning. 
Because, it is within this logical structure that certainty can be guaranteed.  
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2.5 Conclusion  
 
Defining law as being socially embedded, brings us automatically to the concept of community. 
Community as a concept provides us the necessary outer ‘shell’, which embraces the whole social 
dynamism within the context which contributes to the development of legal rules. The only thing 
which lawyers can do is only to try to locate how certain processes can contribute to the generating 
and maintain of legal rules within community. 
In order to comprehend the phenomenon of “community and law” approach, it necessitates to change 
the mentality from in trying to find the locus of law. For this purpose, Tönnies theory and his 
typification between “Gemeinschaft” and “Gesellschaft” provides us with the necessary tools to 
explore where law resides in community.  
By typifying in the same token the concepts, Trust versus Logic, Values versus Rules, Alternative 
Dispute Resolution versus Judicatory system, I am able to exemplify the locus of law in community.  
Trust relation as we found out, constitutes one of the core foundations of the legal system within 
communities. Ina trust relationship, which exist between family relatives, neighbours, and 
communities like in rural villages, enable a personal based exchange system, where the reputation of 
an individual, family or community, constitutes enough certainty to enter in to a “business “ 
relationship. While in logical structure, logic has substituted the Trust relationship, by logical, 
mathematical reasoning, which establishes a kind of trust system for “impersonal exchange”. Its 
means for example that a foreigner can enter into business without even knowing the other (trade) 
partner well.  
 While Trust relationship is made possible by a value system, either religious or cultural, Logical 
system is sustained  by a logical construction of enforceable rules. Values induce peoples behaviour by 
intrinsically, without a clear enforcement from outside. Whereas the logical system, with (legal)rules 
is extrinsic, and needs a clear organ which will enforce these rules. This explain for example why 
people who employ value system hardly use a code or a written system of (legal) rules, this is simply 
because they “know” how it is.  
 The final typification which illuminates us the centre of “law” within the community, is the 
typifictaion between Alternative Dispute Resolution and Judicatory system. While the emphasis in the 
first one lies on how to restore the relationship between individuals or families, the latter just 
ascertains certain aggregation of facts, like Boonin calls it “like a geometric”.  
These typifications enables us to identify law within any community or association, instead of  trying 
to analyse whether certain behaviour should be classified as law or not. Within this “ community and 
law” approach, one can identify law, without really getting too much into detail about whether one 
behaviour should be called law or not. Since law is socially embedded, but that does not mean, as 
many social scientist argue, that law can be conceptualised as a “ social process”.  
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Chapter 3 Jewish Diamond Industry 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter I have tried to show how community organization could generate legal norms, 
as part of the internal dynamic of the community.  I have made an attempt to make a thorough  
analysis of this internal dynamic, in order to make a point. Namely, that communities are 
comprehensive organizations that not only can generate legal norms but also maintain the legal order 
within the community. I have enumerated and outlined three elements, which I considered to be 
decisive, namely, Trust, Value, and ADR. 
 In order to illustrate this theoretical inquiry, I will try to utilize the Jewish diamond Industry as an 
example, so that the theory I have elaborate above, will be illuminated. The Diamond Industry is a 
unique example for this purpose, because it is an industry, which has maintained its own 
organizational structure for the last centuries and it is still characterized by its extra-legal structure that 
has dominated the diamond trade. 
 A peculiar aspect of this example is the intertwinement of both associational structure and communal 
structure with its values, customs and tradition.119 Since the diamond industry is largely dominated by 
ultra-orthodox Jews, their religious doctrine, tradition and family -and communal bonds, it has put its 
own stamp on the whole industry. This further explains why the whole business in the diamond 
industry cannot be comprehended with a conventional (contractual)-legal mind, but rather by a more 
illogical relationship based on trust, values and solving disputes, instead of exclamation of justice . 
  In this chapter I want to try to elucidate how trust among participants in the diamond business, like 
dealers, cutters, distributors or brokers, facilitates and regulates an exceptional business practice, 
which is very characteristic to the diamond industry. Moreover, the whole legal/normative relationship 
(business) among participants in this branch is based on three pillars, which are crucial and interrelated 
with each other. Trying to have a kind of parallel setting with the previous chapter, I will start off with 
discussing the importance of Trust and, in this case, the issue of (good) Reputation in the diamond 
industry. Since the whole industry evolves around the ability to get access to the credit market, having 
good reputation is indispensable for trading diamonds. A good reputation means a guarantee for 
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conducted future business agreements. Moreover, without a good reputation a trader will be hampered 
to get access to the vital information and Credit Supply, which both will be explained.     
The second pillar constitutes Values, which are shared within the diamond industry. These Values are 
both a mixture between those that are particular to the profession of the Diamond Industry as such, and 
are developed by the Diamond Industry in the past centuries. And there are values, which  are brought 
in a being part of the Jewish community. I will explain by  giving some examples how Jewish Values 
penetrate/permeated into the diamond industry.  
Values represents the cornerstone of the industry, which is being upheld by the Diamond Dealers Club 
(A Bourse), as the central organization  that control the whole business.  
 In the third Pillar I will explain more about the DDC (Dimaond Dealers club) as the organization that 
is in charge to guarantee that the business goes according to the accorded values and habits. Moreover, 
the third Pillar is about dispute resolution and the role of the DCC in fulfilling this job. However, the 
duties of the DDC are not limited by dispute settlement only, but it does make up the core 
responsibility.  
 In order to illuminate more about how the diamond industry generally function, I would like to 
embark on this chapter with giving a brief introduction on how the diamond industry is organized and 
how it generally functions. I will argue how important “network effects” are in the Diamond Industry. 
 
3.2 The Diamond Industry’s Chain of Network 
3.2.1 Network Effects 
“While networks may enjoy economies of scale and scope in production, the unique quality of a 
network is economies of scale and scope in demand. Economists refer to this phenomenon as “network 
effects”: the value of membership in a network is enhanced by an increase in the number of other 
members or in the other members’ usage of the network.”120 
Network effect is the advantage one draws from being a member of an organization with certain ties. 
Being a member, automatically gives the participant access to certain means like customary data, 
chain of infrastructure and the like. The advantages are part of just being a member.  
The importance of Network and Network structures like social circles is that it has to be maintained 
and constitutes the cornerstone of the business. Since such an organizational structure carries the 
elements of exclusivity, it is not easy to enter in this social unit. The reason is that the structure itself is 
based on social elements like reputation and trust and this is something that has to be earned along the 
way. 
 The advantages of being a member can derive from very odd reasons like sharing the same language. 
“Language is characterized by network effects—the benefit derived from communicating in a 
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language increases significantly as more people are familiar with it.” 121 As we will see in the next 
paragraphs, in the Jewish Diamond Industry “Mazel u Broche”, establishes an agreement between 
traders. 
 
 
3.2.2 DeBeers Syndicate and the Diamond Industry Network 
 
First of all, before I commence on exploring the internal dynamic of the Diamond industry I will try to 
explain the importance of Network effects. The Diamond industry is characterized by a very strict 
hierarchical structure, which is superseded by the DeBeers syndicate who distributes rough diamonds 
to dealers, cutters and brokers who add value to the rough diamond by their trade and cuttings. 
DeBeers syndicate who supposedly controls 65% of the rough diamond, distributes its diamond 
through its Diamond Trading Company to approximately 125 merchants, called sightholders who are 
not able to refrain the offer. Once an offer is renounced, the sightholder will not be invited for any 
future “sights”. The whole chain of network relations starts here at the heart of the rough diamond 
distribution. 
This distribution takes place at “bourses’, trading halls for diamond merchants, which are spread 
throughout the world. These  bourses “…provide an infrastructure that 
organizes a network of dealers. Bourses now serve as vital fountains of information and 
enable merchants to become familiar with potential business partners.”122 I will get to the importance 
of information, reputation and access to credit later on, it suffice her to mention that it comprises an 
essential part of the diamond business. 
 So the way rough diamonds find their way to the market, is controlled by the DeBeers Syndicate and 
ends eventually at the market after having been exchanged many times from traders. 
 
3.3 Trust and Reputation  
 
Trust is an important factor in the diamond industry since it represents the whole business, without it 
no any transaction will be conducted. Since contracts does not make up the usual business dealings in 
diamond trade, because of enclosure of valuable information, relational trust is its substitute. This trust 
reflects itself in “reputation” based commerce, which is characteristic in many “Private Legal 
Systems” and so, in Diamond industry. 
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 Reputation based commerce is one of the essentials in the so-called private legal systems which 
makes  up the legal framework of associational structures. In his pivotal article about  Private Legal 
Systems, Amitai Aviram states that “In analysing the institutions that mitigate opportunism, the 
private-ordering literature emphasizes two elements: repeated play and reputation.”123 
 Both repeated-play and reputation are interconnected. Repeated-play denotes the desire to conduct 
business in the future  together and as such today’s business is conducted with the purpose for future 
business. This entails subsequently the importance of reputation in Private Legal Systems, like the 
diamond industry, which I will elaborate here briefly. 
 
 
3.3.1 Reputation   
 
Reputation, constitutes the cornerstone of the diamond industry. A good reputation gives the  dealer 
access to precious information about other dealers reputation, information about gemstones, access to 
credit and solvability. “Sustaining reputation-based exchange relies on mechanisms that inform all 
parties of the reputations, or past behavior, of potential business partners.”124 This mechanism enables 
and maintains the trust relationship that prevails among diamond merchants.   
  One of the reason why this industry is marked by commerce by “reputation”, is that any other 
conventional way of doing business would damage the industry by causing unnecessary transaction 
cost and waste of time at court proceedings. As Lisa Berman has  stated  
“ It argues that, if commercial transactions in the diamond industry were governed solely by legally 
enforceable contracts under which the promisee could recover expectation damages in the event of 
breach, the market would be characterized by frequent, inefficient breach of contract. It attributes this 
inefficiency to the uncertainty of recovery, the way courts calculate damages, the time it takes to 
obtain judgement, and the fact that many diamantaries do not have ready access to capital markets.” 125 
The importance of reputation in the diamond industry as a regulatory factor, is reflected by Richman 
emphasise on the so called” reputation mechanism”, in the diamond industry. According to Richman, 
the “reputation mechanism will induce cooperation of diamond dealer and other participants with an 
eye on along term relationship. As soon as a partner fails to commit its part of the agreement, this will 
break the “chain” in the trust relationship and harm the reputation. If a reputation is harmed, it will 
function as sign to others to either to abstain to do any business with this person or to be cautious.  
The first mechanism according to Richman, is “…the floor of the trading hall”. As I will get to this 
later more elaborate, on the trading floor one will find necessary valuable information about the real 
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incentives, characters and past dealing/business of the their trading partners. Hence, the function of a 
“trading floor”, is “…bustling with information about parties and market conditions, and some traders 
spend time on the trading floor just to keep abreast of available information.”126 
 Another mechanism of reputation is by putting the  picture on the wall of the trading hall of the DDC, 
of those who failed to fulfil the terms of the agreement. In case of any wrongdoing of a club member 
of him failing to fulfil his duties arising out of an agreement will make his picture be hanged in the 
trading hall. In other words, “…maintaining good standing as a DDC member – and preventing your 
picture from ever reaching the wall –also becomes well known and functions as an important 
information signal.” 
Finally, there is another mechanism that shows how members are being forced to commit with the 
terms of the agreements, without the interference of the state. Since being in the Network enables the 
trader all kind of benefits, nobody wants to be known as a cheater. This is why all members are keen 
to have good standing. “The third necessary condition for an effective reputation mechanism is 
coordinated punishment. An individual will be deterred from cheating only if he knows that none of 
the diamond merchants will transact with him after he cheats.”127 
 This is something very particular to associations and communities. Namely, since the organization 
provides certain exclusive benefits, it is in the individual members concern to do its utmost best to stay 
within the organization. It will become his duty and his concern to make sure he will not fall out of the 
Network, which he benefits from. In these kind of organizations (like communities and associations), 
‘rights’ and ‘duties’ are interconnected. Without a ‘duty’ you will not obtain a ‘right’. 
The reputation of a dealer is, furthermore, family based, which means that the business is not 
conducted among individuals but families. This is why certain family, community and religious values 
are very dominant and important in diamond business, since it establish the asset of future business. If 
the family has an indisputable reputation, this will enhance and contribute to good business relations 
for in the future. This is why  the whole diamond business is centred around having a good reputation 
and it creates its own vicious circle. The reputation of the last family member, will influence many 
future business transaction in future generations. Since reputation is important nobody will harm their 
own reputation willingly and if some do, they will expelled from the bourse, in this case the DDC 
(Diamond Dealers Club (New York)). The DCC functions here as a kind of reputation watch 
authority. 
“The elder enters into an agreement with the fallen dealer as a way to allow him to recover 
and rebuild a reputation. While reputations are fragile and extremely difficult to recover 
                                                 
126  Idem, p.19 
127  Idem p. 27 
 60
once damaged, rehabilitation is sometimes possible and is substantially aided if a well respected  
industry member offers assistance”128 The importance of reputation is clearly shown in how 
DDC/bourses pay attention on the revelation of diamond dealers who could not comply with the terms 
of their agreement 
 
3.3.2 Information and Credit Supply 
 
I have put this heading under the paragraph of Reputation, but it could have been even a part of the 
next chapter about Values. On the one hand, a good reputation gives access to essential information 
about the diamond trade and also to the credit market. On the other hand giving and receiving 
information are bound by certain cultural and religious values, even peculiar business values.  
As this example shows, information supply is an essential element in Diamond Industry’ business 
conduct, at the same time it show the underlying Value (system) that  supports the whole information 
supply. “That frustrating experience – that is the kind of information I would share with my close 
colleagues and relatives. If they asked me about what kind of businessman this individual is, I’d tell 
them that he has given me some trouble. But truthfully, I would only share the information if I were 
asked – I wouldn’t spread it around on my own initiative. Also, I think I’d only share the information 
with people I knew well. If a colleague that I don’t know so well asked me about this person, I’d 
probably just say that I don’t know anything.”129 
Diamond industry chain of network relations, is, as I have mentioned above based on reputation, 
amongst others. The other to elements are access to information and credit. Knowing who is credible 
and trustworthy and not, is actually what the whole diamond business is about.  
 A diamond dealer cannot cope to do business with trade partner who has dodgy reputation. Doing 
business with someone who is not only trustworthy but at the same time also creditworthy, means a 
success in future business, because the relationship that is being entered is not for one time but for 
many deals in the future.  
 In order to maintain a good information flow, the Diamond Dealers Club supervises and educates 
traders in providing information. Since a wrong information can ruin the business of another trader. In 
one of the example of a Rabbi it becomes apparent how important a good information flow is and how 
much value is given to good information flow. In this example of a Rabbi, “a man goes before his 
Rabbi and admits to having spread harmful information about his neighbor. He asks the Rabbi what he 
should do to repent. The Rabbi says “You need to do the following: go home, find a feather pillow, 
and release the feathers into the wind.” The man follows the Rabbi’s instructions and returns the next 
day. The Rabbi then says, “Now, to gain forgiveness, you must go back to your home and retrieve all 
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of the feathers.” “But Rabbi,” the man exclaims, “The feathers by now have scattered throughout the 
village!” “Precisely!” the Rabbi says. “And so too has the damage you have caused to your 
neighbour’s reputation.”130 
This is why the diamond traders are quite aloof in providing wrongful information, or even any 
information as long as they are certain it will not damage anybody wrongfully. They will hardly 
provide information to strangers. One has to bear in mind that  the role how different values and 
especially religious values exert on the traders, are immensely. No legal system can maintain such an 
order as certain values do. 
 
3.4 Values and the Diamond Industry  
 
3.4 1Values 
 
Good reputation is being supported by subsequent values that underlie a good reputation  
Values play an important role in the diamond industry. Adhering to certain values contributes 
to the creation of good reputation, which in turn improves the trading position of a merchant. 
Additionally, adhering to certain values or the same values, contributes immensely to trust 
relationship, which is necessary in order to be in part of the Diamond Industry.  
 Certain kind of business manners, which we are used to, like putting agreements on paper, going to 
court in case of  business dispute, does not occur in the Diamond Industry. It is solely based on a 
construction of chain of networks tied up through certain values and institutions that make sure these 
values are being sustained. 
 Next to special business custom or ethics, the Diamond Industry has also developed its own customs 
and ethics. Instead of putting an  agreement on paper after having constructed by a lawyer, with 
signature, and agreement of the trading floor in the diamond industry goes along with the words, 
“Mazel u’broche’, which creates a binding agreement.  This remind me of the animal market in the 
Netherlands, where shaking hands constitutes an effective agreement. These particular business 
dealings are also accepted by the Dutch law as legally enforceable “agreements”.  
  
3.4.2 Community and its influence on the Diamond Industry 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, the peculiarity of the diamond industry is that it  intermingles 
communal values with associational structures. Although it looks peculiar, it is not as weird as it 
appears. Communal values, or culture, whether religious or traditional, enhances the effectiveness of 
norm enforcement and application. It increases the knits in the ties among members of the association 
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more rigorously than without. As Avner Greif rightly states, “Common culture reduces costs involved 
in regulation in several ways. Since it creates a sense of belonging, it widens the scope of services 
provided by the network to include social gratification.”131 
Therefore, the deterrence effect of exclusion from the network is greater because exclusion entails not 
only loss of business with network members, but also loss of social standing. “Common culture also 
provides members with knowledge about matters relevant to the business transacted over the network 
and standardizes this knowledge among the network members, thus reducing information 
asymmetry.”132 
Community connection and bondage creates cost advantage, which other “free mainstream business  
relationships”, does not have. Costs that goes along with good legal advice, accountancy, judiciary and 
all other thinkable administrative matters, are lacking in the community. Instead, trusting your fellow 
community members, based on reputation and the subsequence trust, substitutes the unnecessary and 
costly guarantees, which one should take in order to do business without flaws.  
Moreover, besides the existence of merely relational ties and cost advantages, it also contributes 
immensely to the legal-moral conscience of the member. What is perceived as “wrong” in the 
community has a more pressing effect on the community-members, then when one would just consider 
it as administrative manner, which can be circumvented. For example, tax evasion. Or what 
“Economics and Law” scholarship advocates namely, if there is an financial advantage to be gained by 
breaching an agreement than that should be done.133 Instead as Richman depicts, “Common culture 
may also add a psychological element to the enforcement of norms because a violation of the norms of 
one’s social group with which one empathizes or identifies may be perceived by oneself and by others 
as more morally wrong than violating the norms of more distant peoples or groups. Moreover, 
membership in a network may induce a sense of kinship that would increase the guilt associated with 
violating a norm that harms one’s “kin,” and may eliminate the ability to justify norm violation with 
an antipathy to “outsiders.”134 
The kind of inducement that community relational ties brings on members, is way more effective in 
the enforcement of values and rules that stems from it, than a logical ordered legal system. As I tried 
to exemplify in this chapter up till now, the strict business structure in the Diamond Industry, is merely 
based on relational ties (family or community), instead of abstract, logical and rational legal rules. 
 As Richman Asserted, “Moreover, family ties also connect Club members, as many members gain 
entry through the sponsorship of close relatives. In short, extended family and community networks 
cement the Club’s larger community and reinforce the intimate familiarity and interdependence that 
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Club members have with each other.”135 Furthermore,”…, a common culture creates a unique good—
esteem or social standing in the group—which can be a powerful motivator to follow the norms of the 
group.”136 
As explained in my previous chapter on “community and law” approach, the trust based relationship 
creates a cost advantage because there is no need to set up an artificial enforcement system. A trust 
relationship, which is based on either common values, common culture or common religion will 
reduce the cost in business interaction. As Amitai Aviram has stressed: “For all these reasons, 
common culture reduces the cost of enforcing norms.”137 This is why, a “Part of the value in belonging 
to a common culture, however, is the difficulty in artificially producing it.”138 
 
3.5 Diamond Dealers Club and Alternative Dispute Resolution   
 
The Diamond Dealers Club, as an organization fulfils the function of spill in the whole chain within 
the business. Being accepted by the DCC and being a member, means that many doors will get open. 
One would get access to information, traders contact, dispute settlement, and everything that is needed 
to trade well on the floor. It is hardly unthinkable to trade in diamond without being a member of the 
DDC.   
 The DDC is a “Bourse” like any other bourse, except it is situated in New York in one of the main 
Diamond centres of the world. As its name reveals it is truly ‘just’ a club, but having a huge impact on 
the running of the diamond business. The functions of the DDC are manifold, I will just mention some 
of them. 
First of all the DDC is a meeting place for all diamond dealers, cutters and brokers who work in one of 
the chains in the diamond branch that starts off with rough diamond supplied by DeBeers syndicate 
until it reaches the jewellery. Participants in the different chain of the diamond industry meet each 
other in the “Club House”. The atmosphere is informal and pleasant, and does not carry any rigidity or 
formality.  
This reminds me of the function, which Turkish coffeehouses had in the past and still have. Each 
profession had its own coffeehouse where they meet up, talk and try to get a job. But in a way one has 
to be accepted by the “coffeehouse”, otherwise one could not enter. Being  a part of this coffeehouse 
meant that one had access to information, customers and solidarity. It was and it is a kind of 
clubhouse, labour organization, and employment office at the same time.  
 Although informal, the function, which DDC exercises are manifold. Moreover, its mainly because 
the informality of the DDC that it could operate on many fields at the same time. A second key duty of 
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the DDC is to function as the Arbiter in conflicts. Arbitration is important, since the whole business 
stands and fall on relationships. If a relationship brakes off, every effort has to be done to repair it. 
This explains why the participants rather opt for DDC’s own arbitration than courts redemption.  
 In this respect, DDC requires a dealer to “…sign an agreement to submit all disputes arising from the 
diamond business between himself and another member to the club’s arbitration system. The 
agreement to arbitrate is binding. Unless the club opts not to hear the case, the member may not seek 
redress of his grievances in court. If he does so, he will be fined or expelled from the club. 
Furthermore, since the agreement to arbitration is binding, the court will not hear the case.”139 
If we want to answer the question, why the Diamond Industry could survive for so many years, the 
reason has to be found in this aspect of the industry, namely the exclusivity of arbitration by DDC. 
The exclusivity of the Diamond Industry in combination with information and credit supply services, 
enhances the importance of DDC and also in succeeding solve disputes. Since other possibilities to ask 
for redress are closed, adhering to the terms of DDC becomes essential .The authority of the DDC 
increases in this way and therefore, also in getting an appropriate result. As Berstein stressed, 
“Accordingly, the true power of the DDC’s dispute resolution system rests on the degree to which it 
supports trust-based exchange and can foreclose future transactions to uncooperative merchants. The 
DDC fulfills this role by facilitating information exchange and publicizing individual reputations”140 
At the same time, this function of arbitration goes hand in hand with DDC’s  function to maintain 
“good reputation” of the club members. It is important to stress again that all these functions are very 
much related with each other. As Richman has correctly put, “The purpose of the DDC’s arbitration 
board is not to enforce contracts; it is to maintain the accuracy of reputations.”141 If a dealer fails to 
commit to its agreement obligation, instead of going to file a suit at the state court, hic picture will be 
hanged in board room of the club. With this, all other dealers will be notified about who is trustable 
and who is not. In a business where everything evolves around trust this is highly effective and less 
expensive.  
In this example, which Richman referred to in his Article, “… a dealer falsely accused another of 
stealing his stone. He later realized that he actually misplaced the stone and apologized to the dealer, 
but the accusation had already become common knowledge. The second dealer then brought the first 
before the arbitration committee for impugning his reputation, and the board ordered the false accuser 
to make a public apology and donate fifty thousand dollars to a Jewish charity.”142 
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3.6 Conclusion 
 
In this example I have tried to illustrate the “Community and Law Approach” would function practice, 
by explaining how the Diamond Industry functions. I have tried to show that within the Diamond 
Industry, three pillars, namely Trust (Reputation), Values and ADR constituted the core foundation on 
which the industry resides. In order to maintain the trust among dealers and cutters, both Values and 
DDC play and eminent part in upholding the whole associative structure of the diamond industry. The 
values, whether religious or communal outlined the structure of the diamond industry. Certain rules, 
and habits had to be maintain just because they were commonly shared. Even Rabbi’s played their part 
in upholding the values in the Diamond Industry.  
On the other hand, DDC as ‘clubhouse’, operated as the spill in keeping the Diamond Industry 
exclusive and rigid organization. Thanks to this rigid and strictness, it could provide the required trust 
that was needed among dealers, in order to play the “game” accordingly. This explains why the 
Diamond Industry could survive for so many years, without being a part of the official state apparatus.  
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Chapter 4   The Harm Principle and Associationalism  
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
4.1.1  Introduction 
 
One of the main posed objection against the application of “Community and Law” approach, 
is the position of the individual. It seems to the critiques, as if “Community and Law” 
approach would discard the position of the individual, as it would put the group interest above 
the individual interest. They argue above all that the individual would therefore be oppressed 
and it would not provide enough protection to safeguard individual’s rights.  
 As one can predict, the main objection stems from the liberal’s, because somehow 
“community” as a concept has a bitter taste to Liberals. Whether knowingly or not, 
“community” as a concept resembles to (us)them automatically to “communitarism” with 
which community approach has nothing to do with it at the first sight.143 
 One of prominent criticism against “Community” approach stems from Will Kymlicka144, 
and I will take his essay as introductory foundation for this chapter. In his essay about “Two 
Models of Pluralism and Tolerance”, one would get easily mislead, because Kynmlicka gives 
the impression as if he embraces the “Community” approach. Will Kymlicka claims namely, 
that  besides John Rawls’ theory of “Religious Tolerence” which is based on reformation, 
there exist another form of religious toleration, which is far more sophisticated and better 
equipped to accommodate religious pluralism than Rawls’ is. He argues that “the Ottoman 
Millet System” constitutes a considerable and serious alternative to Rawlsian theory of 
religious tolerance.  
Because, according to Kymlicka, within this “Ottoman Millet System”, “…the Muslims did 
not try to suppress the Jews, and vice versa, but they did suppress  heretics within their own 
community. Heresy (questions in the orthodox interpretation of Muslim doctrine) and 
apostasy  (abandoning one’s religious faith) were punishable crimes within the Muslim 
community. Restrictions on individual freedom of conscience also existed in the Jewish and 
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Christian communities. The millet system was, in effect, a federation of theocracies”145  But 
he immediately adds to it that his “… aim is not to defend this second model. On the contrary, 
like Rawls, I believe that the liberal system of individual liberty is a more appropriate 
response to pluralism. My aim, rather, is to see what sorts of reasons liberals can give to 
defend their commitment to individual liberty. The ‘Obvious Lesson’ of the Wars of Religion 
is that diverse religions need to tolerate each other . It is less obvious why we must tolerate 
dissent within religious (or ethnic community).”146 
Although Kymicka’s  avowal provides me an appropriate point of departure for my chapter to 
explore and answer the issue of the individual’s autonomy within “community”, I do feel the 
need to address and correct an ill-founded argument in his essay, before I embark further on 
the issue of “individual’s autonomy” in “community”.  
 According to will Kymlicka, this “…second model of toleration…is based on group rights 
rather than individual liberty.”147 The way he conceives the “Millet System” is from the angle 
of  “rights system”. However, the Millet system in itself has nothing to do with a “group 
rights model” or any other rights models, since it was never been the purpose or the aim of the 
“millet system” to endorse a certain right148. In the contrary, the Millet system was an 
alternative governance system enabling certain groups or community to govern themselves 
based on “groups autonomy” rather than on the “ (individual)rights model”. 
 The angle from which he perceives the Millet system, is, as he mentions, from the “group 
rights model”. What the Millet system has facilitated in the Ottoman Empire was the group or 
community autonomy and was not aimed at attaching any right to anybody. Because the 
whole system was not based on a “rights model”. This is why his starting point is rather ill-
founded, but understandable form his Liberal standpoint.  
 But nevertheless, the questions from his essay still remains, how can liberalism defend the 
rights of the individual, while at the same time providing the most probable autonomy for the 
groups/community? In other words, how can liberalism go hand in hand with pluralism?   
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4.1.2 Problem statement 
 
As stated in the introduction my main ‘problem’ in this chapter, which I want to tackle is, how 
the position of the individual can be safeguarded in the “Community and Law” approach?  
 
4.1.3 Outline 
 
The structure of my argumentation is twofold. First I will provide an answer from the liberal 
perspective, and secondly from the associational perspective.  
 From the Liberal perspective, I will argue that John Stuart Mill’s Harm-Principle provides 
sufficient safeguard to protect individuals against unnecessary harm against others. The 
Harm-Principle, I will argue, has two dimensions. The first and the main dimension lies in the 
roots of the political philosophy itself, namely, the demarcation of  the realm of the state and 
that of the society. I will call this “society’s autonomy”. By way “society’s autonomy”, the 
individual will be protected against any intervention from the state. This dimension is what I 
will cal a passive one; the state has to refrain from acting. 
On the other hand, another problem erupts namely, what about the individual’s autonomy 
within the society? How can we maintain individual’s autonomy within (oppressive) society? 
In order to maintain “individual’s autonomy”, the state has to act ‘actively’ in order to protect 
the individual. But the question we are faced with is, when the state should intervene in the 
protection of the individual? In other words, how should the state balance between the both 
‘active’ and ‘passive’ dimension of the “Harm Principle”?  
Since it is unfeasible to find appropriate ways for absolute protection of individual liberty 
with the Harm-principle,  the aim is found ways of the utmost protection of individuals.   
In my second argument I will claim that associationalism, departing from Aristotelian 
“individual as social animal”, emphasises on the individual as a social being. In this respect, 
the individual as such is not being discarded to the existence of the group according to 
assocationalist. In the contrary, they argue that all these associations and communities are 
ways in which the individual unfolds himself. Without these associations and communities, 
the individual cannot exist. They argue that despite the fact the individual retains its 
individuality, in a way, as a social being an individual has to make concession for his own 
sake depending on the associations or communities he is a member of.  
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 After a brief introduction into associationalism, I will try to analyse two versions of the 
individual within associationalism, namely that which represents the German Tradition, Otto 
von Gierke and that of the British tradition (of English/Political Pluralism) Harold Laski.  
 
4.2The Harm-Principle  
 
4.2.1 Introduction into the Harm-Principle 
 
“The subject of this Essay is not the so-called Liberty, of the Will, so unfortunately 
opposed to the misnamed doctrine of Philosophical Necessity: but Civil, or Social Liberty: the 
nature and limits of the power which can be legitimately exercised by society over the 
individual. A question seldom stated, and hardly ever discussed, in general terms, but which 
profoundly' influences the practical controversies of the age by its latent presence, and is 
likely soon to make itself recognised as the vital question of the future. It is so far from being 
new, that, in a certain sense, it has divided mankind. Almost from the remotest ages: but in the 
stage of process into which the more closed portions of the species have now entered, it 
presents itself under new conditions, and requires a different and more fundamental 
treatment.”149 
 
“The struggle between Liberty and Authority is the most conspicuous feature in the 
proportions of history with which we are earliest familiar, particularly in that of Greece, 
Rome. and England. But in old times this contest was between subjects, or some classes of 
subjects, and the Government. By liberty, was meant protection against the tyrant of the 
political rulers.” 
 
The peculiarity and the essence of the Harm principle is being emphasised by these two 
phrases of John Stuart Mill. On the one hand the harm principle is the evolutionary 
consequence in political philosophy, which has concentrated along centuries, in trying to find 
appropriate means to strike a balance in the relationship between the state and the society. 
How far can the state go in  intervening in society? When should the state act and when 
refrain from action? How far should the influence of the state go regarding the governance of 
the society? This is what one could call “social autonomy”.  
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 Another aspects that result from the above quoted phrase of Mill, is, when the autonomy of 
the society is being acknowledged, how far than might their influence go in respect to the 
individuals?  Or in another words, when should the state intervene when the individual gets 
oppressed somehow by the society? One could consider this aspect as an exception on the first 
paragraph. 
 Yet, this paragraph is aimed at elaborating and emphasising on these two aspects of what is 
called the harm principle, namely the “social autonomy” and the “individual autonomy”. 
While the first dimension clearly stresses the abstention of the state for any intervention in 
society, the second dimension, focuses on the other hand in intervening in the society, only 
when harm is caused on the individual.  
 The whole subject of the Harm principle is broad and there exist a vats literature on this 
issue. Instead of dwelling too much in this literature and getting dragged  away, I want to 
claim two things.  
The first one is that “social autonomy” (which is protected by passive dimension of the harm 
principle) as the driving force for a progressive society, constitutes the cornerstone of Mill’s 
Political Philosophy, and more in particular his conception of “harm principle”. I will argue 
that “ social autonomy” is composed of “social organism” and secondly “utilitarian ethics”. 
The relationship between “social organism” and “utilitarian ethics” are like flesh and bones. 
While the “ social organism” describes the “social framework” the utilitarian ethics emphasise 
on the values that keep individuals connected as a social being. 
 
 
4.2.2 The Passive Dimension of the Harm Principle and The Social Autonomy 
 
“To individuality should belong the part of life in which it is chiefly the individual that is 
interested; to society, the part which chiefly, interests society. “150   
 
The “autonomy of the society” is a concept which is much dwelled on by many prominent 
liberals like John Rawls151 , Will Kymlicka152, Avishai Margalit153 and Joseph Raz154 amongst 
others. The dominant view which all these liberals share is that the liberal society would allow 
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and acknowledge some cultural diversity in a political framework, whose main aim it is to 
protect individuals. In his interesting article, Margalit draw on some dilemma’s which the 
state of Israel faced with, with different communities in Israel which put some burden on the 
existence of the Israeli state as a liberal society. The orthodox Jews on the one hand and the 
Israeli Arabs on the other hand, have their own “legitimate “ ground to oppose the Israeli 
state, while at the same time it is the same state who has to acknowledge their communal 
freedom. 
 So, the question that arises in the liberal state is how far this so called ”social autonomy” 
should reach. This has consequently triggered a whole range of a discipline on its own. I will 
not go into detail of the limits of the liberal state and the way or the mechanism that can 
contribute to this accommodation of the existence of the liberal state with “a social 
autonomy”.  But on the other hand, they do support the claim that “social autonomy” is a 
determined factor in Millian Philosophy.  
 Instead, I want to emphasize on the importance of the social autonomy as an important 
element and part of the “harm principle”. In this paragraph, I want to confine myself to the 
argument that one aspect of the harm principle is the upholding and protecting the social 
autonomy against the state intervention. The “society” being made up of individuals, has to be 
protected against the state and as such, which  the society fulfills in the initial phase. It is only 
in the second phase, namely when the society starts to be oppressive against it citizens that we 
reach a phase in which the intervention of the state is required, which I will deal in the second 
paragraph. 
  
4.2.2.1 “Social organism” and “Social Autonomy” 
 
The “social autonomy” in John Stuart Mill’s  theory is comprised of two components. One 
lies in the theory of perceiving society as an “organism” and the other one is the “utilitarian 
ethics.” Both components are driven by the same goal, namely to achieve progress in society. 
Progress is been considered by Mill as the solely end goal to which the society should 
move.155  
While “social organism” depicts the own dynamics of the society which is the result of their 
own peculiar framework. “Utilitarian ethics” explains on the other hand the moral guidelines 
to progress, which the individuals should adhere in a society.  
                                                 
155 Progress is conceived in its negative from as  “not falling back”, see On Representative government, Ch.1 
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First of all, the notion of ‘organism’ gives us the context in which we can place and 
comprehend the different notions he is using in political theory, like ‘individuality’, ‘society’ 
or ‘nationality’.  It gives us above all, the scope in which we can unravel how the 
‘mechanism’ of ‘motion’ or ‘progress’ works.  Especially, how the ‘mechanism’ is linked to 
the interrelationship of different entities or elements within the ‘organism’. The 
interrelationship of different ‘entities’ is dependant on the common goal or ’common 
purpose’. Or as Mill has put it bluntly: “the consensus is so complete(especially in modern 
history) that, in the filiation of one generation and the another, it is the whole which produces 
the whole rather than any part a part”156  
 So, according to Mill, the elements are relative, if you take into consideration the greater 
whole to which it belongs to and constitutes a part of. As he has stressed in logic: to illustrate 
and clarify the concept of ‘organism’ he depicts it with the ‘anatomy of the physical body’157, 
with its due phases of developments and constitution of ‘parts’ (or ‘entities’). The ‘organism’, 
first of all, resembles a tree, which growths in stages till it has reached its eventual shape.158 
The importance of this ‘evolution’ or the ‘growth’ of the ‘organism’ to its eventual state is 
mentioned On Liberty, where he outlines the relationship between the state/government and 
the society. As he continues to assert that a government “…where their governors should be 
an independent power, opposed in interest to themselves.” to a situation where the”…rulers 
should be identified with the people; that their interest and will should be the interest and will 
of the nation...”159 
 Consequently, the notion of ‘organism’ is being used by Mill to explain social and political 
movements. He tries to create a scientific basis on which social and political sciences can be 
based on and regulated. Being rational means to Mill, applying scientific method of, for 
example algebra to understand the society and make it a science that can make prediction and 
calculation in social and political science. 
 
He mentions further in Logic that ”This preliminary aspect, therefore, of political science, of 
necessity supposes that (contrary to the existing habits of philosophers) each of the numerous 
elements of the social state, ceasing to be looked at independently and absolutely, shall be 
                                                 
156 A System of Logic, Book VI Ch.X, p. 924 
157 A System of Logic, Book VI Ch.X p.918 
158 It is important to note that Mill’s use of the metaphor of ‘organism’ is just a method in understanding and 
constructing future human society and political order. In On representative Government, ch.1 p.4, he elaborates 
explicitly on the fact that political phenomenon is not a true organism neither a mechanism, but the both. It is 
namely an organism that needs (or is created) by human intervention. 
159 On Liberty, Ch.1 p. 2 
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always and exclusively considered relatively to all the other elements, with the whole of 
which it is united by mutual interdependence... It is, in the first place, the indispensable basis 
of the theory of social progress .“160 
  This means that the social elements comprised of the “the state”,  “the society”  and “the individual” 
would not be seen as three different components, but components who stands relative to each others, 
in the sense that they both have to serve a common goal as explained. Thus the society is one of the 
components who is autonomous but not independent from other component like the state or the 
individual. In the next chapter I will explain how the state in turn will intervene in order to protect the 
individual for unnecessary physical harm inflicted by other individuals. Except this exemption of 
intervention, the society moves by itself in its pursuit for progress.  
He further states that: “The Empirical Laws of the Society are of two kinds; some are 
uniformities, some of succession”; or as he recalls Aguste Comte in Logic, it is the 
“conformably to the distinction in mechanics between conditions of equilibrium and those of 
movement;”  “The first branch of the science ascertains the condition of stability in the social 
union: the second, the laws of progress”.  These all belong to the, as he calls, “social 
organism”. 161 
 
4.2.2.2 Utilitarian ethics and Social Autonomy 
 
“In proportion to the development of his individuality, each person becomes more valuable to 
himself, and is therefore capable of being more valuable to others. There is a greater fullness of 
life about his own existence, and when there is more life in the units there is more in the mass which is 
composed of them.” 
 
 
Hence we have to consider the harm principle solely as a mechanism to intermingle between 
three institutions. These are the State, (the government), the society and the individual. The 
first pillar or dimension of the harm-principle is, and according to me the most essential one, 
is the autonomy of the society. Or in another words, the state’s duty to refrain form any 
intervention in the society. The society, which is comprised of individuals with a free mind, 
should be free to live according to their believes, conscience and reasonIn this social 
autonomy we find the freedom which individuals, associations and communities derive to live 
according to their own convictions. 
                                                 
160 A System of Logic, Book VI Ch.X p.918 
161 A System of Logic, Book VI, Ch.X, p.918 
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 The importance of the ‘individual’ to Mill, lies in the fact the he conceives the individual as 
the foundation for ‘social progress’. Mill perceives the individual as the cornerstone of a 
progressive society and that is,  individual improvement, to set the standard for social 
improvement.  That is why ‘freedom’ is so important for Mill, in order to shape the condition 
in which the individual can develop their ‘faculties’ and to generate ‘originality’ in society.162 
  The ethics of ‘social progress’ is called ‘the Greatest Happiness Principle’, and is, as I have 
mentioned above, generated by’ individual progress’. “The creed which accepts as the 
foundation of morals, Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right 
in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of 
happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain, 
and the privation of pleasure.. “   According to Mill, morality is dependant on the actions of 
individual. And these actions are directed to contribute to ‘happiness’ and motivated by 
‘pleasure’. This is the foundation of utilitarian morality.   
 However, the distinction with the mainstream utilitarian philosophy is the distinction he 
makes of ‘pleasures’ between ‘higher quality’ and ‘lower quality’ of pleasures. While the 
‘lower quality’ of pleasure appeal to the ‘animal needs’ of the individual, whereas the ‘higher 
quality’ is a stimulants to develop our ‘faculties’. This does not mean that he wants every 
individual to become a philosopher, but that every individual should improve that what he can 
do or does best. Now how does the individual with ‘higher pleasure’, which he needs to 
improve himself, relate to the society as such? Are the individuals not atomistic and egoistic 
human beings? No, in the contrary. 
 Mill claims that in an order of mutuality, or (dialogical) interrelationship of entities, 
individuals are the ones who comprise the society, but in turn it’s the society that also creates 
the individual. That is why ‘originality’ in society should be triggered and advocated/pleaded 
for, because that created in turn original ‘individual’. And the reason is that: “There is no 
social phenomenon, which is not more or less influenced by every other part of the condition 
of the same society and therefore by every cause which is influencing every other of the 
contemporaneous social phenomena”. 163 
  At a certain moment, the relationship between the individual and the society would be so 
intertwined with each other that you cannot argue anymore, whether the society or the 
individual is the most important element in the organism, since they are both equally 
important. 
                                                 
162 On Liberty, Ch.3 p. 30 
163  A System of Logic, Book VI Ch.X p. 899 
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 All this erupts eventually in his ‘general happiness principle’, where he explains why 
individuals should obey the ‘general happiness principle’. This is because “… there is this 
basis of powerful natural sentiment; and this it is which, when once the general happiness is 
recognized as the ethical standard, will constitute the strength of the utilitarian morality. This 
firm foundation is that of the social feelings of mankind; the desire to be in unity with our 
fellow creatures, which is already a powerful principle in human nature, and happily one of 
those which tend to become stronger, even without express inculcation, from the influences of 
advancing civilization. The social state is at once so natural, so necessary, and so habitual to 
man, that, except in some unusual circumstances or by an effort of voluntary abstraction, he 
never conceives himself otherwise than as a member of a body; and this association is riveted 
more and more, as mankind are further removed from the state of savage independence. Any 
condition, therefore, which is essential to a state of society, becomes more and more an 
inseparable part of every person’s conception of the state of things which he is born into, and 
which is the destiny of a human being.”164 
  Consequently, we can argue from the abovementioned that individuals are not just mere 
atomistic human beings, but creatures that do relate to society in an interrelationship manner. 
The ‘individual’ should be free in order to improve themselves and develop their faculties, in 
order to be a part of a (accumulates) progressive society, kept in pace with originality, leading 
to a viscous circle or ‘progress’. 165  
The answer for this question we find in his book On Representative Government, where he 
mentions clearly that, it is the aim of the government “…to promote Progress.” 
Not only education is necessary to create a ‘social union’, but also ‘loyalty’ and ‘a strong and 
active principle of cohesion among the members of the same community or 
state’. Particularly, the latest principle clarifies us, how Mill perceives the notion of 
‘nationality’ both in relation to ‘social union’ and to ‘government’.  
. We mean a feeling of common interest among those who live under the same government, 
and are contained within the same natural or historical boundaries. We mean, that one part of 
the community do not consider themselves as foreigners with regard to another part; that they 
set a value on their connexion, feel that they are one people, that their lot is cast together, that 
                                                 
164 Utilitarianism, Ch.3 p. 32 
165 It is important to note, that although Mill contains that individuals in society are ‘united’ in the totality of the 
society, influencing their action, however he rejects clearly the fact that individuals merge and become a part of 
the totality. In the contrary, although the society is indispensable for individuals, they will stay as individuals and 
will not become a part of the ‘totality’. A System of Logic, Book 6, Ch.VII, p.879  
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evil to any of their fellow-countrymen is evil to themselves, and "do not desire selfishly to 
free themselves from their share of any common inconvenience by severing the connexion. ”  
 
4.2.3 Active Dimension of the Harm Principle 
 
We cannot comprehend the harm principle if we do not take both dimensions, simultaneously 
into account. Which means that we first have to acknowledge, as stated above the “society’s 
autonomy”, meaning that the state should initially abstain from any intervention in the society 
as such. This is actually what liberty should denote, according to Mill, namely the non- 
intervention of the state. Secondly, we have to ascertain in which circumstances the state 
might deviate from this principal rule. According to Mill, "the only purpose for which power 
can be rightful exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will. is to 
prevent harm to others”.166 This active intervention in the society, is what I would call active 
dimension of the harm principle. The state could find appropriable reasons to take actions and 
disturb the natural settings of the society, if an individual’s autonomy is being breached. 
These natural settings, which triggers the spontaneous dynamism of progress in society. 
This is why we have to treat the active dimension of the harm principle with diligence. Instead 
of reframing it from an exception into a rule, the active dimension of the harm principle is 
solely installed to protect individuals in case of harm. As Vernon has correctly stressed the 
intention of John Stuart Mill, arguing that “Given that Mill wanted to restrict the scope of 
state action and that he believed that the state should prevent harm, what could be more 
natural than the conclusion that he wanted to restrict the range of the idea of harm? But what 
displays the mythical basis of this reading is that Mill did not restrict the range of harm”167 
The harm principle, so Vernon argues, is not invented to allow the state to take actions for the 
sake of anything ideal like, liberty or harm and the like. If one reads the active dimension of 
the harm principle with the previous passive dimension, one would understand that the state 
has first the obligation to refrain form action and only to act when it is necessary. Otherwise, 
as Vernon further, stressed ”if we expect a harm principle to tell us what Mill thinks should 
and should not be prohibited, we will be bitterly disappointed by what follows in his essay, 
for no known definition of ‘harm’ captures and excludes the cases which Mill apparently 
wants to capture and exclude.”168 
                                                 
166 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, p.223; A. Epstein, The Harm Principle And How It Grew Richard, The 
University of Toronto Law Journal, Vol. 45, No. 4 (Autumn, 1995), pp. 369-417; 
167 Richard Vernon, John Stuart Mill and Pornography, Ethics, Volume 106, Issue 3 (April, 1996) p.626 
168 Idem 
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 Personally I am in tune with Vernon and also believe that the harm principle would only be 
applied for urgent and limited cases, where the individual is in duress from his environment or 
other individuals. This brings us to the question: how? 
 Yet, this issue is taken up elaborately by Joel Feinberg169, where he tried to reconceptualize 
harm principle in such a way that it can be employed for concrete case, notably criminal law. 
However, before I embark briefly on Feinberg’s analyses I cannot continue further without 
stressing my disapproval of his analyses, for the same reasons I have quoted Vernon.  But 
Feinberg does address important issues of facts which might be a nice beginning to 
commence on illustrating with kind what kind of question we might deal with when talking 
about harm principle.  
In his  celebrated book The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law, Feinberg outlined the 
guidelines in which the “harm principle” could unfold into concrete principles which can be 
employed in criminal law matters. His principle of “set-back of interest“ clause, forms the 
foundation for further elaboration on whether or not, and to which cases harm principle 
should apply. The “set-back of interest” clause, amounts to framing anything as harmful, the 
moment it infringes or reduces another’s interest in something. Although, still rather broad in 
its outset, it made the harm principle more tangible in concrete matters.  
 As Hamish Sterward pointed out, it is not Feinbergs inclination to keep the harm principle 
broad in the contrary, in Steward’s words: “But Feinberg does not argue that every set-back to 
interests should count as a reason for criminalization; instead, he imposes the following 
limit on the scope of the harm principle 
1. The Harm Principle: It is always a good reason in support of penal legislation that it 
would probably be effective in preventing (eliminating, reducing) harm to persons 
other than the actor (the one prohibited from acting) and there is probably no other 
means that is equally effective at no greater cost to other values. 
2. The Offense Principle: It is always a good reason in support of a proposed criminal 
prohibition that it is probably necessary to prevent serious offense to persons other 
than the actor and would probably be an effective means to that end if enacted.”170 
In practice this outline would amount to unworkable dwellings into what would cause a harm 
and what not. To illustrate this I would like to recall John Gardner’s171, example of rape. He 
                                                 
169 Joel Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law (New York: Oxford University Press 1984); Joel 
Feinberg, Harm to Others 
170 Hamish Stewart The Limits of the Harm Principle Criminal Law and Philosophy (2010) 4, p.22 
171 John Gardner and Stephen Shute, ‘‘The Wrongness of Rape,’’ in Jeremy 
Horder (ed.), Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence, Fourth Series (Oxford: Oxford University 
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argued together with Shute, that rape in essence, does not necessary has to lead to harm. 
Because they argue that rape might be harmless, if the victim gets drugged or with other 
means. But still they argue that it would be criminal since it cause a wrongful act. These kind 
of discussion would lead to long and endless philosophical discussions, which has in reality 
nothing to do with Mill’s intention.    
Moreover, it will lead to paternalism172, which is absolutely not what one would read out of 
On Liberty. The reason for this awkward situation is related to the “liberal stance” as 
Dyzenhouse sets forth.” First, liberals argue that the state is entitled to intervene coercively in 
individuals’ lives on the basis of a narrow harm principle which permits governments so to act 
only in order to protect the physical integrity of individuals. “Second, liberals argue that the 
consumption of pornography is a matter of private, as opposed to public, morality. Liberals 
are committed to protecting the private because they want to respect a right of individual 
autonomy”, “Third,  Liberals are committed to a right of complete freedom of expression, 
which makes them hostile to any censorship whatsoever.” 173 It is not so much the liberal 
stance which causes the problem, but the inability of liberals to refrain from idealism, like 
Dyzenhause tried to do.  
He argued for example, that this liberals stance is the weakest point of liberalism because it 
does not give any answer to how to deal with issues like pornography, which is harmful to 
women, according to Dyzenhause. To make his point he refers to John Stuart Mill’s On 
Subjection of Women174. 
The problems, which  Feinbergs analysis, which put us through is that harm principle gets 
watered and got totally out of its order frame, leading to contradiction in the liberal 
philosophy. As Sadursky correctly phrased Sandel: “The problem for liberals is, to use the 
nice formula of Michael Sandel, how they can consistently “take pride  in defending what 
they oppose”: for instance, how can a liberal defend the right of individuals to read 
pornographic  books while  considering  pornography distasteful, or support a woman’s right 
to abortion without condoning the moral appropriateness of abortion, or defend the right of 
adult individuals to use drugs while recognizing that drugs may make one’s life despicable 
and degrading.”175  
                                                                                                                                                        
Press, 2000), pp. 193–217. 
172 John D. Hodson, The Principle of Paternalism, American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 14, No. 1 (Jan., 
1977), pp. 61-69 
173 David Dyzenhaus, John Stuart Mill and the Harm of Pornography, Ethics 102  
Aapril1992 533-536)  
174 John Stuart Mill, On Subjection of Women 
175 Wojciec H.Sadurski, Moral Pluralism and Legal Neutrality, Law and Philosophy Library; Vol.9 p.90 
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 To conclude from what I have tried to depict, in order to prevent any ambiguity in the 
adoption of the harm principle, this is why I argued that the harm principle had two dimension 
which have to be applied simultaneously. On the one hand the autonomy of the society should 
be respected. Moreover, this is the main rule which one could derive from the harm principle 
And the second one is in order to prevent the individuals from unnecessary harm from others 
the state might intervention. 
But how does this work in practice. As mentioned earlier, pornography is frequently used as 
test case to test the harm principle. But one could also mention the euthanasia, 
“cannibalism”176, drugs and alcohol among others. What we have to bear in mind in applying 
the harm  principle to these issues is not whether or not we perceive it as harm, but whether it 
is the duty of the state to intervene for such a harm when inflicted. This is essential in order to 
prevent paternalistic actions from the state.  
 It is initially not the state’s duty to impose certain values on the society a such. Moreover, 
this is the essence of the harm-principle. It is not so much to protect the individuals from any 
morally imposed on them, but the state should refrain herself from imposing values on the 
society as such 
Why should drugs or euthanasia be prohibited? Moreover, if someone uses drugs or commits 
euthanasia who will be harmed? In case of drugs nobody will get harmed, until the moment a 
real harm will be inflicted.  For example only when a junky robs or kills another person he is 
inflicting harm. The reason in itself is not important. One cannot say that because of this 
consequence one should prohibit drugs. Because what one disregards is the responsibility that 
comes along with social -and individual autonomy. It is first of all the society’s and 
individuals responsibility, not that of state. If it become the responsibility of the state, this 
would be paternalistic. It is not so much whether or not one finds despicable, but whose duty 
it is to uphold it? The society’s or the state’s? 
 The same question rises with the issue of euthanasia. Euthanasia is actually a kind of helping 
with suicide, because of unbearable situation of a disease. The prohibition of euthanasia in 
many countries is the result of religious and moral (or ethical ) reasons. If someone, decides it 
would be better to commit euthanasia who are the others, whether the society or the state to 
intervene in this matter. One cannot find any good reason in liberal perspective, and 
especially form the harm principle, that someone else would be harmed when another person 
is coming euthanasia.  
                                                 
176 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/dec/04/germany.lukeharding 
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In the same token, we can discuss the issue of abortion. The opponents of abortion argue that 
a real harm is inflicted on the unborn baby. They call this murder to an unborn child. Here 
again it does not matter how despicable this abortion is to someone, but the first responsible 
person is the one who wants the abortion and her partner. As long a they agree to pursue with 
the abortion, who is there to oppose and for what reason. 
 
 
4.3 Otto von Gierke and Harold Laski: The Associationalist version on the 
Compatibility Between the Community Approach with Individualism 
  
4.3.1 Associationalism 
 
Associationalism or as Paul Hirst177 tried to call it, Associative Democracy, is a political 
theory that emphasises on the importance of the community or the associational aspect within 
a political framework. As Hirst explains it “The political doctrine for such a system of groups 
or community self-governance is called associationalism or associative democracy. Allied 
with the organization of public services and welfare on an associationalist model, community 
self-governance would strengthen the roots of modern social organization and make a virtue 
of increasing moral and value pluralism”178. 
Without refuting the essence of the state, they do stress on the importance of communities and 
associations in all daily life governance of citizens. As a political theory this is a direct 
challenge against the mainstream political theory and thus the concept of state, which we are 
familiar with and which emanates from the sovereignty principle form Bodin and Hobbes. I 
will get to that by my analysis and application of Althusius’ political theory to Afghanistan in 
chapter six.   
The kind of aspect of associationalism, which I want to depict in this chapter is the essence of 
the position of the individual in communities and associations as perceived by the 
associationalists. One of the common errors that is being made in  the acknowledgement of 
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communities as a decisive factor in political and legal framework, is that it had to be 
necessarily oppressive to individuals. In this paragraph, I want to argue the opposite. 
Associationalism is a political theory, which has its roots in a true depiction of reality. And as 
such it tries to portray the human as a real being, which is according to associationalists a 
“social being”. Instead of holding onto an abstract “idea” of an “individual”, associationalists 
prefer a more practicable and real approach. 
Associations or communities are established to serve for a particular purposes of the 
individual. It does not bear any legitimacy or existence in itself, but has a derived legitimacy 
of the individual, which lies at the roots of the association. As Althusiuss stressed it “Ever 
more decisively it appeared as an unavoidable basic element of the social contract theory that 
theoretically the community must be derived from the individual. If one wished to remain true 
to himself, he was obliged to cling to the principles that the individual man was older than the 
association, that every assocation was the product of a sum of individual acts, and that all 
corporate rights, including even the authority of the state, were abstracts of differentiated and 
combined individual rights.”179   
 According to assoctionalists, the individual cannot be conceived as atomic being simply 
because they cannot sustain themselves alone. Individuals have to cooperate with each other 
in order to a attain their individual goals. While survival lies at the core of (natural) 
communities, associations serve a particular individualistic goals. Althusiuss tried to explain 
in detail how this cooperation between individuals are indispensable for individual survival 
and the achievement of individual goals.  
“For when he is born, destitute of all help, naked and defenceless, as if having lost all his goods in a 
shipwreck, he is cast forth into the hardships of this life, not able by his own efforts to reach a 
maternal breast, nor to endure the harshness of his condition, nor to move himself from the place 
where he was cast forth. By his weeping and tears, he can initiate nothing except the most miserable 
life, a very certain sign of pressing and immediate misfortune. Bereft of all counsel and aid, for which 
nevertheless he is then in greatest need, he is unable to help himself without the intervention and 
assistance of another. Even if he is well nourished in body, he cannot show forth the light of reason. 
Nor in his adulthood is he able to obtain in and by himself those outward goods he needs for a 
comfortable and holy life, or to provide by his own energies all the requirements of life. The energies 
and industry of many men are expended to procure and supply these things. Therefore, as long as he 
remains isolated and does not mingle in the society of men, he cannot live at all comfortably and well 
while lacking so many necessary and useful As an aid and remedy for this state of affairs is offered 
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him in symbiotic life, he is led, and almost impelled, to embrace it if he wants to live comfortably and 
well, even if he merely wants to live. Therein he is called upon to exercise and perform 
those virtues that are necessarily inactive except in this symbiosis. And so he begins to think by what 
means such symbiosis, from which he expects so many useful and enjoyable things, can be instituted, 
cultivated, and conserved. Concerning these matters we shall, by God’s grace, speak in the following 
pages.”180 
The associationalists emphasizes on the importance of social units within the political framework, 
which all serve a certain purpose. Without associations they argue, the individual will get lost in 
expressing his will. Since expression of will can be considered to be done in one time, but in small 
steps. The relationship between the state and society  leaves exactly that gap, which associationalist 
wants to fill. In other words, the will of the individual has to be filtered, the moment it reaches the 
‘state’. As Figgis puts it : “It is the denial at once of the fact of conscience, the institutions of 
religion, and the reality of family…. And though for the moment this orgy of state absolutism 
may be restrained by certain surviving institutions of freedom and by the facts of human life, 
the words here quoted show the danger those are in who surrender themselves blindly to those 
forces , which from Machiavelli through Hobbes and Bodin have come to dominant in politics 
and are at this moment dangerously ascendant owing to the horror of that very economic and 
industrial oppression which is the distinctive gift of modern  capitalism to history.”181  
 The individual will according to the associationalists cannot be conveyed directly to the state 
and needs therefore intermediary steps. This introductory analysis has paved the way for me 
to embark on Otto von Gierke and his version of associationalism and the position of the 
individual. 
 
 
 
4.3.2 Otto von Gierke and  the Genossenschaft-Theory  
 
It was thanks to Otto von Gierke political that Althusius’ political theory of associationalism 
was revived. As a legal historian Otto von Gierke was very much interested in corporatist 
(associational) legal systems and tried to unravel the internal legal framework of 
corporation/associations. While emphasising on the importance of the associations, Gierke did 
not disregard the importance of the state structure. State, according to many associationalists 
and especially to Von Gierke, constituted just one of the associations within associations.  
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 However, as a German representative of assoctionalism, Gierke was very much influenced by 
Hegelian Organic Political theory.182 His view on assoctionalism carries Hegelian elements. 
And in the same way Gierke believed that all the separate parts of associations are covered by 
a bigger unit called the state. However, in contrary to Hegel, Gierke’s Organic Theory was 
less abstract, or not at all.     
Gierke departed from a “double character” of the individual namely one part stresses the 
“particularity” of the individual while the other part the “social ability” of the individual. As 
he contends: “We proceed from the firmly established historical fact that man everywhere and 
at all times bears within himself the double character of existing as an individual in himself 
and as a member of a collective association. Neither of these characteristics without  the other 
would have made human beings human beings. Neither the particularity of the individual nor 
his membership in the generality can be thought away without denying the nature of 
man…Man can have no self-consciousness without at the same time recognizing himself as a 
particular and as  a part of generality…And in so far as we attribute purpose to existence, 
individual human life is neither mere self-purpose nor a mere means for the demands of the 
association; but we believe that the individual and the generality exists for themselves and at 
the same time for each other, and that the task of mankind lies in the establishing of harmony 
between the mutuality complementary factors of the particular and the generality. From this 
point of view  we must attribute to the human individual as well as to the human association 
full reality and a unitary character. For us, the individual existing for himself alone and 
drawing upon himself is a natural and real-life unit. But we find just as natural and just as real 
a unity of life in every human association which, by partially absorbing their individuality, 
binds a group of individuals together into a new and independent whole. For the significance 
of human existence could as little be created by a mere totalling of the lives of all individuals 
as it could be expressed by the picking out of single elements of associational life. This we 
find, above the level of individual existence a second, independent level of existence of 
human collective associations. Above  the individual spirit, the individual will, the individual 
consciousness, we recognize in thousand-fold expressions of life, the real existence of 
common spirit, common will, and common consciousness. And not figuratively, but in the 
most real sense of the word, we speak of “communities” over single individuals.”183 
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Conclusively, it is important to stress that according to Gierke the individual does not 
evaporate in the totality, neither in that of association or of the state, but exist as an 
independent part next to that of the state. As he asserts “…since human existence is not 
exhausted in associational life, but is at the same time purpose for itself, we must recognize 
over against the state the individual as an original reality, existing for himself and bearing a 
purpose within himself. For it is only with part of his being that the single man  belongs to the 
state as a member; the rest of his being remains completely untouched by the communal life 
of the state, and is the stuff of his free individuality. Thus state and the individual existence 
stand side by side as two independent spheres of life, of which neither, to be sure, can exist 
without the other and each points toward the other as its complement, but both of which , for 
all that, have their immediate purpose in themselves.”184  
The individual according to Gierke holds two characteristics namely one is ”being an 
indivudal” and the other is “being a part of a totality(social unit)”. The individual cannot exist 
totality on its own like an atomic being, neither will he evaporated in the totality as such. The 
individual maintains a rather dialogical relationship with the association, in the sense they 
both influence each other. Without the individual there is no association, and without an 
association an individual cannot survive.  
One of the essential difference between Liberal (Mill) individualism and that of 
Associationalist like Gierke, lies in the fact that liberals believe that individual ‘will’ can be 
directly conveyed to the state apparatus185. Moreover, state is perceived as the collector of all 
the aggregate of individual will. The constituent political mechanism has the task to select and 
order/structure those (political) will in such a way that it can be processed.  
Gierke however, believes that individual ‘will’ cannot be collected and be put in a bulk in 
order to create a “common will”. In the contrary, he argues that the general will (of the state) 
is “… deliberately and intentionally created, and may even have been  founded by a conscious 
act of will; but even then it is not a collection of individual wills, but the creative act of  a 
general will which calls the state or the new state form into existence. There are no 
individuals who are simply individuals; no free, unbound, unhypothetical single wills, which 
could produce from the sum of their individualities the state will through self-restriction and 
self-renunciation. It would be better to say that these humans, stateless for the moment, which 
are represented as founders of a state, were always bound together politically in their thought 
                                                 
184 Otto von Gierke, Das Deutsche Genossenschaftsrecht, Frederic William Maitland, Political Theories of the 
Middle Age, 1922P.173 Gierke  
185 John Stuart Mill, On liberty and On Representative Government  
 85
and will, and lacked only momentarily the outward realization of their state existence. Neither 
the idea of the state nor the determination to realize it could, therefore, have had its roots in 
the individual spirit; here also, the single active will does not appear as such, but as an 
element of the common will; and what we see is not a uniting of the wills of many 
individuals, but a unitary act of the general will residing in many individuals and formless 
only for the moment, which conformists won existence and creates for it a form.“186  
Individual will, in Gierke’s opinion, has to be “cut and polished” in order to reach the State 
apparatus. And this so called ”cutting and polishing” occurs through associations and 
communities. And certainly, by way of consensus and adaptation to others ‘will’, the 
individual ‘will’, will be shaped. This “cutting and polishing” of the individual “will” will 
eventually lead to the establishment of a “personality”. So in other words, it is not so much 
the individual or the individual “will”, which gets the eminence by Grieke, but “personality”.  
 In Gierke’s  opnion “One individual- and this individual not as the embodiment of an abstract 
idea, but as a living personality- is the Master (Herr) and himself represents the complete 
legal unity of the group. He appears as the head ; through him and in him the multiplicity is 
bound together. Law, order, and authority in the union come from him…he alone represents 
the union as such externally and internally…”187  
This phrase is truly essential in exemplifying the difference between Gierke’s approach to 
individualism and that of Liberals. Gierke adheres here to a kind of Hegelian theory, which 
asserts that the individual develops through several phases in human society. First his 
individual capacities gets shaped and adjusted by the family, the community society, or in his 
words “ and “civil society” and in the culmination thereof, the state. The state according to 
Hegel, constitute the climax of human civilization or the shaping of the individual will.  
Hence, the function of the state regarding Civil Society, is to shape and bring them under the 
umbrella of a common, shared goal. This does not mean that the particularity of Civil Society 
is being diminished, but that their faces are directed to the same end. 
The Civil Society is the stage in which personal, private, interest comes together and merges 
into “particular” interest. This stage is considered as an eminent element within the “Political 
Organism” according to Hegel, since it is in this “unit” where selfish, economic and ethical 
values meet each other and try to interact.  
 As Hegel maintains, “These institutions…” namely the “family”, the Civil Society”  and the 
“state”, “…comprise in detail the constitution, that is, the developed and actualized 
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rationality. They are the steadfast basis of the state, determining the temper of individuals 
towards the state, and their confidence in it. They are, moreover, the foundation- stones of 
public freedom, because in them particular freedom, becomes realized in a rational form. 
They thus involve an intrinsic union of freedom and necessity.”188 And as Nederman already 
has stressed in her article “…we may none the less affirm that the proper strength of the state 
lies in these associations.”189  
 However,  as mentioned above in Gierke we do not retrieve this strong metaphysical 
presence of the state.  We see this approach to individuality as personality back in Gierke’s 
approach to individuality. The individual is into an abstract construction of what individuality 
should entail but as he mentions, the individual as a “real living being”, a personality 
 
 
4.3.3 The Concept of the Individual According to Laski 
 
In contrary to Von Gierke, the English Pluralists represented by Maitland, Harold Laski, John 
Neville Figgis and Cole, amongst others, follow a more anarchistic and socialistic version of 
associationalism.190 This is because the English Associationalists carry much of the influence 
of many different intellectual and philosophical schools, which are mixed up with 
Associationalism. The most prominent influence that has put a stamp on the English society is 
Liberalism and the prevalence of the individual within the society. John Locke, Adam Smith, 
Bentham and John Stuart Mill, to mention a view, has all contributed and shaped the political 
arena in England. Consequently, as regard to the position of the individual within the English 
society, it is much more deeply rooted than any other societies in Europe.  
 On the other hand, as a consequence of industrialisation and the eruption of trade unions, has 
marked the English society as well, leading to a strange associative culture of common ideals 
and common movements. This explains for example why the English Associationalists, 
notably Cole (an anarcho-syndicalist) and late-Laski ( who converted to socialism in a later 
stage of his career)had some strong affiliations with the socialist movement. Moreover, even 
Paul Hirst (Associative Democracy)  was known for its Marxist-socialist past. We would 
therefore see those two influences back in Laski’s  philosophy. 
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 It is also striking to observe similarities between Laski and John Stuart Mill, regarding the 
importance of the individual in their philosophies. As the English representative of 
associationalism, Laski is one of the most prominent political theorist from 20th century and 
has influenced the political landscape with his associationalist, anti-sovereignist concepts.  
Laski, as part of English Pluralist, took a prominent role in advocate of associationalism, 
especially in the Anglo-Saxon world..  
Comparing to John Stuart Mill, we conceive resemblances in their believe that the individual 
constitutes the cornerstone of social progress, just like Mill, as stated in the previous 
paragraph. Social progress can only be achieved if the individuals are not being hampered in 
their development, not by the state nor by the society .As he states, “Freedom of thought, 
then, the modern state must regard as absolute;  and that means freedom of thought whether 
on the part of the individual or of a social group. Nothing is more stupid than for the state to 
regard the individual and itself as the only entities of which account must be taken, or to 
suggest that other groups live by its good pleasure. That is to make the easy mistake of 
thinking that the activities of man in his relation t government exhaust his nature. It is a fatal 
error. The societies of men are spontaneous. They may well conflict with the state; but they 
will only ultimately suffer suppression  if the need they supply is, in some equally adequate 
form, answered by the state itself. And it is tolerable clear that there are many such interests 
the state cannot serve.”191 
However, in contrary to Mill, Laski shares the opinion that the individual mind and the 
individual will expresses itself to the fullest in memberships of associations and communities.  
While Mill feels the need to protect the individual from the oppression of the society to a 
certain extent, Laski on the other hand sees a genuine expression of individuality in 
membership of associations and communities. He argues“ first that liberty of thought and 
association- the two things are inextricably intertwined- is good in itself,…” and “second, that 
its denial is always a means to the preservation of some special and, usually, sinister interest 
which cannot maintain itself in an atmosphere of freedom.”192 
Furthermore, “The greatest contribution that a citizen can make to the state is certainly this, 
that he should allow his mind freely to exercise itself upon its problems. Where the 
conscience of the individual is concerned the state must abate its demands; for no mind is in 
truth free once a penalty is attached to thought.” 193 
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 One can argue that Laski’s political theory is through and through individualistic in essence 
with minor differences with Mill, as he describes his own political theory: “It is in fact an 
individualistic theory of the State-no pluralistic attitude can avoid that. But it is individualistic 
only insofar as it asks of man that he should be a social being. In the monist theory of the 
State there seems no guarantee that man will have any being at all. His personality, for him 
the most real of all things, is sacrificed to an idol which the merest knowledge of history 
would prove to have feet or clay.” 194 
Individualism to Laski, would not constitute in itself, a fair ground for a political theory. In 
that respect the individual ‘will’s’ are too diverse and to complex to be aggregated and 
composed  into a political theory. As he maintained: “We no longer believe that a simple 
individualism is the panacea for our ills. “the mere conflict of interest”, said Ingram thirty 
years ago, “will never produce a well-ordered commonwealth of labour”.195  
This also explains why he rejects the state as the sole protector for individual (‘will’s’) 
because the state: “I am well enough aware that in any such voluntarism as this room is left 
for a hint of anarchy. To discredit the State seems like enough to dethroning it.”196  
The reason is that Laski does not attach the essential position to the state as the guarding angel 
for all individual ‘will’s’, simply because the state is not capable to fulfil all these individual 
‘will’s ‘. He explains,  “In that sense the basis of the state is clearly a reservoir of 
individualism because each will is something that ultimately is self-determined.”197 
Instead, together with Gierke and many other associationalists, Laski asserts that “Man is a 
community-building animal: it is by reverent contact with Aristotle’s fundamental observation 
that every political discussion must now begin. We start with the one compulsory form of 
human association-the state- as the centre of analysis.” 198 Human beings did not come on 
earth as isolated entities, but as a “social animals”, who will seek and make contact with each 
other in order to cooperate. And this evolves around, as Althusius already stipulated, by way 
‘communication’ and ‘consensus’. 
According to Laski, the individual ‘will’, will unfold itself through membership in 
associations. Just like Gierke, the associations canalises the ‘will’ of the individual to a certain 
way. As he further mentions, “We represent a state as a vast series of concentric circles, each 
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one enveloping the other, as we move from individual to family, from family to village, from 
village to county, thence to the all-embracing state.”199  
 Just like Vanden Linden and Eugen Ehrlichs conception that the one should perceive law is 
not from the statist perspective but from the individual. And in this political theoretical 
context Laski argues that“… you must place your individual at the centre of things. You must 
regard him as linked to a variety of associations to which his personality attracts him. You 
must on this view admit that the state is only one of the associations to which he happens to 
belong,  and give it exactly that pre-eminence-and nor more- to which on the particular 
occasion of conflict. In my view it does not attempt to take that pre-eminence by force; it wins 
it by consent.”200 
He is shares the opinion that the individual’s will cannot all be represented by the state. It 
requires intermediate organizations, associations and communities to sort of “filtering” the 
will of the individuals. Whatever reaches the state is that which ahs already been “filtered” by 
associations.  
 Despite the fact that his emphasises on the individual he believes that the only way the will of 
the individual can be represented is by way of associations.  Here he denotes the desire of the 
state impose their will and to undermine the will of the individual. He considers ” it is 
impossible to regard the state as capable, in any general view, of absorbing the whole loyalty 
of an individual.201 
 
 
4.4 Conclusion 
 
The harm principle provides essentially enough safeguard to protect the individual against 
oppression from within his own community. As such the harm principle contains two 
dimensions, which keeps each other in balance. One and foremost dimension is the so called 
passive dimension, which has to make sure that the state refrains from any intervention in the 
society.  
 This is because the society, which is contained of individuals, has to be free in order develop 
and move forward. This can only happen if the society is “autonomous” from the state. This 
so-called “society’s autonomy’, denotes the autonomous dynamic, which exists within the 
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society, and which makes it move forward, into progress.  “Autonomy of the society” is 
composed of  both “social organism” and “utilitarian ethics”. While the first refers to the inner 
dynamic framework of society, the latter refers to the moral guidelines of progress, which 
should be shared among individuals within society.  
 The second dynamic or the so-called active dimension, has to make sure that the individual is 
protected against any unnecessary harm from within the society, by his fellow individuals. 
The state then has the duty to intervene in order to protect the individual. In this case the state 
has a restrained power to intervene, in which the state is only able to act, if there is physical 
harm inflicted on an individual. 
In my second argument I have tried to expose that the individual within associationalism, 
attracts as much importance as in Liberalism. Associationalism, which is political theory that 
accommodates communities and associations, attaches an eminent role for individuality. Both 
in Gierke’s as well as Laski’s theory, the individual, comprises the foundation of any 
association and community. It is by way of communities and associations that individuals 
unfold themselves. However, this does not mean that they depart from the same atomic  
concept of individual, but a more Aristotelian  individual as social animal. 
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Chapter 5     Afghanistan and its Failed Constitutional history  
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
“Since Afghanistan has an Islamic and traditional society, the implementation of 
constitutionalism represented a great challenge. The juxtaposition of the rule of Islam, 
traditions, statutory laws and other elements challenged its legitimacy, and these factors have 
always been a test for any constitution promulgated in Afghanistan.”202 
In Afghanistan, many attempts has been made in order to establish a more centralized, 
modern government system. One of the essential elements in constructing and applying the 
modern concept of state is by way of constitution. Especially in the period, when Afghanistan 
has witnessed her first modern constitution, in 1923, Hans Kelsen’s theory of constitutional 
law attracted much attention. 
 A modern constitution has to demarcate clearly, by defining the duties, which the 
government obtains and the rights of the citizens. The importance of  “Rechtstaat”,  namely 
the “rule of law”, propelled around the world in that time, as the ultimate standard for 
establishing constitutions.203 Especially in the aftermath of the First World War, when several 
newly created, states erupted, Kelsen theory gained special importance because of his 
emphasize on the modern concept of state.  
The current constitution of Afghanistan, which is  constitutes the ninth in a row since 1923, 
has been approved  in 2004, with the hope to establish a more solid foundation for a modern 
state, incorporating different religious and ethnic communities within Afghanistan. This 
constitution would be different than the previous one, which all ahs contributed to 
Afghanistan’s nomination as a  “failed state”. Moreover, the question we have to ask here is 
whether the modern notion of the state suits the Afghan historical and geographical reality at 
all. Accoridng to Kandiyoti, the “..reason why we have imposed the modern political notion 
of the state on Afghanistan is not because of the need the international, global order has in the 
establishment of state structures, instead of something normal.”204 
 In this essay, I want to confine myself to the legal framework of Afghanistan and the 
complex legal environment, which these different constitutions have created and contributed 
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to Afghanistan’s nomination as a “failed state”. I will not go deep in the historical and 
anthropological foundation, but will emphasize on the complexity of the legal framework. 
More in particular, I want to claim that the ambitious plan of imposing a centralist state 
system rendered a dead end in Afghanistan ambition to establish modern state system. 
Integrating different (local/religious) legal systems in a more unitary, centralist, constitutional 
framework of Afghanistan is the foundation of a “state in failure”. And as long as this reality 
of the Afghan geography and demography, which is incompatible with the modern notion of 
state, is being ignored, the Afghan state will, paradoxically enough, always be remembered as 
a failed state.  
 In this essay I like to emphasize on the paradoxical situation of Legal Pluralism in 
Afghanistan. The issue here at stake is that Legal Pluralism, which asserts the existence of 
different legal systems with a geographical/political unity, does exist in Afghanistan, but in its 
“weakest sense.”205 This means that some of the existent legal systems are being integrated in 
the centralist-statist legal system, but have contributed to the legal-complexity in Afghanistan. 
This legal complexity has been of the reasons which has contributed to distorting the proper 
functioning of the state.  
  By scrutinizing four of the nine Afghan constitutions, I want to try to exemplify how this 
“weakest” version of legal pluralism failed and contributed as well to the failure of the afghan 
constitutions. Moreover, my overall claim will be that constitutionalism, and the in its far end, 
modern-state concept, is incompatible with the Afghan reality. Which makes the Afghan state 
a de facto (perpetual) failed state.   
 
5.2 Islam, state law and customary law 
 
Like the founding father of Turkey, King Amanullah, which is considered as the leader of 
Afghanistan who has lead Afghanistan into modernity with the promulgation of the first 
constitution in1923, made unfortunately the same mistake as Ataturk. Which is neglecting the 
reality of the demographic and geographical situation of their own country. However, this had 
more harsh consequences for Afghanistan then for Turkey,  
The problems rises when one applies a modern abstract concept of state to a country, which is 
mainly inaccessible, even with the modern vehicles. And these people have already got their 
own of norms and legal systems, which leans easily to the rural reality of Afghanistan. So 
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why do they need an abstract system at all which cannot be applied to the factual situation on 
the ground? 
 Initially, it is a quite noble enterprise of Amanullah to integrate various legal systems in a 
modern constitution, with the aim of trying to modernize Afghanistan with law as a tool, 
which is called “legal instrumentalism”, on the one hand, and at the same time keeping, 
having a leeway for the Afghan reality.  
As a concept, Legal Pluralism is quite paradoxical, since it presupposes that legal monism is a 
rule rather than an exception. Or As John Griffith has put it rightly, that “Legal centralism is 
myth. Legal Pluralism a fact”. 206 Even in Europe customary law prevailed on a daily base, 
and regulated many businesses even in towns. It was only after the west-phalian treaty, the 
creation of modern state, the rise of napoleon legal systems in France, and parts of Germany 
and Holland, amongst others, that has triggered the rise of abstract, centralist legal systems, as 
the foundation of the modern state. 
 However, the problem we are faced with in Afghanistan in contrary to Europe is that the 
whole sociological development of urbanization amongst others, did not take place. With the 
result that the people of Afghanistan still are relying on tribal and religious rules up til now. 
The development of the people cannot be regulated by modern, abstract concepts and the use 
of law as a tool.  
In this paragraph, I want to give a brief introduction in the three main legal systems in 
Afghanistan which are, Islamic Law, Customary Law and statutory law. After having clarified 
their role and their functions, I will continue trying to exemplify how different constitutions 
tried to deal with this legal systems and what kind of complexity it has triggered.  And how 
their noble aim of introducing liberal democracy to Afghanistan and conciliating between 
different legal systems failed and constituted the failure of the constitution.   
As Khuram put it rightly by stressing the point of the Jurist report, “…the bifurcation of the 
legal system into an official law and unofficial law has been a hallmark of Afghan legal 
history ever since attempts were made to introduce statutory laws.” The Jurists Report 
concludes by stating that “with some confidence that past experience would suggest that any 
attempt to implement and enforce secular statutory laws which depart from customary and/or 
Islamic law is liable to be met with protest and civil unrest.” 207This statement will be the 
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guiding line throughout my paper. 
 
5.2.1 Islamic Law (Sharia): 
 
Sharia is a religious legal system based on the Islamic Koran and the sayings of the Prophet 
Mohammed, which is called the Sunnah. Ths scope of Sharia ranges between public sphere to 
private sphere, such as hygene, social matters, marriage, contract, finance. Islamic law is 
being distinguished betwene Fiqh, which means jurisprudence, and Sharia, legal principles, or 
law.  
 The main distinction in Sharia exists between different shcools of interpretation and between 
different streams. First of all, Islam is divided debtween Shiites, who believe that the 
Prophet’s son in Law Ali is his rightfull preceder, the Sunniites believed in the Caliph. 
Furthermore, within the Sunnites Islamic law has been divided into several schools, like the 
Shafi, Hanafi, Hanbali and Maliki Schools. Whereas, the Shiites adhere to the All these 
divisions in Sharia Schools make a unitary applictaion and intrepretation of Sharia rules much 
more complicated than it already is. 
 
 
5.2.2 Customary Law (Pashtunwali): 
 
The Afghan Customary Law is known as the and is related to the ethnic tribe of the Pashtun’s. 
This customary law dates back to the ancient Arian ethnic tribe and has a solid base in the 
Afghan region and intertwined with the geographical surrounding. Therefore the Afghans 
rather rely to their tribes208  and customary law then to even Islamic or any other Legal 
regimes. Although, the Islamic law will comes as close second.  
The afghans perceive the Pashtunwali and the Islamic law as two distinct legal systems. In 
daily life they are allowed to choose which law they want to apply to the particular case. 
A Pashtunwali is whole set of rules based on tradition/custom, with its own court system, 
organs and procedures. The formal structure of the Pashtunwali and the material structure 
resemble theunderpinnings of the geography and the historical and cultural layers. 
It is essential to stress that the Pashtunwali is not just a customary law, although it has an oral 
tradition instead of a written one, but it plays also a very eminent role in the daily life of the 
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Pashtun and regulates also the relationships with other tribes and even ethnic groups. In this 
sense the influence of Pashtunwali reaches far beyond its presupposed scope and constitutes 
actually the heart of the Afghan society. 
 The essence of Pashtunwali appears clearly when we elaborate on the formal structure of the 
Pashtunwali of which the Jirgas constitutes the main foundation. Jirga’s are a kind of 
councils, which settles disputes among members within tribes or between tribes. The history 
of the  
Jirgas dates back to the period when Jirgas where known as peace missions, stressing the core 
job it had in dispute settlements.  
The construction of the Jirga is aimed at the solution of disputes, based on a long term 
perspective. This approach is rather contrary to our modern notion of justice, which is more 
linked to retribution. Since dispute settlement wants to restore the mistrust and therefore the 
break within or among the tribes, cureing scratches requires totally different approach then the 
one we have in our modern legal system. Consequently this role of the Jirgas as a council that 
settles disputes, or peace mission, earned a lot of respect and legitimacy among people. With 
the result that the decision of the Jirgas are regarded by the Afghans and they condemn those 
who do not accept.209 
The Jirgas consists of wise men who have earned their reputation by their behavior and 
position they acquired within the tribe. Their say in the Jirga is equally unrewarded their 
position within the the tribe. When a dispute reaches the the Jiirga, the parties have to pay a 
certain amount of money, which is called Baramta  or  Machilgha, which is a kind of a Legal 
guarantee. This guarantee will either be kept by the Jirga members or be given to the other 
party, when one of the parties declined to obey the decision of the Jirga. The decisions of the 
Jirgas are based on prior decision, similar to the system of the precedents in the common Law 
countries and is called Tslelay. Tselay also means decisions.210 However the party has also the 
possibility to appeal to the decision which is called Takhm. The non-obedience to the decision 
of the Takhm will be punished  
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5.3 Statutory law:  
 
The modern statutory law entered the Afghan Legal landscape just after the promulgation of 
the first constitution in 1923 by king Amanullah. This period is also called the Nizamnama 
period. The Pre-Nizamnama period is characterized by statutory law that either clarifies the 
Islamic rules of the Sharia or give guidelines to courts in how to make decision in certain 
issues. 
 Islam does not preclude statutory enactments, it only limits the enactment by giving 
guidelines in  which area enactments are possible. So essentially Islam does not exclude 
human legislation, it only limits its scope and guides it along the right lines. The areas in 
which human legislation is allowed are enactments dealing with interpretation of the Islamic 
rules, analogy and inference, and if the Sharia has not dealt with particular issue. Codes like 
Asas al-Qudad  which give guidelines to courts or the Siraj Al –Ahkam which are 
administrative codes based on the Hanifi school in Islamic teachings are just two examples. 
These are not codifications which are autonomous enacted by the government based on their 
need to govern and to ground their policies. This only happened after 1923.211 
The first so called “post-Nizamna period” has started with the promulgation of the first 
constitution of the Afghan Islamic Republic, the so called “Nizamna e-asasi” and dates back 
to 1923. This constitution is enacted by king Amanullah, which I will elaborate more later on. 
Here it suffices to mention that this constitution enabled the enactments of Nizamname in 
various fields of government.  As  Kamali has mentioned  “…that the Constitution of 1923 in 
four ways: Firstly by introducing a partly elected and partly appointed body of 150 members, 
known as Shura-e Dawlat (State Council) whose main duty it was to draft and introduce the 
Nizamnama Legislation. Secondly it was proclaimed a duty of the courts and government 
offices to apply the Nizamnamas in general. Thirdly by enacting a specific provision which 
aimed at codifying the criminal law and replacing  the Shari-ajuristic manual. And lastly, by 
assigning specific areas which were to be regulated under the Nizamnamas.” 212 
The second period started from the promulgation of the “Usulname period”, which is 
characterized by a conservative drawback. It is promulgated by king Nadir Shah, by throwing 
                                                 
211  Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Law in Afghanistan, a study of the Constitutions, Matrimonial Law, and the 
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212   Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Law in Afghanistan, a study of the Constitutions, Matrimonial Law, and the 
Judiciary, p.37 
 97
over King Amanullah. 
Whereas the best period for enacting statutory law was the period that started from 1964 and 
called “the Qanun period”. This quite liberal period in contrary to the others, made for the 
first time statutory law prevail above the Islamic law. Only in case statutory law can give 
solution. Sharia law can be used as guidance in lawmaking.  
 
 
5.3.1 The Constitution of 1923 
 
The promulgation of the first constitution of Afghanistan was very much influenced by the 
Turkish efforts to modernize their own political framework. Just like Ataturk, the founder of 
modern Turkey, King Amanullah was also thrived by modernization process, and wanted to 
lead Afghanistan through 20ths century. Like Atatürk, who was influenced by the “Young 
Turks” movement, King Amanullah was influenced by the “ young Afghan movements in 
Afghanistan who advocated for modernization in Afghanistan. However, the difference 
between Afghanistan and Turkey was that Turkey had developed some sociological 
institutions that, although with some problems especially in the east where the development of 
sociological institutions was lacking), did not cause much problem as in Afghanistan.   
In contrary to Atatürk, King Amanullah realized that he cannot ignore the importance and the 
weight which Islam and tradition has in Afghanistan, and integrated it into the first modern 
(liberal)constitution of Afghanistan in 1923. The constitution aim was therefore twofold. On 
the one hand acknowledging the established reality and respect to ancient tradition and 
religious values, and on the other hand leading Afghanistan into modernity, and trying to 
reconcile both distinct worlds. Unfortunately this would not turn out to be so successful as 
one might think in the initially (especially when one compares to Turkey, one might think that 
it has to succeed) 
The reason is that the aim of King Amanullah to modernize Afghanistan and make it a 
prosperous country in economical and in other ways, was a clear challenge to the tribal and 
religious leaders, who did everything to undermine the efforts of the constitution to seek for 
middle way between tradition and modernization. 
 However, these efforts of King Amanullah are not that noble as one would think initially. 
Because the King was aware of the fact that any attempt to modernization and structure would 
undermine the reign of the tribes. Moreover, despite the fact that King Amanullah did 
acknowledge the essence of tribal and religious life in the Afghan constitution, overall, he was 
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fighting against their dominance in the Afghan society. 213 
 In the end King Amanullah was thrown over and later abdicated, because he resisted the 
claim and the pressure of various religious leaders to remain power. Issues like, stressing the 
Hanifi school in the constitution restricting other schools of islam, or religions, and tribal 
issues make his power decline.  
 
 
5.3.2 The Constitution of 1931 
 
As a result, king Nadir Shah who followed up King Amanullah, and in  order to please the 
conservative religious and tribal unrest in loosing power, King Nadir Shah proclaimed the 
Sharia as the law of the land and made the Hanifi school the leading Islamic theological 
school in the country. Although article one of the constitution guaranteed the right of minor 
religious groups, with the condition that their practice did not disturb the public peace.  
 This one step backward is a very striking example of how political centralist power are 
vulnerable to minor tribal or religious groups, so the religious reality of the country. A 
political can not disregard this social dimension of a country, no matter how noble his 
pursuance actually is. The step which Nadir shah took should therefore also not be attributed 
to his personal standpoint as such, but about his acknowledgement of these forces in 
Afghanistan and the adjustment of political framework accordingly. The next constitution is 
again in this regard a quite liberal constitution and a step forward, in the hope to try establish 
again, at least partly, a democratic order in Afghanistan.   
 
5.3.3 The Constitution of 1964 
 
The new constitution of 1964 can be seen as another step in the constitutional and political 
development of Afghanistan. In order to establish (again) some structure in the rather 
fragmented political environment of Afghanistan, especially during the constitution which 
was promulgated by King Nadir Shah, King Zahir Shah introduced a new constitution in 1964 
 This constitution had to consolidate the state power by centralizing political power, and at the 
same time replacing it by more democracy. This meant in turn that the population of 
Afghanistan had to be consulted in the establishment of the new constitution but also in case 
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of policy making. So this means that the Jirga regained its power back again after a period of 
abstention. This politicization of the Afghan society was again not that easy. How can one 
replace a chaotic, tribal order into a more centralist and structured power? 
 One of the main element was stressing the pluralist nature of the Afghan society and the 
democracy. (Art 32 of the Constitution), but also stressing the importance of equality among 
ethnic groups and religious groups in Afghanistan. Not only did he strive for equality between 
groupings but also between men and women. However, this constitution also failed mainly 
because the Afghan society was not able to carry all those reforms. Especially because many 
contradiction in the constitutions, which was ambitiously put in by the King could not be long 
lasted. For example, by stating that the Sharia law was the law of Afghanistan but at the same 
time making the statutory law prevail above Sharia law.  
 
 
 5.3.4 The 2004 Constitution 
 
After again an era of chaos, war  and instability, which is paradoxically enough the reality of 
Afghanistan, which many of us in western Europe has to accept, another attempt was made to 
impose the modern system of state on Afghanistan, by promulgating another (9th) constitution 
of Afghanistan in 2004. The seeds of this constitution was set in Bonn 15 December 2001 and 
is know as the Bonn agreement.  Let alone the fact that one has to question whether such a 
constitution is worth while after many attempts, but the fact that it has been constructed in 
such a short time does not give any hope. Like Rubin has mentioned in his Article: “But two 
and a half years—the time frame of the Bonn Agreement—could hardly suffice to turn a 
failed state into a stable democracy.”214  
 Although it is a quite ambitious constitution by including the participation of a wide range of 
groups residing in Afghanistan, and therefore making this constitution as one of the most 
democratic constitution since decades, after many attempts one cannot be too hopeful. ” The 
2004 Constitution incorporates many new features which were not included in any of the 
previous constitutions. Islam, traditionalism, nationalism, state law, and all the main factors 
which for centuries constituted the fibre of Afghan social and legal order have been now 
incorporated in the 2004 Constitution, as is reflected in the preamble.”, as Rubin said.215 
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 Regarding ethnic pluralism, the new constitution clearly mentions the different ethnic 
fraction that exists in Afghanistan (Art.4 of the Constitution), and has even made other 
languages like Uzbeki, Turkmani, Baluchi, Pashai, Nuristani and Pamiri official, besides 
Pashtun (Art. 16 of the Constitution). The reason for referring to different ethnic groups, is the 
hope to include these groups in the newly created Afghan state and society, in the hope that 
conflict as has been seen in the past will not erupt.  
However, as in previous constitutions, too much of ambition leads to conflict between 
provisions. While on the hand mentioning the importance of Islamic law, it is not really that 
trustworthy to mention that it will uphold the provisions of International human Rights 
Treaties.  
 The problem we face with constitution is that they are rational whereas facts based on reality 
are mostly irrational an therefore not be grasped in a rational construction, how noble a 
constitution is. The same counts for this constitution which is highly noble and done with best 
intentions, but without having any perception of reality in Afghanistan, it is doomed to fail. 
Otherwise, they would not bother to construct another constitution which be  the basis for 
another chaos sooner or later.  
Delegates hoped that this relatively liberal Islamic constitution would provide a framework 
for the long task of consolidating basic state structures, as the country struggled to emerge 
from decades of anti-Soviet jihad, interfractional and interethnic civil war, and wars of 
conquest and resistance by and against the radical Islamists of the Taliban movement. 
 
 5.4 Conclusion 
 
In the previous paragraphs I have tried to show how difficult it is to keep a system of legal 
pluralism in the constitution, if  the societal structure itself is already chaotic and disordered 
due to its geographical and demographical nature. As long as this nature has not been 
changed, any effort to establish a modern state, and the application of Legal Pluralism, (in its 
“weakest” notion (integrated)) will not bring about the desired result of consolidation and 
centralization of political power. Moreover, it will be the basis for more civil unrest, chaos 
and retardation.  
 As we could observe in the several constitutions, which I have tried to analyze a bit, they 
have tried to include more or less the diverse legal systems in the constitution but they all 
resulted in chaos and disorder. Any other solution like monist legal system would have 
resulted in a dictatorship, with the eventual chaos.  In any case, Legal Pluralism cannot be 
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exerted as tool for the purposes of the state to control, rule and direct the society. Any attempt 
to that is paradoxically enough, an infringement in the democratic nature of the society, which 
is able to rule tehir tribe or community by themselves. If there would have been a need from 
below, so from the tribes, that consequently, a modern state will be created, instead of 
imposed like it has been done many times from above.  
 This is why we have to reject the abuse of legal pluralism for political purposes like 
abovementioned. Legal Pluralism, as a scholarship, is more an observation of the factual 
situation, which has to be maintained, instead of integrating it into a system of legal, 
instrumental tools aimed at directing in “social engineering projects”. 
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Chapter 6  Althusius and Social-Federalism in  Afghanistan 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
6.1.1 Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter I have tried to expound why all seven constitutions in Afghanistan has failed 
and ousted my fear that recently adopted constitution will also fail. I have tried to give a kind of 
historical survey into the structure of those constitutions from more liberal to religious, from pluralist 
to central. What all this constitutions had in common is the intention to centralize the governing 
institutions, either in the short or long run. By-passing the centuries old cultural, tribal and communal 
structures, which has governed Afghanistan until the 21st century, has left the country into ruins. 
 Anthropologically, Afghan society could be called a “complex society”, since the rural order is being 
disrupted by other artificial structures, like that of different attempt that has made to impose a certain 
constitution on the Afghan people. The question at stake is not so much whether or not one could turn 
Afghanistan into a modern liberal democracy, which has always, intentionally or unintentionally been 
the aim. But instead, one should wonder whether there is an order that can be exerted, in which the 
Afghans would feel more comfortable to live in, which suits their custom, dealings and the way of life 
they lived until recently.  
As Simonson rightly observed in his remarks about the current constitution, “Clearly, Afghanistan’s 
constitution describes aspirations more than realities on the ground.”216 Despite the fact that this was 
already known when the constitution of 2004 was drawn, there were probably no any convincing 
theory available, which could concur against the mainstream theories about constitutions and state (-
building) theories. The only dichotomy that existed was that between so-called anarchy (or 
statelessness) and the existence of a state, modelled against western-examples, which was considered 
as the standard to which a perfect functioning state should adhere to. There were no alternatives, or at 
least convincing alternatives that could be employed. This is why I want to make an attempt to 
introduce a theory, which is a serious challenge and an alternative to the current theories about state 
and state-building and one that can be easily applied to complex fragmented and dissolved societies 
like that in Afghanistan.  
However, since this enterprise would take a whole book, if not series of books, I want to confine 
myself instead to one thesis chapter, in explaining how and which theory could turn Afghanistan into a 
stable state This is why I have to confine myself, initially, to fundamental questions, just to explain the 
foundation of this theory as a point of departure. My purpose is therefore to set forth how Althussius 
theory of “Societal federalism” (and “popular sovereignty”) would provide us a different perspective 
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at the locus of political power and how this would help us, not only to understand Afghanistan’s 
situation, but also to establish a least some sort of stability for Afghan population. We need a  theory, 
to put it Würtembergers words, :“Da eine für anerkennungswürdig gehaltene politische Ordnung ein 
wesentliches Element politischer Stabilität darstellt, befasst sich die Legimitätsfrage mit jenen 
Principien, die den Staat im innersten zusammenhalt”217.  
One of the characteristic of Althussius’’ political theory of sovereignty, is that it does not lay the 
emphasis on a hierarchical structure between those that are governed and those who governs, but more 
on a horizontal framework. The government is just another “association” like any other. Each 
association or community holds political power and there relationship with each other and is at equal 
footings. But as well as with the association as the association itself, they are created to make social 
life easy.   
This last chapter will be an illustration of what I have tried to explicate in the previous chapters, in my 
quest to find the answer to my research question. With redefining the concept of Legal Pluralism, in a 
broad way, it would embrace a larger prospect of law than confining to legal norms alone. This 
brought me to the theory of “ community and Law” approach and I tried to identify the locus of law in 
communities. With my example of the Jewish diamond industry I have consequently tried to illustrate 
this theory to a certain extent. 
 In order to refute the general criticism against the “community” approach from the liberal point of 
view, I have tried to argue that both liberal harm principle as well the theory of associationalism, -
which is a political framework that accommodates communities- provides enough safeguard for the 
individuals against oppression from within the community.  
 This brought me ultimately to apply the theory to the current problem of Afghanistan, as a “failed 
state”. First, I have tried to give a survey of a part of the constitutional history of Afghanistan. My 
main assumption was that the universalistic tendencies has made al these constitutions failed, with or 
without applying (weak) Legal Pluralism. In this chapter I will concentrate on the alternative theory on 
political theory and on the concept of sovereignty. 
 
 
6.1.2 Problem Statement 
 
My claim in this chapter is that we need a political framework that accommodates the fragmented 
society  in Afghanistan, instead of structure that aims at consolidating the fragmented structure, even if 
that is in the longer run. I will therefore argue that  the theory of societal federalism will be a suitable 
remedy in case of Afghanistan. More in particular, we have to switch from the Bodinian/Hobbesian 
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conception of sovereignty to that of popular sovereignty, as it is asserted by Althussiuss. 
Unfortunately, I will only explain the theory of Althusius’. 
 
6.1.3 Outline 
 
I have framed the chapter into three parts to make it a little bit comprehensive, since Althusius’ 
political philosophy is everything except comprehendible in analytical way. My main aim in this 
chapter is actually to show why Althusiuss’ political philosophy of societal federalism (or his concept 
of “popular sovereignty”) is applicable to Afghanistan and why it will obtain more result than what 
has been procured until now. 
 In the first paragraph, I will give a short introduction in the political and social environment of 
Afghanistan, and gradually arguing and exemplifying that there is a need to take Afghanistan’s social 
fragmentation into account and to develop a political theory that will accommodate this fragmentation. 
So, the aim of my first chapter is to stresses the necessity of inventing a political theory that is 
acceptable by all social units, which Afghanistan is made up of.  
 One of my argument in this first paragraph is that, by referring to Lijpharts “Consociational 
Democracy”, as a theory that is developed on the soil of Althusius’ theory, how important Althusius 
theory is and can be, for state building, and bringing stability in socially and politically fragmented 
countries, just like Afghanistan.  
 In the next paragraph, my argument will be that what makes Althusius’ political philosophy different 
than what we have known until now, is his theory of  “popular sovereignty”. Instead of laying the 
sovereignty -so political power- outside the society, vesting it in an individual or in an organ, his 
concept of sovereignty resides within the social units themselves, counting them within the political 
framework. In other words, social units are part and parcel of the whole political enterprise, instead of 
being outside the process. 
The order within ‘simbiosis’ is being regulated by mechanisms like “communication” and “contracts”. 
Both mechanism are interrelated with each other. By way of communication each individual expresses 
their wishes and intention. With a contract, it becomes a socially binding contract and enforceable. 
The importance of both communication and contract in symbiosis, in Althusius’ theory is to refute the 
claim that Althusius’ theory of associationalism (societal federalism) hampers individuality. 
 But why should the social units become a part of the political framework? Shouldn’t they be guided 
towards a certain centralizing goal, instead of letting them guide their own life? Is it not better to have  
a Leviathan or a democratic Leviathan, that controls the whole society? Is this not otherwise leading to 
anarchy?  
 I will explain that the concept of ‘symbiosis’, which is peculiar to Althusiuss theory, explains why 
this will not lead to anarchy. And the reason ism that Althusius’ lays the importance on “social life” 
and the way ‘simbiote’ (the participants of this ‘simbiosis’), interrelate with each other, that constitutes 
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the heart of his political theory/philosophy. The relationship between the ‘symbiotes’ are being 
organized/managed  through  “communication” and “consensus”.  
So, to stress again, in ‘symbiosis’ lies the reason why “popular sovereignty” will not lead to anarchy. 
But how then will they uphold order? How will all these social units cooperate with each other?  
Before I explain this relationship I will elaborate on the social units themselves, and just explicate 
what Althusius comprises under a ‘family’, a ‘community’, a ‘kinship’ or an ‘association’. This 
paragraph will only explain certain social units and what Althusius actually means with it. So in a way 
Althusius gives a “face”, a political meaning to all social units, which exists in Afghanistan.  
 The social and political relationship between those social units are being upheld by a theory called 
“subsidiarity principle”, which denotes that decisions that concerns the lower units should be taken by 
those units only. In other words, if a matter concerns the family, than a kinship or a community should 
not intervene with those matters. Every social unit has their own duties and rights. 
  
 
6.2 The Afghan (Social and Political )Reality of the Constitution 
 
6.2.1 Introduction 
 
In the chapter about Afghanistan’s past constitutions (and legal pluralism), I have tried to argue that 
there has always been a gap between the intention of the constitutions to elevate Afghanistan into 
modernity, and the reality on the floor. Afghanistan and its rural landscape had already created a 
century old culture and order, which was working fine and still works. A constitution should not 
induce a certain idealism or wishes, but create order based on reality, what is possible and what is 
available.  
The social reality of Afghanistan is signed by ethnical, tribal and communal fragmentations, whereby 
each social unit has imposed/implemented its own political order. In a way, Afghanistan is constituted 
by small political orders, which are bonded together by mutual assistance and need. Any structure that 
aims at reshuffling the existent order will face resistance, as it happened many times with British and 
Soviet invasions, but also with internal endeavour to establish a new centralized political order. This 
resistance is even elevated by Althusiss as a right, namely, a Ius Resistentia, which I will further 
explain in the next paragraphs.    
 As to political structure is concerned, since king Amanullah instalment and his attempts to create a 
modern Afghan state, all efforts has been put in drawing a constitution that enables to centralize the 
political forces and subsequently to establish a centralized political organization, with its ensuing 
institutions. As mentioned earlier, while drawing the new constitution the parties were both aware of 
the failure of these constitutions and the reason why, namely the highly fragmentised society. As 
Hamish Nixon already has stressed, “The current modernization project could meet a similar fate if 
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Afghan elites and their foreign backers ignore traditional and more recently ascendant power-brokers, 
work at cross-purposes, and diverge from the immense political and technical requirements of 
democratic state-building.”218   
  This means that if not enough importance is given to the fragmented structure and if it is not taking 
into account, while constructing Afghanistan’s political future, than it seems as if this attempt will 
again fail. The reality of Afghanistan will consequently only allow a federal model as the politically 
participating parties already conveyed their wishes for this from of government.  
 Simonesen has already stressed in his article, that during the proceedings before the enactment of the 
constitution of 2004, the question was whether or not to adjust the politics Afghanistan to the reality 
on the floor.  He says the following about this:“ During much of 2003 there was great speculation in 
the country as to whether the Constitutional Drafting Committee would adjust to reality and 
recommend a federal model to the Constitutional Loya Jirga.”219  
Notwithstanding the awareness of this reality, because of power politics purposes they persisted on the 
establishment of a strong government for the same reason as one should actually refrain from it. And 
the reason was because “… the insistence of the President of the Transitional Administration, Hamid 
Ka r z a i , and his allies that in the present unstable circumstances, which are likely to persist in the 
foreseeable future, Afghanistan cannot afford a weak and fragmented central authority.”220 
So, it is not something that is unknown, moreover, it was a rational choice which is being made since 
decades, in order to serve certain interest and goals instead of the maintaining the stability in 
Afghanistan and consequently, of the region itself. But how can we frame this ‘reality’ politically? 
Which political theory would give us enough inclination to apply with the desired result? Since all the 
theories which are at our disposal, departs from a centralist approach (even the federalist models to a 
certain extent), we need therefore a theory that will include all parties within a demarcated territory. 
One of the theories that is created in order to be applied for those political and socially shattered 
societies, is the so-called ‘Consociational Democracy by Arendt Lijphart.221 
 
6.2.2 Arendt Lijphardt and Consociationalism  
 
According to Lijphart’s Consociational Democracy, a transitory period is required, which can 
overcome the chaotic conflictious war-period. Instead of vesting all the power in one party, this 
approach favours power-sharing among different parties, the aftermath of a conflict. His theory is 
characterized by four main political institutions, namely the establishment of a grand coalition, a 
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mutual veto, a proportional representation and segmental autonomy (Lijphart ) A consociational 
democracy is a type of democracy, which emphasizes on the importance of power-sharing among 
different segments in society222 (Power-Sharing and Postconflict Peace Periods Helga Malmin 
Binningsbø). Nevertheless, the eventual aim of consociational democracy on a long run, is again, to 
establish a modern state such as in Europe. So it’s a kind of temporal, technical solution to bridge the 
fragile period after the conflict. In that sense it has nothing in common with the real intention of 
Althusius’ theory, on which it claims to be based on. 
.But still, Lijphardt’s theory gives me sufficient grounds to argue and conclude, how much Althusius’ 
theory would be applicable in Afghanistan’s case. Even if his simulated theory by Lijphardt could 
bring peace and order in conflict-zones, than how effective would his actual theory be in case of 
Afghanistan or any countries like Afghanistan? 
Power sharing, as we have acknowledged and which is explicated by Lijphard, or at least 
decentralization of political power, is indispensable for a stable, long-lasting  state-institutions, 
especially in a fragmented societies like Afghanistan. Moreover, the question is whether centralization 
of political power (centralization of administration)  is a plausible mean to attain control and establish 
good governance. Would government policies not better fall in place when the governance structure is 
split in several ethnical, tribal or even territorial constituencies, in order to penetrate good governance? 
Especially in Afghanistan? 
 
6.2.3 Afghanistan and Pashtunwali 
 
The relevance of Althusiuss’ political theory in this respect is perfectly put by Hüglin, who describes 
his theory in the following way: “Althusius for the last time fully incorporated the medieval system of 
corporate and regional group life into political theory, but for the first-and last-time gave it a modern 
constitutional stability.”223 
Applied in our Afghan example, Althusius’ theory, would enable to frame this kind of peasant life in 
Afghanistan into a modern framework and giving it at least a meaning and a place. The Afghan rural 
life is characterized by customary law and its due model of governance, which is based on group 
formations and dispute resolutions. 
 One of the ancient customary law that is present in Afghanistan, amongst others, is the so-called 
Pashtunwali, the customary law of the Pashtuns, and it is known for its odd though effective way of 
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solving disputes, keeping and enforcing order.224 I will not give a full outline of the Pashtunwali, but 
just enough elucidation to understand and to place Althusius’ theory when I start to analyse it.    
 ‘Jirga’s’for example, are the councils in Afghanistan who have the duty to  govern a certain tribe, 
family, village or any other communities. The decisions of the Jirga are considered to be law and has a 
legal effect. Furthermore, it also functions as a kind of arbitrary court, trying to solves disputes. Just 
like in the DDC in the diamond industry, Jirga’s aim is to repair the broken relations. The goal of the 
Jirga in its judicial function is to solve relationships and declare justice.   
 But “…, the centrality of jirga in the resolution of tribal conflicts in accordance to tribal customs has, 
sometimes, been interpreted as a challenge to the authority of the central state. It has, therefore, been 
considered as a rival to the state by certain governments in Afghan history.”225 
Therefore, instead of conceiving Jirga’s as threat to “central governments”, we have to include them 
into a political framework where they can retain their own communal autonomy, by enforcing their 
own legal systems, habits and culture the way they did for centuries. Instead of inducing them to 
change centuries old order for an order that is artificially, philosophically (analytically) created. “The 
Jirga’ matches the social-economical “social life” and serves the needs of the population.226 
Since they are connected and bound by interrelational ties, Jirga’s main concern is to “restore” the 
relationship. This is brief portray how the Afghan society looks like from Pashtun Perspective. 
 
 
6.3 Societal Federalism and the Political Philosophy of Althusius  
 
6.3.1 Introduction 
 
One of the difficulty in Althuius’ political philosophy is to analyse it in an analytical way, in order to 
make it more comprehendible theoretically. Because by making his theory more analytical , and 
comparing it with other prominent philosophers, we would go astray to the importance of his theory in 
practice. Because his theory is already complicated enough by integrating “peasant life” into political 
framework. But still I will make an attempt by commencing in explaining his concept of sovereignty , 
and try to juxtapose this with the kind of sovereignty, which has influenced our political philosophy 
nowadays, namely that of Hobbes and Bodin.  
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But before I embark on the explanation of Althusius’ Societal-Federalism, I will start elucidating the 
heart of political power namely that of sovereignty. Only then we will comprehend the differences 
between Althusius’ political philosophy with those who has dominated our mainstream political 
theory, notably Bodin and Hobbes.  
 
6.3.2 The concept of  Sovereignty  
 
.The concept of “sovereignty” has been the first attempt to establish an independent platform on which 
a whole political theory could lean on. It was first brought up by Bodin, whose aim it was consolidate 
all power to “issue laws”, in one institution. It was a political theoretical masterpiece in which the 
framework for political power of issuing laws were stated, without any recourse being made to 
religion or any perched theories. The concept of sovereignty, which is derived from the Romans227, 
enabled to establish a theory about “enforcing laws”, that stood on its own.  
The need to construct this consolidated theory of political power, was the result of political fragmented 
environment after the so-called “investiture controversy “228, and the aftermath which was 
characterized by Feudalism, in which the power of kings and dukes were not clear and clarified 
enough to exert the necessary power. Bodin’s  conception of sovereign  made an end to this 
controversy by vesting all the power ( the power to issue laws) to a supreme power.  
 He created an autonomous “shelf” (layer) on which the “land” could rest on. All subsequent political 
theories could evolve, because of this concept of sovereignty developed by Bodin. According to 
Bodin, the absolute ruler has the ultimate power over the territorial realm, which means the territorium 
itself.  
According to Bodin the ruler cannot be bound by any law or legal rules. As he maintains: “Those who 
are sovereign must not be subject to the authority of anyone else. . . . This is why the law says that the 
prince must be excluded from the power of law. . . . The law of the prince depends exclusively upon 
his pure and sincere will.”229 
Bodin further clarifies why the sovereign should not be bound by law, which he himself has created. 
He explains, “For as the great sovraigne God, cannot make another God equall unto himselfe, 
considering that he is of infinit power and greatness, and that there cannot bee two infinit things, as is 
by naturall demonstrations manifest: so also may wee say, that the prince whom we have set down as 
theimage of God, cannot make a subject equal unto himself.”230 
The sovereign conception of Bodin departs from a so-called territorial realm, which means that the 
prince/ the ruler controls the territory which he is ruling. The sovereignty according to Bodin, is 
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territorially linked and is absolute. The sovereign rules his territory with indivisible and absolute 
power. However, still Bodin retains a kind of duality between the political society and civil society. 
The importance of Bodin in modernization of governing institutions, is the centralization of 
governmental institutions and managing to construct a hierarchical structure, which replaced the old 
divinity related structure of governance.  
The king rules his own territory while the citizens have power over their own realm. The peculiarity of 
Bodin is that he endows  the ruler (king/sovereign) the power to rule over his territory. However, as 
Althusius maintains, this two-tone power structure is contradictory since it creates two sovereigns at 
the same time, instead of one. Althusius argues that “Bodin defends the opposite position by 
distinguishing between the sovereignty of the realm and of the ruler. But if sovereignty is therefore 
twofold, of the realm and of the king, as Bodin says, “I ask which is greater and superior to the other? 
It cannot be denied that the greater is that which constitutes the other and is immortal in its foundation, 
and that this is the people.”231 
This so called duality in political power between the realm of the territory and citizens has been solved 
by Hobbes, who has therefore been heralded as the first modern political philosopher, and the founder 
of legal positivism and sociology. The way Hobbes reasoned is going slightly further than Bodin and 
its based on the nominalsitic philosophy, which avows that God has left the earth to rational human 
beings, who are able to construct their own world order according to their own rational capacity. This 
is also why Hobbes has been considered as a political nominalist232.  Hobbes political philosophy of 
the great Leviathan is made in order “to keep all in awe”, for the sake of peace. Because all individuals 
has the same equal rational capacities and hopes and desires, all these rational individuals will sooner 
or later clash. That is why, for the sake of their own well-being, they have to submit themselves, to a 
“god on earth” the Leviathan, by way of a covenant. Only than, so only when a “Leviathan” takes 
power over the citizens, by transferring  the sovereignty to him, they will achieve piece.   
 Since individuals bear the same rational capacities, “From this equality of ability, ariseth equality of 
hope in the attaining of our ends. And therefore if any two men desire the same thing, which 
nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies; and in the way to their end, which is 
principally their own conservation, and sometimes their delectation only, eandeavour to destroy, or 
subdue one another.” In order to prevent rational human  beings to go in war with each other, they 
have relinquish their rights to supreme power namely the sovereign, who will protect their rights in 
name of those individuals. A commonwealth, or a state, “…is said to be instituted, when a multitude 
of men do agree, and covenant, every one, with every one, that to whatsoever man, or assembly of 
men, shall be given by the major part, the right to present the person of them all, that s to say, to be 
their representative; every one, as well he that voted for it, as he that voted against it, shall authorize 
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all the actions and judgements, of that man, or assembly of men, in the same manner, as if they were 
his own, to the end, to live peaceably amongst themselves, and be protected against other men.”233  
By vesting the sovereign power to an individual outside the society, and conferring him the supreme 
power to enact laws, and who is also not bound by the same laws, was the beginning of the 
constitution of the modern state, which resembles as Carl Schmitt said “ a secularisation of theology”. 
234God, did leave the earth, but was superseded by individuals who are rational beings, and could 
control and govern the territorial and social realm by (supreme) sovereign power.  
Eventually, what has been created is a top to bottom power structure, whereby God has left the earth, 
and cleared the way for rational human beings. This was the beginning of positive law, with John 
Austin as first philosopher of positive law. Positive law, was a kind of inauguration, or completion of  
vesting law outside the society.  
 
 
6.3.3 Althusius and his Concept of Sovereignty 
 
“The less the power of those who rule, the more lasting and stable the imperium is and remains. For 
power circumscribed by definite laws does not exalt itself to the ruin of subjects, is not dissolute, and 
does not degenerate into tyranny.”235 
In contrary to Bodin, Althusius places the political power, ‘sovereignty’, within association or 
community. The reason he gives is that, these associations bear “social life” and should therefore 
maintain the political power. The reason for vesting the sovereignty within the society (community 
and assoctiation), is, as he explains, “We have thus far spoken of the first part of special right of 
sovereignty, namely, the right established to procure the material necessities of life.”236As I will 
enunciate further in the next section, “that which procure ‘social life’”, is called symbiosis and carries 
the heart of politics in Althusian political theory.  
In Althusius’ view, “This right of the realm, or right of sovereignty, does not belong to individual 
members, but to all members joined together and to the entire associated body of the realm. For as 
universal association can be constituted not by one member, but by all the members together, so the 
right is said to be the property not of individual members, but of the members jointly.”237 Therefore, 
“…what is owed to the whole is not owed to individuals, and what the whole owes individuals do not 
owe. Whence it follows that the use and ownership of this right belong neither to one person nor to 
individual members, but to the members of the realm jointly. By their common consent, they are able 
to establish and set in order matters pertaining to it. And what they have once set in order is to be 
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maintained and followed, unless something else pleases the common will. For as the whole body is 
related to the individual citizens, and can rule, restrain, and direct each member, so the people rules 
each citizen.”238 
In other words, to define the concept of “popular sovereignty” Althusiuss” explains, “Thus,  
sovereignty can be defined as co-proprietorship by all the society members of the goods and the rights 
of the association. The sovereign is neither the proprietor nor the life-tenant, since sovereignty, in 
principle and in fact, belongs to the people represented by the collegial organization of the federated 
members. The sovereign is only the “dispenser, the administrator, or the proxy” of the laws of the 
association.”239 
This Althussian concept of sovereignty, can therefore be considered as a straightforward attack to 
Bodin’s concept of sovereignty, which he perceives as deceiving and inaccurate. In his own concept of 
sovereignty, Althusius attaches political power to “the people”: “This means essentially that it is 
“people” which will have the right to judge about what they want and how they want to live their live. 
The people, or the associated members of the realm, have the power of establishing this right of the 
realm and of binding themselves to it.”240 
In this respect Althusiuss differs rigidly with Bodin on the locus of political power. As he describes 
and clarifies his distinction with Bodin, “Bodin disagrees with our judgment by which supreme power 
is attributed to the realm or universal association. He says that the right of sovereignty, which we have 
called the right of the realm, is a supreme and perpetual power limited neither by law nor by time. I 
recognize neither of these two attributes of the right of sovereignty, in the sense Bodin intends them, 
as genuine. For this right of sovereignty is not the supreme power; neither is it perpetual or above 
law.”241 
I cannot stress enough on this quoted phrase of Althusius, in which he unmistakably sets out the 
eminent difference between his concept of sovereignty and that of Bodin. Political power should not 
be consolidated in the hands of one individual (or institution), but should belong on that part of the 
society, which deals with “social life”. It constitutes the fundamental framework of his political theory 
of the so-called “societal federalism”, which I will outline hereunder.  
He considers Bodin’s concept of sovereignty as a blanc cheque for a “robbers band “ as he argues,  
“Note the argument of Romans 13: the minister of God is for your good. If he is the minister of God, 
he can do nothing contrary to the commandment given by his Lord. Indeed, an absolute and supreme 
power standing above all laws is called tyrannical. Bartolus says, “great is Caesar, but greater is the 
truth.” Augustine says, “when justice is taken away, what are realms except great bands of robbers?” 
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On this point, however, not even Bodin disagrees with us. For he does not release the power he calls 
supreme from the imperium of divine and natural law.”242 
Another eloquent detail which is worth to mention, is the link, that is assumed to exist between 
Althusiuss “popular sovereignty” with that of Rousseau. Because of the similarity in their concept of 
sovereignty, there arose a confusion about Althusius concept of “popular sovereignty” and that of 
Rousseau. One started to interpret Althusius,  popular sovereignty as a “parliamentary democratic” 
theory just like Rousseau. This reading is based on a misconception, since Althusius’ Popular 
sovereignty denotes in essence, “popular governance”. 243 While Rousseau’s “popular sovereignty” 
succeeded and complied with Bodin’s and Hobbbes’ account of sovereignty, Althusius, opposes this 
reading of sovereignty rigorously. It is this reading of sovereignty, which aims at centralization of 
political power by consolidation all the power in one institution (individual).  
 We can conclude form the above elaborated outline that Althusius concept of “popular sovereignty”, 
constitutes the cornerstone of his political theory called “societal federalism”. This concept of 
sovereignty differs in this aspect with Bodin and Hobbbes, that the society, by way of communities 
and associations, retain their political power. Political power should not be centralized, but in the 
contrary, fragmented. This is the crucial difference between Althusian Political philosophy and that of 
Bodin and Hobbes.  
 As Hüglin concluded, “Finally, through the extension of royal administration, centralization 
of power, market formation, and the unification of law with the state and its indentification 
with a precise territory, sovereignty became associated with the state, which gradually 
reduced local autonomy.”244  
 
 
6.3.4   The ‘Symbiosis’ 
 
‘Symbiosis’ constitutes the heart of Althusius’ political philosophy, which departs from a  “bottom to 
top approach” Moreover, it will contribute to a better understanding of the concept of “popular 
sovereignty” and furthermore, it will be illuminate his theory of “societal federalism” elaborately.  
According to  Althusisus:  “Politics is the Art of Associationg (consociandi)  men for the purpose of 
establishing, cultivating, and conserving social life among them. Whence it is called “symbiotics.” The 
subject matter of politics is therefore association, in which the symbiotes pledge themselves each to 
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the other, by explicit or tacit agreement, to mutual communication of whatever is useful and necessary 
for the harmonious exercise of social life.”245 
‘Symbiosis’ is, to put it bluntly, the way daily life is organized, handled and dealt with by people in a 
giving territorial surrounding, somewhere. As he further states “This essence of “symbiosis” is the real 
life or the way human beings has settled down there own habits and daily duties.”246 What they do on a 
daily basis, is what constitutes the centre of political power. 
Moreover, whatever there is on the floor constitutes reality to Althusius and has to be respected, 
instead of changing the reality based on a theoretical, abstract ideals. In other words, in symbiosis lies 
the essence of the ‘acceptance of the way certain things are’, instead of the endeavour to transpose it. 
‘Symbiosis’ is crucial a element in Althusius’ political philosophy, because it is only symbiosis, which 
elevates or introduces the “peasant life” into political theoretical framework. It makes it possible for 
political inquiry and structure, instead of doing the reverse. Or as I have put in my introduction, it 
brings politics back to the “particularity”,  instead of  the particularity into “politics”. But what do I 
mean by that, “bringing the politics back to particularity?  
According to Althusius’, “ The end of political “symbiotic” man is holy, just, comfortable, and happy 
symbiosis, a life lacking nothing either necessary or useful. Truly, in living this life no man is self-
sufficient, or adequately endowed by nature.”247 The simplicity of political life is hereby expressed, 
stressing  that whatever is out there existent in the social unit, should be perceived as politics. This 
assertion in reading Althusius  political theory is reaffirmed by Hüglin who even argued that “--- the 
purpose of economic activity is the acquisition of whatever is necessary for food and clothing; the 
subject of politics is pious and just symbiosis; its end is the governing and preserving of association 
and symbiotic life. Because from politics alone arises the wisdom for governing and administering 
even the family, all symbiotic association and life is essentially, authentically, and generically 
political. But not every symbiotic association is public.”248 
We have to bear in mind that whatever Althusius’s  tries to portray as “real life” does not contain any 
value position towards “real- life” as such. Which means that Althusius’ political theory is not 
idealistic, in the sense that he does not attain hypothesis to achieve a potential utopia. In the contrary. 
real social life will have its own conflict, trouble and issues. Whatever Althusius argues with 
‘symbiosis’ is that real life has already his own structure, in living a social life, which has to be 
respected.  It is in this organizational form, commenced with family, clans, communities, tribes and so 
on, that social life is organized in several levels. Both these levels, which I will explain further on, its 
natural continuation of that what gathers to getter to serve the needs of others that are inferior. 
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The essence of ‘symbiosis’ for Althusian Political theory lies in its function as to include factual 
situation (or  the community and law approach, which I have elaborated above) a political 
significance. Symbiosis is the conceptualisation of this empirical statement into something tangible in 
theoretical approach.  
The clue is that an order already exists in the shape of family, community or associations, and this 
communal bond, are tied up by mutual (social) contracts, which I will get to that later on. In this 
respect it suffices to mention that contractual relationship according to Althusius constitutes the 
official communication of free will of individuals to each other that shapes the bonding character. 
As he states, “The symbiotes are co-workers who, by the bond of an associating and uniting 
agreement, communicate among themselves whatever is appropriate for a comfortable life of soul and 
body. In other words, they are participants or partners in a common life.” So they are part of the 
“symbiosis”, in order to survive. Basically this is what Althusius’ tries to explain. Because for 
Althusius   “more than for Aristotle, man is a social animal, and the symbiotic life is for him so natural 
that without it he could not realize himself. . . . Thus, this is not free choice, but an absolute necessity, 
which pushes the individual toward the vital core that gives him more than social life: life tout 
court.”249 
 A ‘simbiosis’ is an essential element of life and social life in particular. The individual cannot live on 
its own in an atomistic way. Simply because the individual, according to Althusiuss, cannot survive. 
As he maintains  “The longer an individual lives isolated, the more impossible it becomes for him to 
settle and live honestly . . . . And since the remedy seems to be in symbiotic life, he is driven and 
almost forced to embrace it. . . . If he wants to live in a simple manner, it is the latter [symbiotic life] 
that will require him to utilize all of his virtues, which remain inactive outside of this union.”250  
Because, “For when he is born, destitute of all help, naked and defenseless, as if having lost all his 
goods in a shipwreck, he is cast forth into the hardships of this life, not able by his own efforts to reach 
a maternal breast, nor to endure the harshness of his condition, nor to move himself from the place 
where he was cast forth. By his weeping and tears, he can initiate nothing except the most miserable 
life, a very certain sign of pressing and immediate misfortune. Bereft of all counsel and aid, for which 
nevertheless he is then in greatest need, he is unable to help himself without the intervention and 
assistance of another. Even if he is well nourished in body, he cannot show forth the light of reason. 
Nor in his adulthood is he able to obtain in and by himself those outward goods he needs for a 
comfortable and holy life, or to provide by his own energies all the requirements of life. The energies 
and industry of many men are expended to procure and supply these things. Therefore, as long as he 
remains isolated and does not mingle in the society of men, he cannot live at all comfortably and well 
while lacking so many necessary and useful As an aid and remedy for this state of affairs is offered 
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him in symbiotic life, he is led, and almost impelled, to embrace it if he wants to live comfortably and 
well, even if he merely wants to live. Therein he is called upon to exercise and perform 
those virtues that are necessarily inactive except in this symbiosis. And so he begins to think by what 
means such symbiosis, from which he expects so many useful and enjoyable things, can be instituted, 
cultivated, and conserved. Concerning these matters we shall, by God’s grace, speak in the following 
pages.”251 
To wrap up, ‘symbiosis’ constitutes the anatomy of Althusian “popular sovereignty”. The way social 
life is organized constitutes the foundation of Althusius’ concept of sovereignty. Individuals are born 
as a ‘social animal’, and therefore need to cooperate with other individuals in order to survive. 
“Symbiosis”, however, does not preclude the existence of the individual in the political realm. It only 
stresses the need of cooperation among each other. 
 
6.3.5 Communication and Contract 
 
As elazar already pointed out in the introduction to Althuiuss’ work, “The foundations of Althusius’ 
political philosophy are covenantal through and through. (covenant) is the only basis for legitimate 
political organization.”252 
First of all ‘contract‘, to Althusiuss, is the confirmation of agreements that is the result of 
‘communication’ among the ‘simbiotes. The foundation of the relationship between ‘symbiotes’ 
should therefore be framed as ‘communication’ and ‘contracts’ together, since contract evolves out of 
‘communication’. It is “The pact or covenant is then the philosophical fundament of the basic 
relationship among men. Althusius calls this relationship symbiosis, characterized  by "communicatio" 
and "consensus." It is much more than a contract in its literal sense, not a bargain among individual 
interests, but a concept of living together in mutual benevolence organized politically in a plurality of 
social organizations.”253  
‘Comminication’ is the tool with which ‘consensus’ is reached among individuals. And ‘consensus’ is 
necessary if individuals want to cooperate together in a social unit. This explains why contract theory, 
or as he calls ‘social contract theory’, is essential to Althusian political theory.  
 His “social contract theory” should not be confused with Hobbesian or Lockean contract theory, 
because in Althusius’ theory, it is not a hypothetical contract between the ruler and people, but a 
contract between individuals and social units among each other As Alian de Benoist rightly stressed, 
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“For Althusius, however, the “social pact” is not the result of individual egoism and its tendency to 
make contracts on the basis of personal interest, but rather the result of the natural disposition of 
people to reciprocal sympathy based on shared values. In this sense, his doctrine is 
incompatible with methodological individualism.”254 
Contract in Althusiuss political theory has a different function than in other mainstream political 
philosophies. While the theories from Hobbles to Locke and from Rousseau to Rawls are mainly 
hypothetical presumptions, in order to embark from there on to a political theory, Althusius on the 
other hand departs from how inter-human relationships work in reality. And according to Althusius it 
is the contract between individual and associations that constitutes the foundation of symbiosis and of 
his associationalist political philosophy.  
 Althusius discerns between the so called “Herrshaftsvertrag” and “Sozialer Vertrag”. As Otto von 
Gierke stated: “Althusius legt seiner Theorie die bis ans Ende des vorigen Jahrhunderts herrschend 
gebliebene, ja überhaupt erst von Hobbes angefoschtene Zerreissung der den Staat angeblich 
konstituirenden Willensvorgänge  in die beiden Glieder des Gesellschaftsvertrages und des 
Herrschaftsvertrages zu Grunde”255 The first one is what we used to call “social contract”, namely the 
kind of contract one makes between the ruler and the people. Bur I have to stress that even in this form 
of contract, it is a “real” contract and not a hypothetical one like with Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau. 
Althusian contract theory resembles the kind of contract one makes in marriages between to 
individuals. They are real contracts, attaching real duties and rights to both individuals. The same with 
the “Herrschaftsvertrag”. 
 
 
6.3.6 The Political order of Associations and Communities 
 
Hence, the reason why sovereignty should belong to the association, is because the real political power 
belongs there where “social life” unfolds. “Social life”, or as he calls it “symbiosis”, represents the 
true depiction of how people regulate their own life. It is a place where individual minds come 
together, where by way “consensus” and “contract” relationship are being put. This whole enterprise is 
what Althusius calls “popular sovereignty”.  
If sovereignty is enclosed within social units, like associations and communities, than how would a 
political order look like with associations? How would the political framework been able to regulate 
all these small association and communities? This is what Althusius calls “societal federalism”. It is a 
kind of federal structure based on associations and communities. Before I go further in explaining this 
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political framework of “societal federalism”, I first want to outline the several social units as he 
explains.  
As mentioned above, internally, a social unit is comprised by “communication” and covenants” among 
symbiotics. This structure within the social units is also practice among the social units. So Althusiuss’ 
framework for an associational political theory is as he described “The material of politics is the 
aggregate of precepts for communicating those things, services, and right that we bring together, each 
fairly and properly according to his ability, for symbiosis and the common advantage of the social 
life.”256 
Again, the focal point in Althusiuss’ political theory is the way in which those social units interrelate 
with each other. In other words, it clarifies the theory of  “societal-federalism”. But before I embark on 
explaining how societal federalism functions according to Althusius, I will just clarify the different 
conceptions that take part in this political framework of societal federalism by Althusiuss.   
 With the private association Althusius wants to denote all those associations that came into being in a 
‘natural’ way. Which means families, kinships communities of families and Kinships, but also ethnical 
or religious communities, would all fall under this branch. Althusiuss maintains that: ”There are two 
types of simple and private association. The first is natural, and the second is civil.  The private and 
natural symbiotic association is one in which married persons, blood relatives, and in-laws, in 
response to a natural affection and necessity, agree to a definite communication among themselves. 
Whence this individual, natural, necessary, economic, and domestic society is said to be contracted 
permanently among these symbiotic allies of life, with the same boundaries as life itself. Therefore it 
is rightly called the most intense society, friendship, relationship, and union, the seedbed of every 
other symbiotic association. Whence these symbiotic allies are called relatives, kinsmen, and friends.” 
257 
So, natural associations are relationships and bondages that has arisen due to natural chain of 
circumstances and not by a rational construction, like forming a ‘bakery guild’ or trade union. What 
makes all these natural associations like families and kinships have in common is the fact these 
”..simple and private natural association is nourished, fostered, and conserved by private functions and 
occupations through which these associated symbiotes communicate each to the other every aid and 
assistance needed in this symbiosis. They do this according to the judgment of the chief and the laws 
of good order and proper discipline prescribed by him for inferior symbiotes. These functions are 
either agricultural, industrial, or commercial. … Moreover, there are two kinds of private and natural 
domestic association. The first is conjugal , and the second is kinship . The conjugal association and 
symbiosis is one in which the husband and wife, who are bound each to the other, communicate the 
advantages and responsibilities of married life…” 
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This is off course very relevant to our example of Afghanistan, where we have many tribes, kinships 
communities, kinships and clans who shape the political geography of the country. According to 
Altthusius they all bear a political power, simply because they maintain symibiosis, living of  “social 
life”. He explains that a “Kinship associations--is one in which relatives and in-laws are united for the 
purpose of communicating advantages and responsibilities. This association arises from at least three 
persons, but it can be conserved by fewer. Frequently it consists of a much larger number. …  He is 
called the leader of the family or of any clan of people, who is placed over such a family or clan, and 
who has the right to coerce the persons of his family individually and collectively. …”258 
 Kinships as association is something we see often in Afghanistan. Moreover, one might even argue 
that the whole region surrounding Afghanistan like Pakistan Iran the Middle east even the Balkans and 
Afrika, or even a large part of Asia is characterized by “Kinships”.  
 The way these Kinships exercise their political powers evolves very naturally. For example in the 
Kurdish clan system (ashiret) or (larger) families, one might find spontaneous council meetings if an 
important decision has to be taken that concerns the family. The way those councils are composed of 
depends on experience and the position of the family member. Age and their subsequent respectable 
position is important to take serious part in these councils. 
The political nature and the economical (household linkage) could explain us a lot about there relation 
between (large families and their illegal activities to attain financial means. Either in Afghanistan, 
Turkey or Italy. As Atlhusiuss maintained, “The responsibilities of the family and relationship are 
services and works that the member owes to his kinsman, such as forethought, care, and defense of the 
family and of the members of the household. … The leadership in meeting these responsibilities rests 
upon the paterfamilias as master and head of his family. …  Upon the older members of the family 
rests the duty of correcting and reprehending their younger kinsmen for mistakes of youthful 
indiscretion and hotheadedness. …”259 
A community is on the other hand a kind of collection of families and kinships, clans, who 
live together in a demarcated area. What binds them together is the similarities on the ground 
where they live, language the same destiny but also, the same history by living in the same 
neighbourhood or village, and trust. “The community”, according to Althusius, is “an 
association formed by fixed laws and composed of many families and collegia living in the 
same place. It is elsewhere called a city in the broadest sense, or a body of many and diverse 
associations.--- Furthermore, this community is either rural or urban. A rural community is 
composed of those who cultivate the fields and exercise rural functions. ”260 
                                                 
258 Idem, p.35 
259 Idem, p.40 
260 Idem, p.41 
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Next to natural association which erupts out of nature, we have “created” or “civil 
associations”. He explains civil association as follows:  “Civil association--That is to say, they 
agree among themselves by common consent on a manner of ruling and obeying for the utility 
both of the whole body and of its individuals.----bakers, etc— “The types of collegia vary according to 
the circumstance of persons, crafts and functions. Today there are collegia of bakers, tailors, builders, 
merchants, coiners of money, as well as philosophers, theologians, government officials, and others 
that every city needs for the proper functioning of its social life.” In other words, “An urban 
community is composed of those who practice industrial functions and pursuits while living an urban 
life.”261 
Next to private associations like ‘natural’ -or ‘civil’ associations we find public assocotions. These 
public associatios are crucial, since they are attached with “public duties, which we would call the 
government nowadays (in opposition to state). They are assigned with the duty to deal with public 
affairs, but they are in associational essence not higher or lower than any other private association   
Although the private unions are also part of Althusiuss’  political theory, since they bear sovereignty 
within themselves, public associations are the ones that are externally political active, meaning that 
they would exert, as we would call it today, public functions. Applying public duties is not something 
left for private associations, but public associations, like city council, or village councils, those are 
association that are set in forth in order to fulfil a public duty. The linkage between private and public  
associations are very well put by Althusiuss who proclaims that: ”With this discussion of the civil and 
private association, we turn now to the public association. For human society  develops from private to 
public association by the definite steps and progressions of small societies. The public association 
exists when many private associations are linked together for the purpose of establishing an inclusive 
political order. It can be called a community, an associated body, or the pre-eminent political 
association. It is permitted and approved by the law of nations.“262 
It is essential to note that Althusiuss political theory is characterized by associations only, which 
means that the power of a public association lies in the hand of other associations together. In other 
words, we trace here the real essence of a political system, “from bottom to top” instead of “top to 
bottom”. The whole system is characterized by contracts and consent, from all the way down in the 
chain, from family to the top, which is “the Commonweale”- association. Because the accountability is 
done to the lower associations and there existence lies in the hands of other members (or member 
assotioans), any public policy that is being employed is executed in such a way the order that stays the 
closes to the receiving social unit has the duty. This is also called “subsidiary principle”. 
 
 
                                                 
261 Idem, p.41 
262 Idem, p.39 
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6.3.7 Social-Federalism and Subsidiairty 
  
Althusius made the distinction between public and private associations. While private 
associations deal with private matters, public associations with private matters. Althusian 
political framework comes down to a well ordered political structure among those 
associations, in which their relationship with each other are regulated in an appropriate 
manner. One of the core principle in his theory is the so-called Subsidiairty principle, which is 
currently the core leading principle in European Union matters. In other words, ”The 
articulation of and equilibrium between different levels is guaranteed by the principle of 
subsidiarity.”263  
 Subsidiairty connotes, as Althusius himself explains that “Superior to every member, he is inferior to 
the whole that he presides over, whose opinions are his obligation.”264 Every unit is responsible for its 
own matters, and no unit should intervene in  matters that does not belong to its power. Higher social 
units should only take up those duties which are left by the lower ones. “Politically, the principle of 
subsidiarity signifies that higher levels must always be limited in the sense that they do not intervene 
unless and until a lower level is unable to carry out a required task. This is a principle of equilibrium 
and regulation that aims to keep initiatives at the lower level, and to protect them from being 
subsumed by those above.”265 
Althusius theory of societal federalism is characterized by so-called “subsidiarity principle”.  
Subsidiarity principle connotes that “…constitutionally the ruler is subordinate to the association as 
the constitutive body, and legally he is restricted to a general administration within the constitutional 
frame, leaving the sphere of the "singuli" to self-determination.266 
 The ordering “societal Federalism” is not similar to the regular federalism which we are acquainted 
with. In the regular federalism, the hierarchical structured institutions are administration of central 
governance, which are decentralized. Moreover, they all constitute an administrative sub-unit with a 
whole political framework. One might claim that the so-called Althusian Public associations might be 
ordered in such a hierarchical way but not necessarily. The essential guiding line is not the hierarchical 
structure but the subsidiary principle. If a unit does not need any other unit to reside above him than 
there is no need.  
 
 
                                                 
263 Alain de Benoist ,The First Federalist:Johannes Althusius, p.33 
264 Alain de Benoist ,The First Federalist:Johannes Althusius,p.35 
265 Idem, p.55 
266 Thomas Hueglin, Johannes Althusius: Medieval Constitutionalist or Modern Federalist? Publius, Vol. 9, No. 
4, Federalism as Grand Design (Autumn, 1979), pp. 9-41; p21 
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6.4 Conclusion 
 
The main question I posed in my introduction was how to establish political stability in Afghanistan, 
after many wars and failed constitutions. I argued in this chapter that Althusius’ concept of “societal 
federalism” would bring stability in the already, by tribal, ethnical and communal diversity fragmented 
society. Instead of trying to centralizes the government, one should try to elevate, as Althusius called 
it, ‘peasant life’ to political theory. This can only be achieved by attaching sovereignty not to an 
individual outside the society, but vesting it within the social units themselves. Each social units is at 
the same time a political unit.  
 With his concept of “popular sovereignty”, Althusius tried to argue how social units retained political 
power. One of the elements of popular sovereignty is “symbiosis”, or “social life”. He argued that “ 
social life” beard political essence because it was the true depiction of how individuals interrelated 
with each other. The way they interrelate is by way of ‘communication’ and ‘consensus’. In this way a 
true and natural cooperative relationship will evolve, and this again constitutes the cornerstone of 
Althusian political philosophy.  
 The social units, which he discerns between public and private associations, comprises his whole 
political landscape. The theory of “societal federalism” is concentrated on the relationship between all 
those social units with each other. The focal principle that regulates the relationship between 
associations is called “subsidiarity principle”, which connotes that higher units should only deal with 
issues, which the lower social units (associations) cannot handle.  
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Conclusion 
 
“How could Legal Pluralism Liberate citizens from oppressive value systems imposed by the state?”  
This research question was my point of departure from, which I embarked on my journey in finding 
the answer. I came to the conclusion that Legal Pluralism can only liberate citizens from oppressive 
value systems imposed by the (nation) state, only by way adopting legal and political system of “social 
units”, or communities and associations.   
 The first step I took, is to analyse the concept of legal pluralism and try to develop a comprehensive 
and solid concept of legal pluralism, which I can apply in my solving my research question, For this 
purpose I concluded that in the application of the concept of legal pluralism one should not be 
obsessed with legal- normative rules and focus on the normative side, but try to see it more 
comprehensively, including the organizational-institutional framework in which legal rules are 
generated and accommodated. 
This could be the only solution to circumvent the ambiguity, misconception and the analytical folly of 
Legal Pluralism, which was rightly stated by Tamanaha and Merry. However, Tamanaha’s  solution to 
develop a non-essential conception of law” could not contribute to a solid definition of law on which 
legal pluralism could apply.  
 This is  why I argued, first of all, that it is not so much the state law, but the inclination and the belief 
that law has to be logical in its framework, from which we have to abstain. Only than we could 
conceive law as socially embedded, and try to grasp the phenomenon of law as a part of a whole 
process. This brought me to Eugen Ehrlich’s conception of law, which I have endorsed as a suitable 
conception of law on which my comprehensive concept of legal pluralism could is based on. 
The reason I gave was that Eugen Ehrlich’s account of “living law” embarked from an institutional-
organizational framework, namely social units’ like communities and association. He argued that law 
is a product of the totality of a ‘social unit’, managing that the totality of social rules accommodates 
the whole legal system, but this does not mean that legal rules has to be equated with social rules. 
 After having concluded the fact that Eugen Ehrlich’s account of Living Law would be a suitable basis 
to underlie the concept of legal pluralism, in the second chapter I continued further in analysing how 
community or association could generate legal systems. 
 In my exploration in locating the locus of law with community I embarked on the rather newly 
developed “ community and Law” approach, and employed the typification of Ferdinand Tönnies, in 
tying to locate the locus of law. I concentrated on three elements, namely, Trust, Values and 
Alternative Dispute Resolution as the three elements which (simultaneously) constitute the locus 
where law could be found in a community system. I juxtaposed these elements against three elements, 
which can be conceived as characteristics of our mainstream modern concept of law, namely Logic, 
Rules and Judicatory system.  
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By way of juxtaposing these elements, it would appear eventually how “community and law” 
approach functions and how to locate law in communities and social units. Instead of concentrating 
on, whether certain behaviour is legal or not, by pointing on these enumerated elements one could 
trace the legal source within a community system.  
 In order to illuminate this I have used the Jewish Diamond Industry in order illuminate how those so 
called “community and law approach” functions in practice. The reason why the Diamond Industry 
could retain its autonomy for so many years from the nation state, is by application of their of system 
or regulation. The  diamond Industry is characterized by a system of Trust and Reputation, a Value 
systems which is mainly based on Jewish and family values, and on the function of the bourses (DCC 
in New York) as an organ that exerts the alternative Dispute Resolution process amongst others.  
 After this analysis on “community and Law” approach, I tried to refute the main arguments against 
community approach by predominantly liberals.  
 I commenced this chapter with a short introduction of Kymlicka’s  grievances on Millet systems. As 
an answer to Kymlcika’s grievances that the individual community would oppress the individual, I 
posed two arguments against his assertion. The first argument I used, was that the harm principle 
constituted enough protection to protect the individual against unnecessary harm to fellow individuals.  
 But for the proper use of the harm principle, I argued that one could trace two dimension with john 
Stuart Mill’s Harm-principle. One, and the foremost dimension is the so called, “Passive Dimension” 
With Passive Dimension I denoted that the state should refrain from any intervention in the society. 
The second dimension, namely the active dimension” constituted the active intervention in the society 
in order to protect the individualist unnecessary harm from other individuals, but has to be employed 
with diligence.  
Having developed a concept of Legal Pluralism and having described the way “Community and Law“ 
approach functions, and refuting the criticism against community approach from liberal point of view, 
I reached  the stage in which I tried to apply the result of my research question to Afghanistan. 
 Initially, I gave  brief outlines about the four of the nine constitution which Afghanistan has, and 
explained why these constitutions have failed. My argument was that all these constitutions, whether 
or not inhibiting (weak) Legal Pluralism, aimed at centralization of power, in short or longer run. This 
is why all these constitutions has failed. 
I concluded my thesis with a chapter on Althusius’ theory of “Societal Federalism”, which emphasises 
on a political framework that enables and accommodates the existence of communities and 
associations.  
The social units, which he discerns between public and private associations, comprises his whole 
political landscape. The theory of “societal federalism” is concentrated on the relationship between all 
those social units with each other. The focal principle that regulates the relationship between 
associations is called “subsidiarity principle”, which connotes that higher units should only deal with 
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issues, which the lower social units (associations) cannot handle. The way these “social units” are 
ordered, is called” societal federalism”.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
